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   ABSTRACT 
I am focusing my dissertation on the concept of ‗hierophany‘ as established by Mircea Eliade in 
order to formulate a theory of the ultimately cooperative relationship between the sacred and the 
avant-garde. On the outer surface, the relationship between the two seems intensely characterised 
by contention and conflict, due to the sacred being bound to the timeless, mythical dimension 
and the avant-garde being conventionally defined as a modern movement. However, I intend to 
re-theorise the avant-garde as being much more than a historically and culturally constrained 
phenomenon, that avant-garde — much like the sacred — is an inherent predisposition within the 
consciousness with transhistorical and transcultural qualities. And even though the sacred is 
normally associated with the archaic while the avant-garde is defined by a constant newness, I 
am setting out to establish that the archaic can indeed exhibit avant-garde aspects, and this is 
where my study of Antonin Artaud‘s theoretical material enters to help resolve such difficulties. 
Apart from upholding a dream cinema that detaches from (modern) conventions of aural 
narrative, Artaud proposes a revival of a mythical theatre, especially in his romantic idealisations 
of the Balinese theatre where the playing out of images and gestures is as he posits a process of 
transmutation channelled by the gods. Correspondingly, with a mechanical assemblage such as a 
work of cinema revealing mythical images and symbols, such an idea of radically mixed 
connotations goes to show that film may not be exclusively modern afterall. Film may in fact be 
essentially aligned with the primitive tendency to seek divine meaning and empowerment in 
everyday objects, places, and events — that through the cinematic medium, objects that are 
normally considered inanimate and even ordinary would come to possess sacred significance, 
acquiring a life force that magnifies the object‘s relationship with higher dimensions. Ultimately, 
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my attempt to show that film inherently possesses such animistic qualities would lead to a 
dismantling of the dichotomy between the sacred — which Eliade so insists is a separate 
dimension completely alien to this world — and the profane — which predominantly 
characterises modernity, of which both the avant-garde and the cinematic medium are considered 
by conventional standards to be two of the main components. The films I focus upon either 
express an idealisation of Eastern philosophy — regardless of whether or not such an idealisation 
is directly articulated — or provide an answer, or rather a replenishment, for a vision of higher 
fulfillment that the modern Western cultural attitude is severely missing. My original 
contribution is — not exactly to play one cultural attitude against another, as that would be the 
greatest fallacy — but to discern, by way of the intrinsic film form, the nature of those themes, 
images, and symbols that profoundly resonate with the mythical/sacred imagination, so much so 
that such operative patterns within the consciousness can be considered universal. In that 
connection, I set out to examine those aspects of the sacred that are inherently predisposed 
towards expanding creativity, which is that intense area of hybridity where the sacred and the 
avant-garde converge. Apart from analysing some interpretations of Germaine Dulac‘s The 
Seashell and the Clergyman (1928) in Chapter 2 — or more precisely, Artaud‘s ideas of this film 
that is based upon his original scenario — I discuss in detail specific scenes from the following 
films, all of which break open modern secular norms and enter completely uninhibited into the 
mythical realm where conventional definitions of reality become radically challenged:  
1.) Maya Deren‘s Meshes of the Afternoon (1943) 
2.) Jean Cocteau‘s Orpheus (1950) 
3.) Kenji Mizoguchi‘s Sansho the Bailiff (1954), Ugetsu (1953), Utamaro and His Five 
Women (1946), and The Life of Oharu (1952) 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Mircea Eliade (1907 – 1986) provides a foundational definition of hierophany: ‗From Greek 
hiero-, ―sacred‖, and phainein, ―to show‖, is a term designating the manifestation of the sacred.‘1 
The universality of such a definition offers tremendous scope for analysing specific operative 
patterns within the human consciousness, as well as the ways in which such innate experiential 
capacities influence and inspire the most leading-edge examples of cinematic art. While the all-
encompassing nature of universal structures allows for enormous latitude in making certain 
generalisations with less or even minimal susceptibility to being contradicted, I am using a 
phenomenological approach as I will later explain to show that in order to successfully analyse 
such an abstract concept as the sacred, there are some aspects to it (as presented by Eliade) that 
must be protected from being shredded apart by the disputing of every last component. However, 
because Eliade expressed minimal interest in cinema, it becomes essential to establish the 
concept of film hierophany
2
 through the works of filmmakers and film theorists (e.g. Antonin 
                                                          
1
 Mircea Eliade and Lawrence E. Sullivan, ‗Hierophany‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, ed. by 
Bryan S. Rennie (London and Oakville: Equinox, 2006), pp. 116 – 127 (p. 87). 
Also published in Eliade and Sullivan, ―Hierophany‖, in Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 6. 
2
 There are two previous studies directly concerning film hierophany: Paul Schrader‘s Transcendental 
Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer and Michael Bird‘s Religion in Film. I am not discussing Schrader‘s 
text at length because it only contains brief mentionings of hierophany here and there. I am providing two 
quotes from the text that give a clear indication of what the text concerns: 
‗Yasujiro Ozu in Japan, Robert Bresson in France, to a lesser degree Carl Dreyer in Denmark, and other 
directors in various countries have forged a remarkably common film form. This common form was not 
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Artaud, Maya Deren, Jean Cocteau, Kenji Mizoguchi) who were extensively devoted to 
discussing the sacred as revealed through the intrinsic film form. Such masterpieces — whether 
cinematic or theoretical — demonstrated such innovativeness and originality, certainly during 
the time in which they were produced, earning those artists avant-garde status.
3
 To begin with, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
determined by the film-makers‘ personalities, culture, politics, economics, or morality. It is instead the 
result of two universal contingencies: the desire to express the Transcendent in art and the nature of the 
film medium. In the final result no other factors can give this style its universality.‘ (Transcendental Style 
in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer, p. 3) 
‗The Transcendent is beyond normal sense experience, and that which it transcends is, by definition, the 
immanent. Beyond this truism there is little agreement about the nature of the transcendental in life and 
art…Part of the confusion is semantic; the term ―transcendental‖ can have different meanings for different 
writers. It can mean, directly or indirectly: (1) the Transcendent, the Holy or Ideal itself, or what Rudolf 
Otto called the ―Wholly Other‖, (2) the transcendental, human acts or artifacts which express something 
of the Transcendent, or what Mircea Eliade in his anthropological study of comparative religions calls 
―hierophanies‖, (3) transcendence, the human religious experience which may be motivated by either a 
deep psychological need or neurosis (Freud), or by an external, ―Other‖ force (Jung).‘ (p. 3) 
3
 Nathaniel Dorsky provides one of the most direct interpretations of the sacred aspects of avant-garde 
cinema in his initial suggestion that cinema has the potential to portray the human condition as a 
revelation of higher meanings. According to Dorsky, the fact that one can be profoundly affected by the 
lighting shifting from image to image shows that inner transformation can be inspired by exposure to 
image sequences exhibiting seemingly subtle content: 
When I first encountered avant-garde films in the early 1960s, the works I found most interesting 
were those that were discovering a language unique to film, a language that enabled the viewer to 
have the experience of film itself and, at the same time, allowed film to be an evocation of 
something meaningfully human. I began to notice that moments of revelation or aliveness came 
to me from the way a filmmaker used film itself. Shifts of light from shot to shot, for instance, 
could be very visceral and affective. I observed that there was a concordance between film and 
our human metabolism, and that this concordance was a fertile ground for expression, a basis for 
exploring a language intrinsic to film. In fact, film‘s physical properties seemed so attuned to our 
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the concept of avant-garde
4
 must be understood in terms of the military metaphor which directly 
applies to the co-existence between the undesirable old and the more desirable new — and that is 
the phalanx, a formation constituted of a leading-edge vanguard and a supporting rearguard 
which remains a secondary yet essential background. In the Iliad where Ajax ‗broke a phalanx of 
the Trojans‘5, the purpose of the phalanx is to show such compact solidarity as to possess a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
metabolism that I began to experience film as a direct and intimate metaphor or model for our 
being, a model which had the potential to be transformative, to be an evocation of spirit, and to 
become a form of devotion.‘ (‗Devotional Cinema‘, in The Religion and Film Reader, p. 407.) 
4
 The following is an earlier 19
th
 century conception of avant-garde by Henri de Saint-Simon:  
It is we artists who will serve you as avant-garde…the power of the arts is in fact most immediate 
and most rapid: when we wish to spread new ideas among men, we inscribe them on marble or on 
canvas…What a magnificent destiny for the arts is that of exercising a positive power over 
society, a true priestly function, and of marching forcefully in the [vanguard] of all the 
intellectual faculties… (Cited in Kirsten Strom‘s ‗ ―Avant-Garde of What?‖: Surrealism 
Reconceived as Political Culture‘, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62/1 (Winter 
2004), p. 38.) 
5
 Homer, Iliad, Book 6, trans. by Samuel Butler, p. 103. 
Writing in the 1920s, Germaine Dulac states the unjust ways in which cinema had been made to serve as a 
derivative of the other arts that came before, a derivative in a sense that it is seen as a kind of copy, only 
that it is presented in a different medium: 
Every art bears within itself a personality, an individuality of expression that confers upon it its 
value and independence. Until now, the cinema was confined to the task, simultaneously servile 
and splendid, of drawing its life‘s breath from the other arts, those ancient masters of the human 
sensibility and spirit. Regarded in this way, it had to abandon its creative possibilities in order to 
be cast, as demands required, according to traditionalist comprehensions of the past and to lose its 
character as the seventh art. Now (the cinema) is proceeding resolutely and gradually through 
adverse elements, occasionally stopping to do battle, and moving to surmount the obstacles in 
order to appear in the light of its own truth before the eyes of an astonished generation. 
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semblance of unbreakability.
6
 Antonin Artaud (1896 – 1948) saw the acute contrast between 
conventional cinema (the rearguard) and true cinema (the vanguard) — true cinema which he 
also refers to as ‗raw cinema‘7 (I shall explain in Chapter 2 how this true cinema is synonymous 
to his notion of sacred cinema). According to Artaud, the modern Western status quo has 
reduced cinema to being artistically under-nourished. Conventional cinema as a form of 
entertainment focused upon the popular approval of the masses is so driven by the pressures and 
rapid changeability of technological progress, that the true essence of cinema becomes lost as 
conventional cinema comes to acquire the function of just another exhibition of the current 
technological advancements. Artaud characterises the true essence of cinema with what he refers 
to as ‗stability‘ and ‗nobility‘8. These are terms that need extensive defining if we are to properly 
decipher what he means by a raw cinema completely imbued with sacredness to the point where 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Germaine Dulac, ‗Aesthetics, Obstacles, Integral Cinégraphie‘, in French Film Theory and 
Criticism 1, p. 389. Translated by Stuart Liebman in Framework 19 (1982). The original French 
version first appeared as ―Les Esthétiques, les entraves, la cinégraphie integrale‖, L’Art 
cinématographique 2 (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1926).) 
The military metaphor can be found in Dulac‘s statement that the cinema must ‗battle‘ mainstream 
attitudes in order to nurture any further growth as a uniquely expanding art.  
6
 The metaphor of the phalanx was very openly applied in 1901 when Vassily Kandinsky founded the 
Munich art society called the Phalanx. The mission of the Phalanx was, as cited in Peter Selz‘s German 
Expressionist Painting, ―to further common interest by close cooperation. Above all it [the Phalanx 
project] wants to help overcome the difficulties which young artists encounter in getting their work 
exhibited.‖ (p. 177)  
7
 Antonin Artaud, ‗Witchcraft and the Cinema‘, in Collected Works Volume Three: Scenarios on the 
Cinema, Interviews, Letters, trans. by Alastair Hamilton (London: John Calder, 1961; repr. 1999), p. 66. 
8
 Artaud, ‗Witchcraft and the Cinema‘, in Collected Works 3, p. 65. 
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the art form and the sacred quality become inseparable, causing the art form in question to be 
entirely characterised by the sacred as an essential definition. In other words, true cinema must 
be sacred, and the same applies to true theatre. Thus, it is important to initially define ‗stability‘ 
and ‗nobility‘ as a constancy inherent within the art form itself, without which the art form 
would lose its meaning and identity altogether: 
 
There is no doubt that it [the cinema] is a means of expression that has not yet been 
materially perfected. There are several ways, for example, in which it could be given a 
stability and a nobility which it does not possess. One day we shall probably have a 
cinema in three dimensions and even in colour. But these are accessory devices which 
cannot contribute greatly to the substratum of the cinema which is a language, as much as 
music, painting and poetry.
9
 
 
He never properly spells out what he considers to be the characteristics of conventional cinema. 
However as his film theory and theatrical philosophy are inextricably linked, what he considers 
to be the characteristics of conventional cinema and those of conventional theatre would be near-
identical versions of each other. The definition of conventional cinema — or rather the definition 
of conventional in general — not properly offered in his writings on film is then offered at great 
length in The Theatre and Its Double. In fact towards the end of ―Witchcraft and the Cinema‖, he 
states that he sees no differentiation between what he considers to be the idealistic cinema and 
                                                          
9
 Artaud, ‗Witchcraft and the Cinema‘, p. 65. 
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the idealistic theatre. Since he sees no differentiation between the idealistic aspects of these two 
media, he should correspondingly see little differentiation, if any, between the definitions of 
conventional cinema and conventional theatre. And it hardly needs emphasising that by laying 
out the acute contrast between Artaud‘s definitions of conventional cinema and sacred cinema, 
the qualities of the latter — in view of the uninviting character of its opposition — would push 
itself forward all the more as a means of fulfilling a basic human need to embrace the mythical 
imagination. Correspondingly, Michael Bird presents an interpretation of Amédée Ayfre‘s theory 
of a cinema that attempts to access what can be referred to as the mythical level of 
consciousness, not the mythical in the sense that it is so outrageously fantastical that it inevitably 
removes itself from what is familiar, but rather this cinema extracts elements from everyday life 
to construct a transcendent reality where those same everyday elements are imaginatively re-
assembled. The analogy implied here (not that it is at all articulated) is the difference between 1.) 
green-leaf vegetables that are rinsed and plainly presented as a side dish, and 2.) green-leaf 
vegetables that are dressed into a salad, tossed with other ingredients that in turn enhance the 
freshness and texture of the vegetables. Clearly, it is the analogy of the latter that applies to the 
sacred experience situated in the everyday, as this is an instance where ordinary components are 
transformed into a concoction that is simultaneously special and (freely) accessible:         
One of Bazin‘s disciples, Amédée Ayfre, has developed what is possibly the most 
succinct and formidable exposition of a cinematic theology. As opposed to contrived 
―dramatizations‖ (the Hollywood religious film) on the one hand, or strict documentary 
records of daily reality on the other hand, Ayfre suggests that there is a cinematic 
approach to the sacred that discloses not only its surface appearances but also its inner 
strivings that point to its depth. ―Genuinely‖ religious films, by no means restricted to 
9 
 
explicitly religious subjects, are those in which the cinematographic recording of reality 
does not exhaust reality but rather evokes in the viewer the sense of its ineffable mystery. 
This cinematic realism confronts the spectator with a reality ―in which there is more than 
that of which it is the image.‖ A fundamental criterion for such a cinematic realism is that 
it explores the real by means of the real. It should transcend the every day precisely 
through the every day.
10
 
 
Bird‘s idea of ‗inner strivings‘ has double-edged implications for the experience of the 
sacred/mythical in everyday life. On the one hand, seeing the sacred/mythical in the everyday 
should not be difficult, precisely because the everyday is the area of most familiarity requiring 
little to no effort by way of navigation. In this respect, ‗striving‘ is not an accurate 
characterisation of such an experience primarily because aligning with the everyday is not 
generally qualified by the struggle to adapt (otherwise the process would not be considered 
familiar and habitual); smooth swimming would be a more appropriate characterisation. On the 
other hand, it is left ambiguous as to the kind of culture in which the everyday is situated. If it is 
a modern, secular society we are considering, then the sacred/mythical would be buried under 
such a hard but scattered (as in, not unified) cultural surface. This is the kind of case that would 
indeed require ‗inner strivings‘ to access the sacred that is being repressed by norms and 
standards that hardly even acknowledge its existence. This dissertation extensively discusses 
both cases, fully bringing out the valuable qualities of striving and not striving.  
                                                          
10
 Michael Bird, ‗Religion in Film‘, in The Religion and Film Reader, p. 393. 
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Eliade and Artaud  
     The idea of hierophany as a manifestation of the sacred raises two questions: 1.) Does the 
sacred manifest itself into hierophanic form out of its own volition?; 2.) Is hierophany merely a 
status assigned by an external agent, such as an individual or a collective? If it is the former, then 
that means the absolute sacred source possesses the free will to transform itself into a concretised 
extension of its own non-physical nature. The fact that someone would consider something to be 
a hierophany would only go to show that the sacred as a self-determining, self-directing force is 
influencing that person‘s consciousness. The process of selecting a hierophany then would not so 
much be operated by the individual‘s or the collective‘s own intentions and faculties of decision-
making, but rather the hierophanic selection would be a matter of the sacred channeling itself 
through the agent‘s consciousness in order to inspire the agent to assign something a hierophanic 
status. However, if the latter case applies — that is, if the hierophanic status is externally 
assigned — then the individual or collective bestows whatever significance and meaning upon 
the object, place, or person; and if it so happens that the object becomes meaningful enough to be 
considered sacred, then it can pass as hierophany. Eliade‘s approach combines both perspectives 
in his theory that the sacred is an embedded structure within the consciousness, thus causing the 
sacred to operate through the human being and consequently influencing their attitudes, 
behaviour, and experiential capacities. At the same time, he does say that the sacred constitutes 
only a part of consciousness rather than its entirety, leaving a significant remainder of the human 
consciousness free reign to decide whether to uphold the sacred in a dominant position or to 
occupy only a minor role or even to not be acknowledged at all: 
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In a series of lectures at Boston College in 1968, Eliade declared: ―In discussing the 
sacred, we always return to viewing it as a structure of the human consciousness rather 
than as a set of historical data.‖ This does not mean that Eliade reduces the sacred to the 
structure of human consciousness; rather, more precisely, he claims that the sacred is 
―part of the structure of human consciousness.‖ However, Eliade never developed much 
in the way of the theory of consciousness. So it is difficult to determine exactly what he 
meant by these statements.
11
 
 
John Dadosky observes that Eliade does not extensively discuss sacred consciousness, and the 
implications here are two-fold. Firstly, considering that Eliade places sacred consciousness in a 
position of supreme importance, leaving this concept largely undefined implies that, for the most 
part, sacred structures can be intuited without the need for systematic explanation. Secondly, 
considering that Eliade does not adequately elaborate upon sacred consciousness, it then 
becomes essential to look for such an elaboration elsewhere. Antonin Artaud‘s bedrock 
philosophy lies in the ‗rejection of the usual limitations of man and man‘s powers, and infinitely 
extend[ing] the frontiers of what is called reality.‘12 With the determination to radically 
transform external reality from an idealistic standpoint that the imagination reigns supreme — 
that we should cultivate inner worlds that would make external factors seem like mere 
                                                          
11
 John Daniel Dadosky, The Structure of Religious Knowing: Encountering the Sacred in Eliade and 
Lonergan (State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 1-2.  
12
 Artaud, ‗Preface: The Theater and Culture‘, in The Theater and Its Double, trans. by Mary Caroline 
Richards (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958), p. 13. 
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supporting characters in life‘s grand scenario — Artaud‘s film theory and theatrical philosophy 
provide extensive answers to the questions raised by Eliade‘s statement that ‗the sacred is an 
element in the structure of human consciousness, that it is a part of the human mode of being in 
the world.‘13 Such questions include the following: 1.) Since the sacred constitutes a part of 
human consciousness, does the part occupied by the sacred belong under sacred control alone? 
2.) Or does the individual also play a role in governing the sacred structures within the 
consciousness? Saying yes to the first question would mean that the individual does not have the 
creative capacity to direct sacred structures. If that part of the consciousness is governed by the 
sacred alone, it very much means that the individual‘s original perspectives cannot be generated 
nor developed nor expressed through that specific part occupied by sacred structures. And 
indeed, Eliade‘s theory of illo tempore or primordial time confirms that hierophanies, especially 
those that come in the form of ritualistic activities, are re-enactments of divine occurrences — 
products of reminiscences over a mythical time, operating outside of and independently from 
historical time
14
, which can be accessed by the more profound levels of consciousness:  
 
                                                          
13
 Eliade, ‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, 58. 
14
 ‗The key feature of synchronicity to be found in myth is repetition. In following the admonitions of the 
myth, which is supposed to present exemplary models for life, e.g. models for fishing or hunting, for 
working the land, for getting married, etc., one always repeats something which was revealed from the 
beginning…If man goes again to the mythical event which is being re-actualized, he does not go back in 
historical time, but rather he goes out of his profane time to the sacred, mythical time when the gods or 
the heroes were with him.‘ (‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, p. 61) 
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…religious man periodically becomes the contemporary of the gods in the measure in 
which he reactualizes the primordial time in which the divine works were accomplished. 
On the level of primitive civilizations, whatever man does has a transhuman model; 
hence, even outside of the festival time, his acts and gestures imitate the paradigmatic 
models established by the gods and the mythical ancestors. But this imitation is likely to 
become less and less accurate. The model is likely to be distorted or even forgotten. It is 
the periodical reactualizations of the divine acts — in short, the religious festivals — that 
restore human knowledge of the sacrality of the models.
15
 
 
So from a perspective of following the patterns established during illo tempore, humanity is only 
repeating the ways of the gods. The sacred is a non-physical divine state that was already in 
operation during the pre-human era when the gods had embedded certain patterns, agreements, 
and instructive blueprints within the cosmic order, all of which would become followed by 
humanity. Thus, the sacred is a fundamental source of seminal energy whose powers — ranging 
from the most turbulent to the most subtle — were exercised by the gods who in turn established 
paradigmatic structures within the cosmos that laid the foundation for sacred phenomena. The 
example of the boat ritual re-enacting a certain occurrence in illo tempore suggests that the gods 
had left instructions for humans over unverifiable periods of time. Illo tempore became a grand 
intentional source that staged certain imprints left by the gods upon the cosmic order which then 
became interpreted by humanity. Ritualistic hierophany constitutes a re-actualisation of what had 
been taught by the gods, restoring sacred knowledge upon humanity which means that such 
                                                          
15
 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. by Willard R. Trask, pp. 87-8. 
14 
 
knowledge had been latent within the consciousness all along, waiting to be re-activated and 
practiced through the imitation of divine precedents. 
  
     We can see here that the retrieval and resulting re-enactment of primordial memories — the 
methods of access being largely subject to the consciousness‘s level of reception — rather 
minimise the role of human originality and creativity. However, we can still step outside Eliade‘s 
immediate framework to pose the following question: if the individual can indeed play a role in 
governing the sacred structures within the consciousness, can the sacred‘s power to inform, 
influence, and constrain the human experiential capacity effectively cooperate with the 
individual‘s originality? — keeping in mind that this is an instance where the individual is just as 
much of a creator as the sacred source. Saying yes to this question would generate a wide range 
of implications concerning the sacred aspects of avant-garde art, as the cooperation between the 
sacred and the individual‘s originality would mean that the sacred is intent upon expressing itself 
through uniqueness and ever-expanding states of newness. Artaud‘s theoretical material offers a 
full response to the above questions. His idea that the sacred is a life force operating from a non-
physical realm of purity constitutes the bedrock of his film theory and theatrical philosophy, as 
the principle itself suggests that the sacred is a primary inspirer (co-creating with the artist who 
themselves are the primary inspirer of their own work; Artaud makes this point in his statement 
that ‗man fearlessly makes himself master‘) as well as an inspiration (the sacred serving as a 
usable device sought by the artist) all by itself. It is this sacred life force that drives forward the 
human inclination to continuously seek beyond the current state of things. We will find that it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to separate this life force from the consciousness, as both refer to 
15 
 
sentient energy in motion that can be focused and moulded to the point where concrete 
consequences arise from the direction of such energy. Even if consciousness and life force are 
not one and the same, they certainly do overlap at significant points:  
We must believe in…a sense of life in which man fearlessly makes himself master of 
what does not yet exist, and brings it into being… 
 
Furthermore, when we speak the word ―life‖, it must be understood we are not referring 
to life as we know it from its surface of fact, but to that fragile, fluctuating center which 
forms never reach. And if there is still one hellish, truly accursed thing in our time, it is 
our artistic dallying with forms, instead of being like victims burnt at the stake, signaling 
through the flames.
16
 
 
Originality truly is at the centre of Artaud‘s philosophy, as he places emphasis upon the 
manifestation of ‗what does not yet exist‘. It is this principle of originality that solves the 
problem created by Eliade‘s insistence that hierophanic rituals are an imitation of divine models. 
For if the sacred life force operates through originality and uniqueness, then Eliade‘s concept of 
imitation cannot at all hold a monopoly over a human‘s relationship with the mythical/sacred 
dimension. Indeed, imitation may have its place within very specific ritualistic contexts, but it is 
not at all a primary qualifier of hierophanic art. Furthermore, Artaud‘s presentation of such a 
violent metaphor of being burnt at the stake conveys the most extreme transformation from the 
                                                          
16
 Artaud, ‗Preface: The Theater and Culture‘, in The Theater and Its Double, p. 13.  
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core, as fire symbolises an annihilation of redundant forms that are no longer serving the sacred 
life force. The purpose of the life force is to create from the purest level — meaning to 
imaginatively conjure from the most authentic state that can be considered one of nothingness. 
Artaud rather implies that this nothingness is not actually constituted of nothing as such, but 
contains the potential to make the artist a ‗master‘ — a creative expert — at moulding non-
physical energy, as if moulding clay. There is an undeniable correspondence to the fire that 
transmutes soft clay (a seminal state) into a solid, durable sculpture (a concrete embodiment of 
imaginative ideas), even though there also an allusion to the unbearable pain that fire brings, 
simultaneously destroying the status quo and purifying the consciousness from old, stagnant 
remnants. The sacred life force then becomes a spiritual cleanser — burning all obstructions to 
its grand purpose of unlimited creation.  
 
     Artaud does however refer to an inner core that cannot be reached by an attitude of intensely 
clinging onto the concreteness of physical forms — as in, the attitude of viewing physical forms 
as more real than the non-physical nature of the imaginative moulding that had given birth to 
such forms to begin with. Placing more importance on the concrete extensions than on their non-
physical source of origin is an attitude that is severely misaligned with the creative life force. 
Again, the fire metaphor conveys the idea of artificial forms being burnt down while the inner 
essence, which is the sacred life force, remains eternal. An avant-garde principle subtly implied 
here lies in the notion that the creative life force is ‗signaling [itself] through the flames‘17; we 
must keep in mind that each flame is unique in shape, size, colour variation, glow, and 
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 Artaud, ‗Preface: The Theater and Culture‘, in The Theater and Its Double, p. 13.  
17 
 
movement as the flames together play out the fire dance. Thus, the life force is always given to 
expressing itself in innovative and ever-changing ways, so much so that even when the fire is put 
out, the life force awaits a new medium of ignition so that it can once again express itself 
through constantly original perspectives. A similar idea is suggested in Leonard Pronko‘s 
‗revolution of the spirit‘ where he first points out that it was precisely because of the surrealists‘ 
obsession with physicality that had caused Artaud to harshly criticize them, eventually leaving 
the group (although the surrealists‘ clinging onto the physical form as a means towards 
accomplishing a revolution — the most inappropriate means in Artaud‘s eyes, as stated by 
Pronko — was only one among many reasons for Artaud‘s abandonment, or for being 
abandoned, however one chooses to see it):     
Artaud allegiance to the East was stronger than his allegiance to the surrealists, and it was 
inevitable that so strong-minded an individualist should leave the group — or be 
expelled. He fustigates them energetically a few years later for their political affiliations, 
their efforts to bring about a social revolution, their commitment to the physical, whereas, 
according to Artaud, the great revolution must be a revolution of the spirit, a 
metamorphosis of what he called the soul.
18
 
  
While he seems to be such a proponent of self-liberation through the preservation and nurturing 
of an individual‘s creative and intellectual potential, Artaud‘s concept of the soul‘s revolutionary 
mission entirely surpasses the normally desired freedom to pursue one‘s personal interests and 
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curiosities. Although he is upholding the imagination as forefront in his vision of a societal 
reform where the mythical is to become a normal standard,
19
 not just any kind of imagination 
would pass as demonstrating mythical qualities. The earlier fire metaphor already shows that he 
would only favour the burning down of all artificialities which do not serve the life force, to the 
point where only the (non-physical) core essence — independent of and remaining beyond 
worldly hindrances — is left to carry forward the most passionate of creative expressions. 
Creative passion very much refers to a radical transformation not dissimilar to a spiritual 
upheaval where wounds and burns are freshly cleansed, leaving scars that may become viewed 
as artistic masterpieces incorporating a state of grace attained by initially sinking into the depths 
of a purifying pain. This is where Artaud seeks  ‗that fiery purification, that unification and that 
emaciation (in a horribly simplified and pure sense) of the natural molecules…that operation 
which permits, by sheer force of destructive analysis, the reconception and re-constitution of 
solids according that equilibrium of spiritual descent by which they ultimately become gold 
again.‘20 There is a suggestion here of heading down a path of spiritual decline collecting every 
resistance to creativity, but ultimately the purpose of such a decline is to meet with a momentous 
destruction which then inspires the proportionate opposite of the accumulated resistance (i.e. a 
greater rebirth of expanded potentiality). Artaud implies that the destruction of the previous 
baggage serves as a platform for an infinitely more precious outcome.  
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The Problem of Dichotomy 
     This is where Artaud describes a sense of ‗equilibrium‘ to counter the ‗spiritual descent‘.21 
And when the conditions become ripe and ready, all the elements of creative ascension manifest 
into a creation of such an elevated order, that he refers to such a product of sophistication as 
‗gold‘. Significantly, Douglas Allen provides a similar interpretation where the destruction is 
fully operative in Eliade‘s notion of bursting open an ordinary plane so that a transcendent 
reality can arise from an otherwise homogeneous mode of existence: ‗By means 
of…sacralization, the ‗closed‘ profane world is ‗burst open‘. A natural object, such as a tree, 
while remaining a tree reveals something ‗other‘. ‗No tree or plant is ever sacred simply as a tree 
or plant; they become so because they share in a transcendent reality, they become so because 
they signify that transcendent reality…‘ ‘22 Allen‘s interpretation as it stands does not actually 
favour the dichotomisation between sacred and profane,
23
 as he is describing hierophany as a 
metaphorical bridge where the distance between sacred and profane becomes irrelevant, 
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especially as there is an open channel interlinking the two dimensions. Defining the pre-
hierophanic stage as dimensional isolation (i.e. the separation between sacred and profane) is 
problematic in itself, because the two worlds would be excluded from each other with no sign of 
establishing a relationship, if it were not for the hierophanic process that is. Positing the pre-
hierophanic profane world as one that is ‗closed‘24 is also a reflection of a cultural attitude in 
which limitations are imposed upon the concept of dimension itself. Here, Eugene Eoyang 
presents an example of contrasting cultural attitudes towards the relationship between literature 
and painting, arguing that in China, Korea, and Japan, there is minimal differentiation, if any, 
between the two media. While such media classification does not apply to such Eastern methods 
of beholding aesthetics, the West
25
 generally considers literature and painting to be separate 
media (with some exceptions which can be found in attempts during the modern era to 
incorporate the visual/spatial dimension into poetry
26
): 
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21 
 
Whereas in the West, the arts of literature and of painting are separate, in China, Korea, 
and Japan, they are one. The adept at painting was equally — and naturally — adept at 
literature, because the same instrument, the brush, was being used. The intellectual 
difficulties of the systematic and meaningful study of the relationship between literature 
and the other arts, which has occasioned such controversy and such irresolutions in the 
West, and the ―avant-garde‖ attempts to integrate seemingly disparate arts within one 
new art form (whether ―concrete poetry‖ or ―word-pictures‖) would seem odd to the 
Chinese aesthetician, who is not surprised to see a poem inscribed in a painting; indeed, 
he would consider a painting without an inscription unfinished.
27
 
 
A painting-poem or a painting-prose upholds artistic hybridity — the composite nature 
seamlessly integrating the visual and the aural in such a way that even if the differentiation 
between literature and painting is recognised, the differentiation is maintained on a harmonious 
foundation. The diversification of elements (the co-existence of different artistic media) is not 
considered a problem of incompatibility, but rather an expression of mutual interdependence 
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always birthing new variations of cross-media combinations. Secondly, the unity between 
literature and painting is analogous of inter-dimensional fusion, especially as this is a very literal 
demonstration of a painting that speaks and a poem that paints. However, the conventional 
Western difficulty with even allowing painting and literature to occupy one and the same 
exhibited surface (e.g. paper, canvas, primed board which can be wooden or metallic, and even 
collage) reflects a way of thought that is intensely defined by dichotomisation. A more unified 
approach would consider different qualities as components of one and the same whole web — a 
web that interweaves unique, certainly contrasting, but cooperative threads, as opposed to tearing 
those threads apart only to emphasise their imposed isolation. The analogy of the Chinese (and 
Japanese) unification between literature and painting provides significant insight into an art form 
which ultimately does not separate between the visual and the aural, the written and the 
painterly. The interactions between artistic media (in this case, image and writing) also offer 
some clear indications concerning which cultural attitude is more conducive and effective as an 
analytical position in the study of sacred art. While it is a fallacy to make a sweeping 
generalisation that one cultural attitude is superior to another, the analogy of the painting-poem 
or painting-prose has shown that if we are seeking to explain inter-dimensional relationships 
through the observation of art, the Western habit of dichotomisation remains a poor choice due to 
its cross-cultural unviability. In order to further establish the case for this unviability, it is of 
great value to investigate Eliade‘s usage of dichotomisation, whether it is between sacred-
profane or supernatural-natural (which according to Eliade, constitutes synonymous 
relationships). There is a significant instance where he posits that the ‗natural‘ and the ‗human‘ 
are inferior to the ‗supernatural‘ and the ‗superhuman‘: 
 
23 
 
…the ideal of humanity that the primitive wishes to attain he sets on a superhuman plane. 
This means: (1) one does not become a complete man until one has passed beyond, and in 
some sense abolished, ―natural‖ humanity, for initiation is reducible to a paradoxical, 
supernatural experience of death and resurrection or of second birth; (2) initiation rites, 
entailing ordeals and symbolic death and resurrection, were instituted by gods, culture 
heroes, or mythical ancestors; hence these rites have a superhuman origin, and by 
performing them the novice imitates a superhuman, divine action. It is important to note 
this, for it shows once again that religious man wants to be other than he finds himself on 
the ―natural‖ level and undertakes to make himself in accordance with the ideal image 
revealed to him by myths.
28
 
 
What remains consistent in Eliade‘s theoretical framework is the way in which he equates the 
paradoxical relationship inherent in hierophany
29
 with the dichotomised structure (natural-
supernatural) which characterises the initiation rites of primitive humanity. Without hierophany 
to bridge the gap between the natural (which is profane) and the supernatural (which is sacred), 
                                                          
28
 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 187. 
29
 ‗By appearing in the concrete form of a rock, plant, or incarnate being, the sacred ceases to be absolute, 
for the object in which it appears remains a part of the worldly environment. In some respect, each 
hierophany expresses an incomprehensible paradox arising from the great mystery upon which every 
hierophany is centered: the very fact that the sacred is made manifest at all…The same paradox underlies 
every hierophany: in making itself manifest, the sacred limits itself.‘ 
— Eliade and Sullivan, ‗Hierophany‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, p. 89. 
24 
 
the natural all by itself cannot attain spiritual, and hence sacred, value.
30
 The initiation rites 
described above directly reflect this idea that the natural is subject to its own limitations and 
deficiencies, and that ultimately the natural needs to be bestowed with a means towards 
salvation, which in this case is the hierophanic initiation. The fallacy in such an idea lies in the 
inferiority imposed upon humanity and the physicality in which humanity is clothed so to speak. 
Eliade implies that the status of being ‗natural‘ and ‗human‘ is a form of entrapment or at least a 
confinement that hinders the spiritual advancement of those inhabiting such a status (i.e. homo 
religiosus), to such an extent that they must reach towards ‗the ideal image revealed…by 
myths‘31 in order to prove their worth. The cause of such a hierarchical structure that belittles 
and almost invalidates the ‗natural‘ and the ‗human‘ very much amounts to the rigid division 
between the natural/profane and the supernatural/sacred.
32
 Again, it is important to envision how 
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such a relationship between the natural/profane and the supernatural/sacred would be radically 
transformed, if the dichotomised structure constraining the relationship were to be dismantled 
altogether (given also dichotomy‘s cross-cultural unviability that I had attempted to establish 
earlier). In order to construct an alternative interpretation of such an inter-dimensional 
relationship (natural/profane and supernatural/sacred), I am presenting an analysis of Saler 
Benson‘s ―Supernatural as a Western Category‖ in order to help resolve the problem of 
dichotomy, thus developing a much more inclusive, nuanced model of hierophany that is cross-
culturally viable. Saler observes that many social scientists who use the term ‗supernatural‘ have 
a tendency to over-step the important task of defining what it actually is.
33
 Writing in 1977, he 
suggests that there may be certain loose and general presumptions within the social science 
community as to what the term means.
34
 Even so, definitions of ‗supernatural‘ are rarely 
articulated, if at all. In the light of what is lacking in qualifying the supernatural, Saler then puts 
forward what he considers to be one of the major applications of the term: ‗supernatural is 
employed as a broad cover term for a variety of postulated entities, forces, or ―beings‖…whose 
effects surpass those possible of achievement by ordinary human capabilities.‘35 Here, Saler 
presents a differentiation between the ordinary and that which surpasses it. And even then, this 
differentiation is by no means defined by a clear-cut line drawn between one class of entities and 
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another. If anything, this differentiation is much more fluid in nature, the transition from the 
ordinary to what surpasses it not at all demarcated. In order to demonstrate an example of that 
which surpasses the ordinary, Saler provides a brief study of gods as understood by Greek 
philosophers and poets, sorting the gods into two main categories. He observes that the 
supernatural was neither used by philosophers nor poets, a commonality demonstrated by both 
even though they fell into rival camps
36
: 
 
One sort of god is anthropomorphic being. He (or she) is filled with purpose and very 
often passion. We meet such gods in Hesiod, where we find that they themselves are 
created, engendered, or generated. We meet them also in Homer where it becomes clear 
that the gods are part of nature, not outside of it. They differ from men in being deathless 
— this is the hallmark of the divine — and in having greater powers.37 
  
The process of anthropomorphising in a sense unites the human with the divine, eliminating the 
possibility for the application of the supernatural-natural dichotomy. The gods may only occupy 
a status superior to humans because they do not undergo physical death and possess powers that 
ordinary humans do not. Even so, the gods remain part and parcel of nature, as Saler implies that 
all such powers surpassing ordinary human capacity are still included within the natural realm. 
As for the case of Saler‘s second category of abstract gods that are not anthropomorphised, 
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which he refers to as ‗a depersonalized verity‘38, they are considered ‗gods‘ because of their 
longevity which surpasses that of humans. And they are by no means ‗supernatural‘ in the 
culturally bound Western understanding of the term:
39
  
The classical Greeks, philosopher and poet alike, sometimes made use of the adjective 
huperphuēs. It is tempting to gloss it ‗supernatural‘ — it could conceivably be used to 
mean that. In classical usage, however, it means (depending on context) ‗overgrown‘, 
‗tangled‘, ‗enormous‘, ‗monstrous‘, ‗outlandish‘, and so forth — even, in some contexts, 
‗superior‘. It has the primary sense of ‗growing above ground‘.40 
 
Even translating the Greek huperphuēs into ‗supernatural‘ is highly problematic in itself. If we 
respect its classical usage, huperphuēs may signify an elevation or expansion from what is 
considered ordinary, perhaps even a radical diversion from the ordinary if indeed the term could 
also mean ‗monstrous‘ and ‗outlandish‘. However simplifying such qualities into the culturally 
bound category of ‗supernatural‘ is unwise, as such qualities are not excluded from the natural 
realm as the supernatural is understood to be. The same contention also applies to the Latin 
expression supra naturam excedens ‗employed rather like the Greek huperphuēs‘41, argues Saler, 
as ‗we have little reason to suppose that they [the Romans] drew a sharp boundary between a 
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natural realm and a preternatural-that-is-supernatural realm.‘42 Even attempting to translate the 
term ‗supernatural‘ into other languages can become a near-impossible task. Such an attempt of 
translation necessitates that the cultural attitude being translated also distinguishes between the 
natural and what lies outside of it. This simply cannot be expected to be a cross-culturally viable 
concept, as suggested by Stewart Guthrie:  
First, the notion of ―supernatural‖ upon which so many influential definitions of religion 
rest is itself, like the term it is meant to distinguish, a Western folk category, not a cross-
cultural one. It often is not found in non-Western religions…In my own fieldwork, for 
example, the Japanese term for ―supernatural‖ (chōshizenteki, possibly a translation of 
the Western term) seemed unknown to most people, some of whom said that it might 
mean ―extremely natural‖.43 
 
If it is the case that the Japanese term chōshizenteki means ―extremely natural‖, this only goes to 
show that the realm outside of nature is not given much consideration at all. On the contrary, the 
meaning amplifies naturalness, magnifying and exaggerating the significance of nature as 
opposed to diminishing it as the term ‗supernatural‘ tends to do. Considering that Eliade 
associates the natural with the profane and the supernatural with the sacred, it follows that this 
                                                          
42
 Saler, p. 42. 
43
 Stewart Guthrie, ‗A Cognitive Theory of Religion‘, in Current Anthropology 21/2 (April 1980), pp. 181 
– 203 (p. 185). 
29 
 
structure of dichotomy seems to fall apart on its own ground.
44
 Douglas Allen‘s further 
interpretations of Eliade‘s hierophany continue to show that dichotomisation — much as it has a 
stronghold over the secular Western perspective — cannot prevail: 
 
Living in the modern world, artists have found it impossible to express their experiences 
through traditional artistic and religious language. ―This is not to say that the ‗sacred‘ has 
completely disappeared in modern art. But it has become unrecognizable; it is 
camouflaged in forms, purposes and meanings which are apparently ‗profane.‘ ‖ 
 
Eliade finds that some of the characteristics of modern art can be given religious 
interpretations based on hidden mythic and symbolic structures. The ―destruction of the 
language of art‖ and the sense of destroying all forms and structures need not be 
interpreted simply as an expression of the chaos, alienation, and meaninglessness of the 
modern world. What may seem little more than nihilistic expressions of secular modern 
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life may conceal deeper mythic and symbolic structures, meanings, and significance. In 
much of modern art, there is more than simple destruction; there is a reversion to chaos in 
which the artist seems to be searching for something new that hasn‘t yet been expressed. 
Comparing the attitude of many modern artists to archaic mythic religion, Eliade senses 
that this destruction of artistic language may be the first phase of a complex process of 
recreation of a new universe. Death is precondition for rebirth. The destruction of the old 
world is necessary in order to create a new, more meaningful world. In this regard, some 
creations by modern artists may anticipate radically new, cultural creations.
45
 
 
The idea that the sacred has inevitably become profane very much suggests that the sacred has 
the freedom to transform itself into another state — quite ironically violating the dichotomised 
structure which is a modern Western construct (dichotomy means a permanent split; the notion 
that something can transform into something else with relative ease goes to show that such a split 
is redundant). Allen presents Eliade‘s views on the sacred‘s capacity to camouflage itself into the 
profane fabric of modern existence, suggesting here that the metaphorical hard surface of 
secularisation still maintains some porous areas for the sacred to permeate. Any such area that is 
porous would mean that there can be no constriction imposed upon the interaction between two 
(or more) qualities which has every tendency to absorb into each other. Significantly, the avant-
garde principle underlying Allen‘s interpretation is the destruction of the old and unwanted 
which occurs in modernity‘s attempts to rebel against the authority of the outdated. Such 
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destructive phenomena featuring in the modern art scene constitutes the playing out of mythical 
patterns of destruction and renewal, hence Allen‘s interpretation that this innovative creation 
embodies ‗a new, more meaningful world.‘46 Thus, there is no escaping from the cosmic 
universe, as everything — even the most seemingly secularised expressions — possesses the 
potentiality to be interpreted as hierophanic: 
By focusing on Brancusi, Chagall, nonfigurative painters, and other modern artists, 
Eliade interprets the destruction of artistic languages and forms as revealing a desire to 
return to a primordial plentitude; a desire to rediscover and experience the deeper 
structures underlying phenomenal appearances. In this he sees similarities between 
modern art and archaic cosmic religion. And by using initiatory and other mythic and 
symbolic structures, Eliade interprets ―the end of the world‖ in modern art not as a final 
nihilistic phase but as a first phase necessary for rebirth, renewal, and new creativity. 
Eliade compares the modern artists‘ ―destruction of worlds‖ (traditional artistic worlds) 
to ―primitive‖ and paleo-Oriental ritual scenarios of the need for the periodic destruction 
and recreation of the cosmos. ―The religious necessity for the abolition of old, tired, 
inauthentic forms (‗illusory,‘ ‗idolatrous‘). All this corresponds in a certain sense to the 
death of God proclaimed by Nietzsche. But there is more: the passion for matter 
resembles the pre-Mosaic cosmic religiosity. The modern artist who can no longer 
believe in the Judeo-Christian tradition (‗God is dead‘) is returning, without noticing it, to 
‗paganism,‘ to cosmic hierophanies…‖.47 
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Significantly, Allen observes that — at least symbolically or as a result of (unconsciously) 
following certain mythical patterns — modern artists are forsaking the Judeo-Christian God and 
returning to paganism. This (artistic and intellectual) return to an ancient era is only coming into 
fashion so to speak, not because it is old, but because paganism is more accommodating of 
certain idealised qualities which remain independent of the historical period in which they are 
normally placed (the fact that paganism historically precedes Christianity becomes quite 
irrelevant). If modern artists were concerned with the historicity of such pagan qualities or 
indeed turning such historicity into a problematic issue, those artists would not incorporate those 
qualities into their new creations which they would spare from things that are outdated and 
outworn. The transformation of an ancient era into a novelty goes to show that the cultural trend 
of conforming to a monotonous order (Judeo-Christianity) that sets itself up as an exclusive class 
is disintegrating; it must also be noted that modern secularisation bears a similar kind of 
monotony to Judeo-Christianity, at least in Allen‘s conception of it, as secularisation dictates a 
homogeneous meaninglessness that does not recognise sacralised distinction. This qualitative 
convergence between Judeo-Christianity and secularisation conveys an ultimate principle that 
nothing can ever be separated from its inherent religious aspects, again implying the redundancy 
of dichotomy. The dichotomy between the modern and the archaic falls apart on the grounds that 
Eliade is attempting to extract archaic properties from modern phenomena, as if the archaic or 
the mythical is a latency waiting to be re-discovered and re-activated. This mythical dimension 
contains what Allen refers to as ‗a primordial plentitude‘, meaning that the potential therein of 
generating newness and originality is indeed endless.  
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The Phenomenological Approach  
     Douglas Allen begins with a frank statement that Eliade‘s theoretical material is full of 
empirical fallacies, that it simply cannot pass as a sound and substantiated analytical project. For 
the most part, Eliade presents an idealistic vision of how modern cultural attitudes can be 
transformed without actually providing adequate data to prove the viability of his vision. 
However, as Allen comes to insist, there remain areas of valuable insight in Eliade‘s works, 
much of which concern his ability to theoretically compensate for any possible shortcomings in 
the available empirical evidence: 
 
We must acknowledge that Mircea Eliade himself lends considerable credence to the 
view that he has never really dealt with the crucial phenomenological issues and 
consequently lacks a critical systematic methodology. When asked how he arrived at his 
frequently unexpected and bewildering interpretations, this scholar is apt to reply that he 
simply looked at his religious documents and this was what they revealed… 
 
Now it is our thesis that Mircea Eliade does in fact have an impressive phenomenological 
method. We would submit that this is precisely why Eliade is a methodological 
improvement over the other phenomenologists of religion we have examined. As one 
studies a major classic in the field, say, Gerardus van der Leeuw‘s Religion in Essence 
and Manifestation, she or he cannot help but be impressed by the vast amount of data 
which have been collected and classified. What invariably disturbs the philosophical 
34 
 
phenomenologist is that van der Leeuw and his colleagues never appear to have 
formulated a critical methodology. On what basis do they make their comparisons and 
generalizations, guard against subjectivity in their interpretations, defend their specific 
classifications and typologies? What we shall attempt to show is that underlying Eliade‘s 
approach is a certain methodological framework which allows him to deal with many of 
the central phenomenological concerns.
48
 
 
From the above passage alone, we can already discern Allen‘s position that the accumulation of 
data would amount redundancy if a valid methodology to qualify the data cannot be 
systematically constructed. He does not discount the importance of data, but there seems to be an 
implication that data without direction remains close to meaningless. According to Eliade, even 
among historicists who rely upon physically verifiable and quantifiable data, there is still more to 
analysing a phenomenon than being utterly dependent upon the empirical. While there is great 
value in collecting empirical data, one must not overlook the value of intuitive theorising — 
which is to seek and evaluate the core meaning of a phenomenon that encompasses those aspects 
that cannot be empirically proven. The sole consideration of empirical evidence all by itself is to 
take the hierophany very much out of its own sacred and therefore irreducible context, as the 
likelihood of the information being fragmented and incomplete would be especially high: 
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We see here the need for a historian of religion to go beyond mere accumulation of data. 
Rather, he must try to grasp the center of a religious belief, the meaning of it — just as I 
have been discussing the meaning of mythic time — in order to do justice to the religion 
itself and also to do justice to ourselves, to enrich ourselves with meanings that are new 
for us, rather than passing off all myth as superstition. As an illustration, let us consider 
the following. Despite the many differences and historical developments in Christianity, 
almost everyone would agree that its center is the notion of the Incarnation, God made 
man, and man‘s subsequent redemption. But let us say a Chinese came to Europe to 
understand Christianity and applied the methods of sociological or anthropological field 
work in a village in France or Italy. He stays six months, watches the people, sees a 
church, an occasional process, and a man called a priest reading from some large book. 
He will make a scientific description of what the people in that village do, but he may 
well miss the meaning of Christianity or even of those peasants in that place. This has 
happened with so many anthropological monographs, the work of men who do wonderful 
field work and description, but miss the meaning of what they describe and give us 
fragmentary information which makes the religion appear to be nothing more than a 
superstition.
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If we are considering empirical data all by themselves, we can make an immediate observation 
that hierophanies are most susceptible to embodying contradictory meanings, especially if one 
and the same hierophany embodies meanings assigned by diverging cultural collectives, even 
                                                          
49
 Eliade, ‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, pp. 74 – 91 (p. 62). 
36 
 
more so if the hierophany is being considered by collectives from varying and certainly widely 
spaced apart historical periods. And yet, Eliade does manage to construct a universal definition 
of hierophany. It is only when we begin to investigate the more minute, circumstantially 
constraining details associated with individual hierophanies that contradictions inevitably arise as 
a result of such specific focus. Thus, it is the more general definition that remains the most 
consistent and harmoniously aligned with the core meanings. The above example of a Chinese 
studying Christian traditions a village environment in France or Italy is another case of a possible 
over-reliance upon the limited availability of immediate resources — such resources constituting 
an empirical factor whose availability and therefore accessibility remains beyond the control of 
the scholar. Furthermore, empirical data are always prone to contradicting each other, such as the 
example Eliade puts forward of using an already established scientific method to analyse the 
ways of the local villagers. Gavin Flood suggests that Eliade‘s resistance to reductionism 
constitutes a resistance to a categorically specific reductionism — the kind of reductionism ‗that 
seeks to explain religion in non-religious terms.‘50 For instance, Eliade does not consider it to be 
an adequate method of analysis when the psychologist reduces religious expression to a 
psychological state, when the sociologist reduces religious expression to sociological data, or 
when the anthropologist reduces religious expression to be one among other cultural expressions 
of a human collective.
51
 Such reductions translate religious or sacred phenomena inaccurately 
and even disrespectfully, as the disciplines of psychology, sociology, or anthropology — at least 
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those that Eliade had experienced in his immediate environment — do not necessarily take into 
account that the sacred exists independently of belief and acknowledgment. Edmund Husserl‘s 
concept of epoché must be brought into the equation. Epoché displays clear similarities with 
Eliade‘s rejection of reducing religious data into non-religious terms while upholding the 
reduction of religious data into observations that preserve the transcendental nature of the sacred. 
Husserl‘s epoché would describe this latter kind of reduction as an attempt to express the purest 
essence of a phenomenon. What epoché would be opposed to is a socialised interpretation of that 
phenomenon (which, in a manner of speaking, is a regurgitation of externally imposed 
instruction which in turn fails to acknowledge that such phenomena exists independently and 
autonomously from socialised interpretations of them): 
…Eliade‘s methodological principle of irreducibility is really an insistence upon a 
phenomenological epoché. One recalls that Husserl‘s phenomenological epoché was 
directed against reductionism. By ‗bracketing‘ or suspending the interpretations we 
normally place on phenomena, the phenomenologist attempts to consider phenomena 
‗just as phenomena‘, ‗to disclose and clarify the meaning of phenomena, that is of 
whatever presents itself.‘52 
 
In his Paris Lectures, Husserl presents epoché as the most naked observation of the data in 
question — naked in a sense that all judgments, conditioned biases, and critical assumptions are 
suspended especially for the sake of freely carrying out such an observation: 
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…I may freely abstain from entertaining any belief about experience…This simply 
means that I refuse to assert the reality of the world…I must similarly abstain from any 
other of my opinions, judgments, and valuations about the world, since these likewise 
assume the reality of the world.
53
 
   
It is the relinquishing of judgments that allows the phenomenologist to observe religious or 
sacred phenomena with accuracy. A problem does arise, however, as Husserl would assert that 
sacred phenomena are situated in an ‗alien world‘, implying a separation between such a world 
and the phenomenologist observing it. According to Gavin Flood‘s interpretation, ‗For the 
phenomenology of religion the ‗religious world‘ is the field which is, in Husserl‘s term, an ‗alien 
world‘ (ein fremde Welt) to be understood and penetrated by the phenomenologist who stands 
outside of it.‘54 A separation between the ‗alien world‘ and the phenomenologist is an artificial 
construct which does not at all produce effective results. For if such a separation is ever-present, 
the ‗alien world‘ would remain impenetrable to the phenomenologist who, as Husserl claims and 
as Flood interprets, stands outside of it. Positing this ‗world‘ as ‗alien‘ necessitates that there 
must be a point of entry for the outsider to experience within it. Without this point of entry, any 
understanding on the part of the outsider-phenomenologist would remain an impossibility. So let 
us assume, only so that I can further clarify my point, that such a separation between the 
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phenomenologist and the ‗alien world‘ does exist (even though I am ultimately arguing against 
it). More precisely, let us even impose this separation. Even if a separation between the two were 
to be imposed, the phenomenologist can still develop an understanding of the so-called ‗alien 
world‘ through an attitude of sympathy: 
 
…if Historians of Religions are to understand religious phenomena ‗on their own plane 
of reference‘, they must attempt to place themselves within the perspective of homo 
religiosus, and such a capacity for participation must be grounded in a sympathetic 
attitude. By means of the epoché, phenomenologists attempt sympathetically to grasp the 
meaning of the experiences of the other.
55
 
 
With sympathy as a primary tool of the phenomenologist, any claim that a certain world is 
‗alien‘ loses its validity. Sympathy conducts a process of intuitive interpenetration which dictates 
that while different worlds may display the most drastic divergences, there is no such thing as an 
ultimate separation between worlds. Eliade‘s claim that we all possess aspects that inherently 
belong to homo religiosus means that we have an innate capacity to understand a phenomenon to 
which we have never before been exposed. This dissertation relies almost entirely upon a 
sympathetic approach, as my analysis of cinematic portrayals of the sacred have caused me to 
question how I would interpret certain image sequences if I had never before been exposed to 
their immediate cultural context, as this tends to be the most freshly intuitive approach.   
                                                          
55
 Allen, Structure and Creativity in Religion, p. 115. 
40 
 
 The Sacred in Avant-garde Cinema 
     An interview with filmmaker and film theorist Jean Cocteau (1889 – 1963), whom I discuss 
in Chapter 3 (especially his film Orpheus), contains significant implications concerning his own 
definition of the avant-garde, or at least those aspects of it he identifies with. I will later show 
how his rebellious perspective has influenced his ideas on film poetry — the concept itself 
constituting his vision of the sacred aspects intrinsic within the film form. To begin with, 
Cocteau makes clear that he is radically opposed to over-organisation, micro-management, and 
anything that is forcefully deliberate; yet the principle of equal importance lies in his association 
of such burdening characteristics with institutions of authority (more than anything else, he 
favours the opposite of such unnecessary tediousness, and that is the sophisticated spontaneity 
characterising his ideals of film poetry): 
   
Cocteau: I will recount one thing; then you must let me rest. You perhaps know the work 
of the painter Domergue? The long girls; calendar art, I am afraid. He had 
a domestique in those days — a ―housemaid‖ who would make the beds, fill the coal 
scuttles. We all gathered in those days at the Café Rotonde. And a little man with a 
bulging forehead and black goatee would come there sometimes for a glass, and to hear 
us talk. And to ―look at the painters.‖ This was the ―housemaid‖ of Domergue, out of 
funds. We asked him once (he said nothing and merely listened) what he did. He said he 
meant to overthrow the government of Russia. We all laughed, because of course we did, 
too. That is the kind of time it was! It was Lenin.   
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Interviewer: Your position as by far the most celebrated literary figure in France is 
crowned by the Académie Française, Belgian Royal Academy, Oxford honoris causa, 
and so on. Yet I suppose that these are ―faults‖?   
Cocteau: It is necessary always to oppose the avant-garde — if that is enthroned.56 
  
Cocteau seems to sympathise with artists of limited financial means, hence his noticing of 
Domergue‘s housemaid who was an impoverished painter. There is an implied admiration of the 
persistence of creativity despite the overwhelming challenges of the immediate circumstances. 
But then of course, Cocteau distinctly contrasts this admiration for the struggling artist with his 
despising of governmental authority. This rebelliousness is equally expressed in his following 
statement that if avant-garde artists come to rely upon the awards, accolades, and recognition 
from those various academies mentioned by the interviewer, then the avant-garde itself would 
become an enemy of the true artist. Such a position goes to show that Cocteau only identifies 
with those aspects of the avant-garde that remain independent of set criteria as dictated by 
sources of authority that he considers to lack both sympathy for and relevance to the true artist 
who may be forced to survive under unpleasant circumstances. This is where he dismisses rules 
and regulations issued by an external authority (some of which are provided in the above 
interview) — especially concerning the judgment of adequacy (or inadequacy) imposed upon 
something by an authority that does not prioritise familiarity or even compassion — in favour of 
an entirely intuitive approach where something happens to qualify a certain status in a 
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synchronistic (near-coincidental) manner. His ideas of film poetry adventurously express such a 
principle of concentrating unpretentiously upon creating the work of art, while relinquishing the 
expectation of any specific outcome: 
 
Indeed, whatever of our shades, our darkness and, in a sense, our poetry we put into a 
film is not our concern and should only be uncovered by those who judge us. The 
cabinet-maker‘s viewpoint is not that of the medium. The one ensures that the table is 
firm, that it stands up and its drawers slide properly; the other makes it turn and speak. 
And, just as tables speak, in other words establish a mysterious link between the darkness 
and light within us, so a work of art should also be a work of craftsmanship that yields its 
secrets without in the slightest having sought to put them across. So I would distinguish 
clearly between a film that tries to be poetic, and a film where the poetry is incidental.
57
 
 
Cocteau suggests that the process of creating film poetry should not at all be self-conscious, that 
it should be allowed to unfold as authentically as possible without an over-attentiveness to 
carving out a particular result. There is a temptation to leap to a conclusion that his ideal of film 
poetry is an art form that just sort of happens, although a careful analysis would show that this is 
not the case. His proposition that film poetry should be ‗incidental‘ suggests that such a state of 
poetry is a product of assembled patterns within the profound levels of the consciousness(‗Poetry 
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is a product of the unconscious‘58), and these patterns are allowed to emerge into the manifested 
work of art without that struggle to make it happen. Nor does poetry seek desperately to impress. 
There is almost an implication here that the poetry simply streams through the metaphorical 
pores of the work of art, which is why Cocteau puts forward that the masterpiece should 
naturally release its secrets without the artist being required to meddle with such subtleties. 
Similarly, filmmaker and film theorist Maya Deren (1917 – 1961), whom I also discuss in 
Chapter 3 (especially her film Meshes of the Afternoon) also puts forward that the magical 
element in cinema is very much a product of effortless manifestation, almost as if the camera is 
an animistic entity leading the vision of the artist/filmmaker to the seemingly destined images:  
Maya Deren, criticizing the way photographers overplay their part in the success of an 
image, recounts Kodak‘s advertisement: ―You push the button, IT does the rest!‖ Yet it, 
the camera, she remarked, ―creates, at times, the illusion of being almost itself a living 
intelligence which can inspire its manipulation on the explorative and creative level 
simultaneously‖…The depersonalization of the camera — its itness — is for Deren, 
following Epstein, one of the magical features of cinema as a whole. She writes this 
passage upon the arrival of ―L‘Intelligence d‘une Machine‖ by Epstein, which she had 
not yet read but nonetheless recommends ―for those who share, with me, a profound 
respect for the magical complexities of the film instrument‖...59 
 
                                                          
58
 Cocteau, The Art of Cinema, p. 38. 
59
 Rachel O. Moore, Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2000), p. 93. 
44 
 
There is an implication here that the camera has a will of its own that can align the artist‘s 
imaginative perspective with corresponding images. Rachel Moore however imposes a 
depersonalisation of Deren‘s idea of the camera. Still, such a depersonalisation can be interpreted 
to mean that it can detach itself from any limitations of the human perceptual faculties, whether 
such limitations are caused by in-built structures or external instruction (as in, the kind of 
instruction to perceive in limited ways). There may indeed be significant reasons as to why the 
human perceptual faculties have limited access to certain things, such reasons even leading to 
further philosophical questions. Yet these are reasons which do not apply to the camera, this 
independence transforming the camera into a magical being free from the terms and conditions 
of the physical senses. Kenji Mizoguchi (1898 – 1956) whom I discuss in Chapter 4 succeeds in 
transforming the eye of the camera into an elaborate vision of a magical entity who has 
orchestrated the image components from a higher dimension converging with our own. Terrence 
Rafferty‘s interpretation is perhaps one of the most effective descriptions of Mizoguchi‘s ability 
to work the camera in ways that express its animistic qualities, to such an impressive extent that 
the camera appears to possess the capacity to imagine, sympathise, and evaluate strategy. 
Rafferty even suggests that Mizoguchi‘s camera has delicate manners:  
His camera seems to glide in and out of people‘s lives with exquisite tact, observing them 
at their best and (more frequent) worst, but rarely intruding on them with an emotionally 
charged close-up or a sternly analytic cut. His movies just flow, stately and inevitable as 
rivers. But there comes a moment in every one of his pictures when you might also begin 
to feel a little disturbed by the intensity of the aesthetic pleasure he provides, unnerved by 
an apparent disconnect between the movie‘s gorgeous, sensuous manner and its often 
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unbearably painful matter. And that is where both the difficulty and the amazing richness 
of Mizoguchi lies.
60
 
 
Mizoguchi‘s portrayals of certain alarming realities about pre-modern culture present, however 
indirectly, profoundly sensitive methods by which such realities can be improved and even 
revolutionised.
61
 The avant-garde qualities of such methods lie in the fact that Mizoguchi‘s 
creation of the new is not at all rigidly forward-looking. In fact, an unwaveringly forward 
direction of thought would become a hindrance and even a crippling limitation, due to such a 
direction‘s prevention of lateral thinking: ‗Mizoguchi…always failed when he tried to simply be 
new. He needed to grapple with the old in order to discover the new, and this engagement with 
the old world made him really love it…‘62 
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       Chapter 1 
         Eliade’s hierophany and its application to avant-garde studies 
 
The placement of hierophany into an avant-garde context at first appears like a marriage of 
opposites. And as seems to be the way things are for marriages of opposites, there is an emphasis 
placed upon the peculiarity and even awkwardness that come with such an oppositional 
relationship, far more so than a recognition that opposites do in fact complement each other — 
such a complementary relationship revealing the valuable common ground underlying the union. 
Even within the avant-garde structure, differentiating between vanguard and rearguard is no 
simple task due to the fact that there are specific cases where the ‗old‘ and the ‗new‘ virtually 
exchange places. This is especially so when traditional components become used in new and 
inventive ways, as in the case of avant-garde sacred cinema — the sacred itself being an ancient 
concept relating even further back to the idea of divine origination. Eliade repeatedly argues that 
the primordial roots of the sacred are not recognised by mainstream modern culture, causing the 
forward movement of the avant-garde to sit oddly with the sacred which is much more 
harmoniously aligned to the cyclical patterns of a mythical time that remains independent of 
linear, historical time. In fact he does not at all describe mythical time in terms of an action-
reaction structure that produces what we would normally consider to be sequences of events 
characterising historical patterns. Rather he associates mythical qualities with ‗the ultimate 
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reality of things‘63 that encompasses the meanings/meaningfulness of cosmic phenomena — 
universal phenomena generating qualities, consequences, and blue-prints all taking place on a 
vast, immeasurable scale unquantifiable by physical standards. So we must begin with Eliade‘s 
foundational argument that mythical phenomena transcend temporal and spatial factors 
governing the laws of physicality and historicity. In other words, his theoretical model dictates 
that the sacred is not bound by temporal and spatial contraints. Here, it is important to specify 
that the vessel or the form embodying the hierophany is localised — meaning that it does occupy 
a specific locality. However, there are also certain qualities more broadly defining the 
hierophanic structure that cut across historical, cultural, and geographical divergences. This is 
where hierophany embodies both the empirical (which Eliade would refer to as the profane) and 
that which remains beyond empirical verification (in this case, the sacred): 
 
How far — considering the diversity and tenuousness of our evidence — are we right to 
speak of different ―modalities of the sacred‖? That those modalities exist is proved by the 
fact that a given hierophany may be lived and interpreted quite differently by the 
religious élite and by the rest of the community. For the throng who come to the temple 
of Kalighat in Calcutta every autumn Durgā is simply a goddess of terror to whom goats 
are sacrificed; but for a few initiated śāktas Durgā is the manifestation of cosmic life in 
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constant and violent regeneration. It is very likely that among those who adore the lingam 
of Śiva, a great many see it only as an archetype of the generative organ; but there are 
others who look to it as a sign, an ―image‖ of the rhythmic creation and destruction of the 
universe which expresses itself in forms, and periodically returns to its primal, pre-formal 
unity, before being reborn.
64
  
 
This is where hierophany becomes the foremost embodiment of uniqueness, or rather a wide 
range of uniquenesses. Hierophany is not just approached from the viewpoint of personal 
uniqueness, but also cultural, historical, and environmental uniqueness (involving for instance 
such factors as class, education background, and invested interests). Still, Eliade insists that the 
pure sacred source must be inclusive of all such uniquenesses: 
 
Which is the true meaning of Durgā and Śiva — what is deciphered by the initiates, or 
what is taken up by the mass of the faithful? In this book I am trying to show that both 
are equally valuable; that the meaning given by the masses stands for as authentic a 
modality of the sacred manifested in Durgā or Śiva as the interpretation of the initiates. 
And I can show that the two hierophanies fit together — that the modalities of the sacred 
which they reveal are in no sense contradictory, but are complementary, are parts of a 
whole.
65
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Here, Eliade‘s idea of what is ‗contradictory‘ (or not) merits careful explanation. His example of 
the perspectives of the initiates and the masses ultimately conveys a fluid and receptive model of 
the sacred that is widely encompassing enough to contain data which may seem contradictory or 
incompatible on the surface level. Surface contradictions, as the name suggests, are only 
contradictory to a limited degree. Yet surface contradictions are not ultimately contradictory, as 
he would argue, because what we are considering here are different aspects of a greater unifying 
whole. Thus, hierophany may be associated with any manner of diverging perspectives, yet the 
pure sacred source itself must remain consistent in its capacity to include and incorporate surface 
inconsistencies, to the point where any so-called inconsistency would become transformed into 
‗complementary…parts of a whole.‘66 If the sacred source cannot be consistently receptive in 
such a manner, it would then cease to be a source of pure potentiality, and in turn cease to be the 
sacred itself. For the sacred does not deny personal, historical, cultural, and environmental 
divergences; it cannot deny them, because it is an encompassing source. The sacred does 
however remain independent of temporal and spatial constraints (constraints which include the 
conditional divergences just described),
67
 precisely because the sacred is pure by nature: 
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…in his ―Notebook of a Summer Vacation (1937)‖, Eliade observes how his fellow 
travelers experience the passing of borders for the first time and the intensity of the first 
hours of a journey, of even the most insignificant happenings. He regards this ―spectacle‖ 
as very reassuring: ―The thirst for the fantastic, for daydreaming, for adventure has 
remained as unquenched as ever in the soul of modern man.‖ ―The adventure of which 
each one dreams, and which for some has begun with the crossing of the border, is, in any 
event, a desire for transcendence, for an anchoring in significant reality, in certain 
‗ontological centers‘. People want, at all costs, to get out of neuter, non-significant zones. 
If I had the courage to carry my thought to its logical conclusion, I would say that people 
today, as always, long to go out of the ‗profane‘, neuter zones and attain the ‗sacred‘, that 
is, ultimate reality.‖68 
  
Allen‘s interpretation of the sacred significance which Eliade bestows upon seemingly ordinary 
occurrences has numerous avant-garde implications. The example of the intense curiosity and 
passion for adventure experienced during a first journey shows that there is a much more 
profound level of human consciousness (a mythical consciousness) that views ‗significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the sacred, I am no longer related to temporal differences in a diachronic context; I have the 
right to jump from the ancient Neolithic Near East to India and Africa in examining the world of 
the agriculturalist, although it arose at different times in these places.  
— Eliade, ‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, p. 61. 
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reality‘ (which is essentially sacred reality) as lying beyond known borders. The issue of whether 
the new experience will be a positive one is secondary to the idea that there is an innate structure 
within the consciousness that is constantly driving the individual‘s experiential capacity towards 
expanding and advancing. In fact this example of Allen‘s interpretation and Eliade‘s notion of 
experience expansion quite clearly places the ‗neuter zones‘ of the stagnant status quo in the area 
of the rearguard, while the ‗ultimate reality‘ — lying beyond the ‗neuter‘ and the ‗non-
significant‘, and therefore constituting the vanguard in its progressive and forward movement — 
naturally invites the human consciousness to participate, as the ultimate reality possesses an 
infinite mystery or ‗cosmic sacrality‘ awaiting (hierophanic) revelation.69 The argument to follow 
in this and subsequent chapters proposes that the timelessness of the sacred, mythical dimension 
and the progressive direction characterising expressions of originality and newness in fact co-
exist in highly imaginative ways through portrayals of the sacred in avant-garde art.
70
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The archaic and modernity in Eliade’s theory of the sacred 
…for religious man nature is never only natural. Experience of a radically desacralized 
nature is a recent discovery; moreover, it is an experience accessible only to a minority 
in modern societies, especially to scientists. For others, nature still exhibits a charm, a 
mystery, a majesty in which it is possible to decipher traces of ancient religious values. 
No modern man, however irreligious, is entirely insensible to the charms of nature. We 
refer not only to the esthetic, recreational, or hygienic values attributed to nature, but 
also to a confused and almost indefinable feeling, in which, however, it is possible to 
recognize the memory of a debased religious experience.
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boundaries of familiarity, briefly discussing kratophanies may serve great value as they constitute the 
aspects of hierophanic phenomena that hold the most potentiality for expressing creative newness, 
especially through their characteristic divergences from what are considered established norms:  
A second type of hierophany may be termed as kratophany, a manifestation of power. 
Kratophanies preserve the sacred in all its ambivalence, both attracting and repelling with its 
brute power. The unusual, the new, and the strange frequently function as kratophanies. These 
things, persons, or places can be dangerous and defiling as well as sacred. Corpses, criminals, and 
the sick often function as kratophanies. Human beings in powerful or ambivalent circumstances 
(such as women in menses, soldiers, hunters, kings with absolute power, or executioners) are 
hedged around with taboos and restrictions. People approach sacred foods with etiquette and 
manners designed to ward off defilement, sickness, and pollution. The precautions that surround 
saints, sacrificers, and healers stem from fear of confronting the sacred. Kratophanies emphasize 
the extent to which the manifestation of the sacred intrudes on the order of things.   
— Eliade and Sullivan, ‗Hierophany‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, p. 90.  
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Modern cultures have come to regard humans as being separate from nature — although Eliade 
suggests here that such a disconnection is a societal construct at best, because a total 
disconnection between humanity and the sacred can never come to pass. All homo religiosus 
have within them the capacity to keep developing a relationship with the sacred, despite all forms 
of resistance: ‗I am convinced that whatever modern, secularized man might think of himself, he 
still occupies a sacred dimension.‘72 Carl Olson suggests that Eliade is setting a new trend by 
bringing his theory to a wider audience, in turn drastically diverging from modern societal norms 
which oppose the idea of this innate capacity for sacred experience: 
 
…Eliade interpreted modern Western culture as areligious, suffering from alienation, 
desacralization and demythologization. In one sense, Eliade wanted to reintroduce 
religious mystery into modern human life. This implies that much of his work was 
soteriological. In order to achieve his goal of alleviating modern alienation, Eliade 
returned to religious history for a remedy. The search for meaning and new modes of 
being in the historical past was a religious experience because the historian of religions 
must relive the experiences of past cultures. By following this procedure, Eliade wanted 
to reintroduce religious mystery into the lives of contemporary humans lost in the 
destructive labyrinth of the twentieth century.
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There is a suggestion here that what is new and improved does not necessarily rest upon 
futuristic foundations or indeed the annihilation of the value of the past. This is where it must be 
noted that Eliade does not specifically associate the sacred or the mythical with the past, although 
because both (which are one and the same) are transhistorical, the sacred/mythical then becomes 
‗timeless‘. Qualities that are not subject to external changeabilities replenish — in other words, 
breathe new meaning into — an internally impoverished, secularised culture. Even Olson‘s 
interpretation implies that Eliade rather views the desacralised modernity as an ‗old‘ mental 
construct where the sacred lies dormant as a potentiality waiting to be pushed forward into 
greater recognition. In so being, Eliade is essentially using the sacred as an avant-garde method 
to heal and restore such cultures from spiritual undernourishment. Imagination — which is the 
capacity to envision beyond the status quo of external realities — is a primary component in the 
sacred experience, for without it there can be no creation of hierophanies. Douglas Allen 
provides an interpretation of Matei Calinescu‘s argument that it is through imagination that we 
can access the innate memory of our mythical origin. The important point here is that the 
recollection of primordial times constitutes a ‗new‘ approach to discerning the meaning of life — 
an anamnesis leading to creative expansion, breaking free of the monotony of physicality — 
while modernity is a metaphor for spiritual amnesia where severe limitations are placed upon the 
imaginative capacity to access dimensions that transcend materiality:  
  
In his analysis of Eliade‘s  ―Nineteen Roses‖, Calinescu states that the central question of 
hermeneutics is linked with the broad question of memory as a way to mythical truth. 
After describing Eliade‘s literary techniques of anamnesis, such as attempts ―to translate 
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the dialectic of mythical unrecognizability into concrete, situational symmetries and 
oppositions‖,…Calinescu concludes that Eliade‘s fantastic of interpretation is a 
hermeneutic of trust and optimism. 
 
Eliade’s fantastic of interpretation persuades the reader to look at images, symbols, 
metaphors, stories, or inventions as possible bearers of epiphanies or remembrances. By 
means of these devices the imagination breaks out of the amnesia in which modernity has 
trapped it to recall and revive lost worlds of meaning. The larger message of Eliade’s 
fantastic prose is, in brief, that interpretation remains our best hope for an anamnesis of 
mythical truth.
74
 
75
 
 
The underlying avant-garde principle here is in the idea of recollection as a means of revival — 
an activation of mythical memories as an initiation towards gathering the pieces of a paradise 
lost, although we must keep in mind here that it is the imagination that creates such a paradise. 
Thus, paradise in this sense is self-created, operating a pluralistic existence determined by 
uniqueness and variation, hence Calinescu‘s description of ‗lost worlds of meaning‘. The notion 
that modernity constitutes a form of amnesia means that modern cultures are discouraged from 
considering the human consciousness as occupying multitudes of dimensions — dimensions 
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operating beyond the obvious and outwardly physical one. In an effort to establish the viability of 
multi-dimensionality, Bryan Rennie brings together the two main principles that compose 
Eliade‘s theory of hierophany:  1.) his positing of the sacred as being ‗real‘, and 2.) his 
complementary assertion that it is imagination that entirely defines this sacred ‗reality‘:    
 
…Eliade seeks to increase the ontological impact of religion in general both by his 
insistence on the sacred as the real and by his stress on the imaginary as effective. For 
example, he has said, 
 
no conquest of the material world was effected without a corresponding impact on human 
imagination and behaviour. And I am inclined to add that the reflections of the objective 
conquests upon such imaginary Universes are perhaps even more important for an 
understanding of man. (―Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow‖, 465) 
 
…He clarifies this in his History of Religious Ideas, where he states that the empirical 
value of [practical] inventions is evident. What is less so is the importance of the 
imaginative activity inspired by familiarity with the different modalities of matter…The 
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imagination discovers hitherto unsuspected analogies among the different levels of the 
real. (vol. I, 34)
76
 
 
Imagination‘s primary role in the sacred experience is to access other dimensions that do exist, 
despite the possibility that their existence may not satisfy the system of proof as determined by 
empirical criteria. Eliade covers this in his acknowledgment that the empirical aspects of an 
invention may well be evident. But what is not as empirically evident is the imagination‘s role as 
non-physical inspirer that brings forth every detail of the invention. This is where the 
imagination takes on a role near-equivalent to that of the sacred, and that is the role of creator 
magnetising all the circumstances and details that could transform what is imagined into greater 
concreteness — hence Eliade‘s idea of imagination‘s ‗familiarity with the different modalities of 
matter‘, a familiarity which leads to imagination‘s power to attract all cooperative components 
bringing about the corresponding manifestation. Imagination‘s attracting and over-reaching 
qualities create access into other dimensions that Eliade refers to as ‗imaginary Universes‘77. 
This means that the state of multi-dimensionality itself must be aligned with imagination‘s over-
reaching quality, which is essentially the expansion into new levels of newness. Does this mean 
that there are new dimensions emerging all the time, in correspondence to the over-reaching 
nature of the imagination? Eliade only partially answers this question, as we shall later see, by 
stating that hierophany itself constitutes the birthing of a new hybrid dimension resulting from 
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the intersection between sacred and profane. He does also suggest however that without 
recognition of imaginary universes, human existence would be divided and fragmented at best, 
as that would mean that we are not acknowledging our multi-dimensional nature: 
Eliade constantly, if rather quietly, insists on the importance of the imaginary realm. For 
example, in The Quest he points out that initiatory motifs and symbols ―partake of an 
imaginary universe, and this universe is no less important for human existence than the 
world of everyday life‖ (121). And in Images and Symbols: ―that essential and 
indescribable part of man that is called imagination dwells in realms of symbolism and 
still lives upon archaic myths and theologies‖ (19). On a slightly different note which 
serves to explain his meaning somewhat further, he states that 
 
the novel must tell something, because narrative (that is, literary invention) enriches the 
world no more and no less than history, although on another level.
78
 (No Souvenirs, 
205)
79
 
 
Here, Eliade puts forward that artistic (literary) inventions make an equally important 
contribution as much as history, this suggested contrast with history further alluding to the idea 
that artistic inventions operate transhistorically from their core. The transhistorical suggestion 
becomes even more pronounced in his following statement that such inventions enrich the world 
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‗on another level‘. The avant-garde idea of ever-expanding and ever-increasing states of newness 
and originality is implied here, especially with imagination as the determining principle. 
Significantly, homo religiosus has an innate capacity to interpret sacred phenomena 
imaginatively. Eliade puts forward that homo religiosus is a powerful potentiality within any 
individual, and that it operates through the ‗unconscious‘ — a level that lies far deeper than the 
surface consciousness (this latter, Eliade simply terms ‗the conscious‘). He describes the 
unconscious as ‗far more ―poetic‖ — and, let us add, more ―philosophic‖, more ―mythic‖ — than 
the conscious‘80, suggesting that the human unconscious has been so poorly nourished, 
overlooked, and unacknowledged by modernity: 
The psychologists, C.G. Jung among others of the first rank, have shown us how much 
the dramas of the modern world proceed from a profound disequilibrium of the psyche, 
individual as well as collective, brought about largely by a progressive sterilisation of the 
imagination. To ―have imagination‖ is to enjoy a richness of interior life, an 
uninterrupted and spontaneous flow of images.
81
 
 
This idea of a latent fertility of imagination provides valuable insights into what Eliade considers 
to be the unconditionally embedded qualities composing the level of consciousness possessed by 
homo religiosus — namely the unconscious. He puts forward that the modern secular individual 
is occupied by hindrances which cause difficulty in experiencing the sacred. However, he also 
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uses terms such as ‗disequilibrium‘ and ‗sterilisation‘ to describe the general status of such 
hindrances, in turn implying that the original state of human consciousness is one of equilibrium 
and abundance. Without obstructions, the human consciousness would naturally return to a 
perspective of poetic/mythical inspiration, just as it is designed to do if we are to hold to the 
perspective that homo religiosus reigns over any blockage to the activation or practice of the 
sacred experiential capacity. Apart from the infinite potential of the diversification of 
hierophanies, it also important to note that hierophanic newness also lies in the notion that the 
sacred all by itself is imbued with the potential to constantly and continuously generate newness:   
What matters is that a hierophany implies a choice, a clear-cut separation of this thing 
which manifests the sacred from everything else around it. There is always something 
else, even when it is some whole sphere that becomes sacred — the sky, for instance, or a 
certain familiar landscape, or the ―fatherland‖. The thing that becomes sacred is still 
separated in regard to itself, for it only becomes a hierophany at the moment of stopping 
to be a mere profane something, at the moment of acquiring a new ―dimension‖ of 
sacredness.
82
 
 
What is distinctly avant-garde about the emergence of hierophany is the birthing of a new hybrid 
dimension that adds to the current status of things. While the pure sacred source remains 
constant in its qualities — among which Eliade would identify as ‗strong, powerful, because it 
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[the sacred] is real; it is efficacious and durable‘83 — the emergence of every new hierophany 
means that the creative potential of the sacred is expanding into infinity (because the newness of 
every hierophanic addition becomes a constant). Correspondingly, Robert Baird‘s essay suggests 
that it is in the nature of homo religiosus to seek hierophanic newness: 
…homo religiosus is not an historical but an archetypal religious man. Historical persons 
participate in this archetype to varying degrees, even though no on fully embodies it nor 
does anyone entirely cover it. Hence the statements of religious men about the meanings 
of their rites or symbols is secondary to the way in which the symbols fit into universal 
structures. And, individuals are understood in terms of these universal structures and not 
in terms of their religious individuality. 
 
While no one person is the complete embodiment of homo religiosus, archaic man comes 
closest to this model of authentic existence. Eliade begins by convincing us that we 
should be prepared to admit that homo religiosus has had a tendency to extend 
hierophanies indefinitely.
84
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Baird‘s interpretation is not exactly contradictory, but it does present quite conflicting 
connotations. He first states that for homo religiosus, any sense of individuality remains 
secondary to alignment with universal structures. So there are universal hierophanic criteria and 
there are also cultural and even individual hierophanic criteria, and it is the former that takes 
precedence in the capacity to inform and constrain the ways and predispositions of human 
consciousness. However, Baird then states that homo religiosus has a potential to experience 
hierophanies indefinitely. Such a capacity to experience in increasingly innovative and original 
ways would then transcend the subjection to temporal, spatial, and cultural constraints. This 
inherent tendency to seek newness and to bestow such newness with sacred significance 
constitutes an avant-garde principle, as it affirms that there is no final destination to creativity, 
causing hierophanic creative potential to be constantly expanding and advancing. 
Correspondingly, Eliade does suggest that mythical images and symbols have every potential to 
constitute new trends in the arts. Eric Jozef Ziolkowski further interprets that Eliade seems set 
upon using the emergence of the mythical dimension into the literary scene as a means of 
radically altering the filters through which the arts are perceived:  
As early as 1952, when the original French edition of Images and Symbols appeared with 
his claim in the foreword that he had written it primarily for the use of psychologists and 
literary critics, Eliade expressed his belief that the history of religions had much to 
contribute to literary criticism. By extension, as reflected in the following journal entry of 
1960, he also considered the history of religions of great value for creating literature: ―I 
am more and more convinced of the literary value of the materials available to the 
historian of religion. If art —and, above all, literary art, poetry, the novel — knows a new 
Renaissance in our time, it will be called forth by the rediscovery of the function of 
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myths, of religious symbols, and of archaic behavior.... It could be that someday my 
research will be considered an attempt to relocate the forgotten sources of literary 
inspiration.‖ Eliade later tried to substantiate these intuitions. In one essay, he seeks to 
show how the history of religions can be useful for deciphering hidden meanings in 
contemporary philosophical and literary vogues, while, in another, he documents how 
literary critics, especially in this country, eagerly made use of such findings from 
comparative religion as the ―myth and ritual‖ theory or the ―initiation pattern‖ in their 
interpretation of modern fiction and poetry.
85
 
 
Eliade‘s referral to the revival of the sacred and the mythical as a ‗new Renaissance‘ — and 
further still Ziolkowski‘s later description of the featuring of mythical themes in philosophy and 
literature as a deciphering of the veiled and the concealed — go to show that it is more of a norm 
than not for the sacred to be hidden from plain view in one way or another. The more important 
point here is that when the sacred becomes revealed, there emerges a sense of renewal and 
expanded originality within each hierophanic expression. In the arts especially, hierophany 
embodies that which has never before been conceived in the physical — a pushing forward of 
dimensional territory — hence Ziolkowski‘s referral to the ―initiation pattern‖ underlying certain 
works of prose and poetry. And still, Eliade‘s hierophany cannot avoid modern characterisation, 
so long as there remains an insistence upon a sacred-profane dichotomy. Modernity has a 
tendency is to divide things into isolated compartments, so that whatever is partitioned off can 
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then take its own individualistic course. Even when the sacred and the profane do become 
bridged through hierophany, the hierophany itself carries on the separation pattern — 
demarcating and even alienating itself from all else that is profane to the point of complete 
exclusion: ‗The thing that becomes sacred is still separated in regard to itself, for it only becomes 
a hierophany at the moment of stopping to be a mere profane something, at the moment of 
acquiring a new ―dimension‖ of sacredness.‘86 Andrew Hass describes the further self-
development of an individual component through separation from the integrated whole as the 
point where the modern phenomenon contrasts itself from the pre-modern inclination to bind 
branching disciplines to a centralised source of knowledge: 
One of the distinguishing features that separates us moderns from our forebears is 
precisely our conceptions of knowledge and its appropriation. In a wholly integrated and 
self-contained cosmology, such as the ancients and the medievals constructed, 
knowledge, though still vast and variegated, remained within a single unified system, and 
any point of entry would necessarily lead to or intersect with all other possible points of 
entry. A medical doctor could just as easily end up consulting astronomy as, say, botany, 
or an astronomer just as easily philosophy as, say, geometry, and all would eventually 
end up at theology, especially if educated within the context of European Christendom or 
the Ottoman Empire. But with the modern turn, knowledge lost any such integration and 
harmony. The moment the universe turned outward, with a centrifugal force of infinite 
measure, knowledge lost its self-containment and univocacy, and was forced into 
segregated spheres of autonomous or semi-autonomous understanding. This is not 
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because a sense of the whole was completely abandoned — the ‗universe‘ still turned on 
a notion of aggregated oneness. It is just that the whole, as one, no longer had a structural 
centrality, no longer had centripetal lines of force unifying its every movement.
87
 
 
At first glance, Eliade concept of the sacred does appear to have unifying qualities, especially in 
his proposition that the sacred is an inherently non-physical structure unconditionally embedded 
within the consciousness: ‗If the sacred means being, the real, and the meaningful, as I hold it 
does, then the sacred is a part of the structure of human consciousness.‘88 But then, Eliade 
contradicts himself by implying the sacred‘s inability to encompass all things related to it. 
Instead of allowing the sacred to embrace the profane which just as much constitutes the basis of 
hierophany, he turns against the sacred‘s unifying potential by dichotomising it with the profane: 
For religious man, nature is never only ―natural‖; it is always fraught with a religious 
value. This is easy to understand, for the cosmos is a divine creation; coming from the 
hands of the gods, the world is impregnated with sacredness. It is not simply a sacrality 
communicated by the gods, as is the case, for example, with a place or an object 
consecrated by the divine presence. The gods did more; they manifested the different 
modalities of the sacred in the very structure of the world and of cosmic phenomena.
89
  
                                                          
87
 Andrew W. Hass, ‗Discipline Beyond Disciplines‘, in Literature and Theology: new interdisciplinary 
spaces (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2011), pp. 19 – 36 (p. 20). 
88
 Eliade, ‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, p. 58.  
89
 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 116. 
66 
 
 
On the one hand, Eliade is saying that everything contains sacred potential, that there is nothing 
that lies outside of this all-embracing sacredness as the world itself is a living manifestation of it. 
The world being created from a centralised power goes to show that the basic universal law is 
one of unity, not division. However, Eliade contradicts himself by saying that the sacred is 
―wholly other‖, that a hierophany reveals qualities that are unrelated to its immediate physical 
structure. He is here saying that the sacredness of an object has nothing to do with those 
(profane) components that have come together to compose the object as it stands: 
  
The sacred manifests itself as a power or force that is quite different from the forces of 
nature. A sacred tree, for instance, is not worshiped for being a tree. Neither is a sacred 
stone adored, in and of itself, for its natural properties as a stone. These objects become 
the focus of religious veneration because they are hierophanies, revealing something that 
is no longer botanical or geological, but ―wholly other‖.90 
 
Here, Eliade rather has his foot quite clearly placed in the modern attitude of dividing concepts 
into separate units that are left to take their own unrelated directions. This scattered pattern of 
individualistic self-direction operates without even the inclination to reach back to any such core 
quality that could potentially interlink different units in a familial manner. In saying that the 
sacredness of a tree has nothing to do with the fact it is a tree or the sacredness of a stone with 
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the fact that it is stone, he is suggesting that the sacred is completely and utterly alien. So the 
idea now is to juxtapose the object with the sacred, and from thereon virtually force them to have 
a hierophanic relationship. Furthermore, separating the sacred into an isolated category dissolves 
the possibility that it is the sacred source that births the manifestation, that the sacred has always 
been imbued in nature itself. Again, isolating the sacred with such an unyielding barrier dictating 
a permanent otherness contradicts his earlier statement that ‗For religious man, nature is never 
only ―natural‖.‘91 This earlier statement does suggest that the sacred potential is contained in all 
things, but only to be cut short in another statement that ‗The sacred manifests itself as a power 
or force that is quite different from the forces of nature.‘92 Because of such a major contradiction 
in Eliade‘s theoretical framework, I am setting out to resolve it by proposing that his initial 
theory that the world is impregnated with sacredness by divine beings can still be maintained if 
and only if the sacred-profane dichotomy is dismantled altogether. But even before attempting 
such a dismantling, the following questions need to be posed: 
1.) Does hybridity mean the intersection of qualities that would otherwise be completely 
separate, if it were not for the hierophanic ‗bridging‘ between such qualities? Or does it mean a 
manifested embodiment of qualities that latently overlap (in other words, do such contrasting 
qualities already overlap in the more intangible level of potentiality, and then later come to 
acquire a more tangible embodiment of their points of overlapping through some transformative 
process such as hierophanisation)?;  
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2.) If hybridity is an embodiment of a new state (‗new‘ due to the newly acquired state of inter-
dimensional fusion), does that mean that the individual components of the hybrid structure must 
then become ‗old‘? For instance, do the sacred and the profane considered individually all by 
themselves simply become old, due to the fact that they would lose their individuality once the 
hierophanic fusion between them occurs? If so (and it would be so if we are only and exclusively 
following the way of dichotomy), can the new embrace ‗old‘ components without its own 
foundation of newness being severely disrupted?  
Eliade‘s interpretation of Hegel‘s Universal Spirit does answer such questions in very round 
about ways. Historical events constitute the Universal Spirit‘s self-revelation in increasingly new 
and progressive ways, almost as if the Universal Spirit is continuously perfecting itself through 
historical expressions. Thus, the Universal Spirit contains an overriding inclination to keep 
expanding infinitely (as there would be no end to historical events that show states of 
improvement), in turn offering insight into the nature of the sacred source as one which expands 
in much the same way through hierophanic expressions:  ‗…for Hegel, an event is irreversible 
and valid in itself inasmuch as it is a new manifestation of the will of God…Thus, in Hegel‘s 
view, the destiny of a people still preserved a transhistorical significance, because all history 
revealed a new and more perfect manifestation of the Universal Spirit.‘93 Thus, the Universal 
Spirit upholds both constancy (the steadfast principle serving as a common denomination 
underlying all things) and variation (uniqueness and diversity) without having to make the two 
qualities mutually exclusive. If such an allowance can be applied to the sacred source, the sacred 
would incorporate an element of infinity — a quality of creative continuation without end.  
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The Problem of Dichotomy 
     The problem arises however when the newness of hierophany forcibly converts all the 
components within its own structure into old states, as dichotomisation does not recognise the 
interpenetration of contrasting qualities. The old and the new may co-exist with a barrier 
between them, but they cannot actually mix in permeating ways, turning the concept of a hybrid 
structure on its own head because hybridity by its nature necessitates a thorough mixing of 
contrasting qualities. The hierophanic fusion — which is problematic in itself so long as there is 
an insistence upon dichotomy — can only maintain its status of newness to the exclusion of all 
else within its own structure. In other words, dichotomy dictates that the individual components 
operating within hierophany cannot possess a newness that could possibly compete with newness 
of the assembled hierophany. Yet despite the problems presenting major contradictions within 
Eliade‘s theory, the fact remains that his concept of hierophany does hold great potential as a 
primary tool in analysing sacred art. The ultimate viability of hierophany much depends upon the 
way in which it is re-interpreted, especially so that the modified model of hierophany can 
embrace both unification and diversity. And again, despite his general insistence upon dichotomy 
(which essentially means a permanent split), there remain instances where Eliade would suggest 
the idea of open passages and channels interlinking different dimensions so that such dimensions 
cooperate to create other new dimensions resulting from the fusion, in turn showing that 
dichotomy does not have such a stronghold over his theory of transformative hierophany afterall. 
Here, he uses terms connoting enormous structural contention and radical shifts in the fabric of 
co-existing multiple realities, such as ‗irruption‘ and ‗break in plane‘ to describe the intersection 
between contrasting dimensions, indicating that the demarcation and disconnection qualifying 
dichotomy are being severely undermined:   
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…the irruption of the sacred does not only project a fixed point into the formless fluidity 
of profane space, a center into chaos; it also effects a break in plane, that is, it opens 
communication between the cosmic planes (between earth and heaven) and makes 
possible ontological passages from one mode of being to another.
94
 
 
While it is true that Eliade‘s centre and chaos constitute a relationship between dimensions that 
seemingly oppose each other, the inter-dimensional passageways cause the different dimensions 
concerned to integrate with each other, as opposed to behaving individualistically as if they are 
completely unrelated. Despite Eliade‘s efforts in making a case for the sacred-profane 
dichotomy, his arguments ultimately seem to lead to a sense of absolute unification where 
contrasting dimensions — no matter how seemingly incompatible — are made to interpenetrate 
each other, here again Hegel‘s influences showing through quite clearly:  
  
The change must take place in a definite way. Between one phase and another of that 
development there must intervene an active principle, and Hegel suggested that this 
principle was actually one of opposition and interaction. That is to say, to produce any 
new situation (i.e., any departure from an existing condition of equilibrium) there must 
previously exist two elements so opposed to each other and yet so related to each other 
that a solution or resolution is demanded; such a solution being in effect a new phase of 
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development (temporary state of equilibrium) which preserves some of the elements of 
the interacting phases, eliminates others, but is qualitatively different from the previously 
existing state of opposition.
95
 
 
Herbert Read‘s interpretation of Hegel‘s idea that a new dimension is born from the 
simultaneous clash and cooperation between opposing dimensions very much constitutes the 
bedrock of the avant-garde as a state of consciousness. There appears to be a suggestion that 
there is a kind of escrow that keeps a record of the proportionate opposite of undesirable 
occurrences — such an opposite meaning the preferred or even the idealistic resolution that 
could possibly counter the unpleasantness — and what had been deposited into the escrow then 
becomes delivered into the new and improved dimension upon fulfillment of certain conditions. 
Correspondingly, Bryan Rennie incorporates into his interpretation of hierophany the condition 
of hierarchy within autonomy, this hierarchy manifesting in the form of an acquisition of a 
distinct status ahead of the rest — which is a concept bearing much resemblance to the avant-
garde or the vanguard as a distinguished status emerging forward from the rearguard: 
  
Although the starting point for an understanding of Eliade‘s sacred is its dialectical 
opposition to the profane, it becomes apparent that the conclusion is not one of simple 
opposition but one of complex interdependence. Having pointed out that ―anything man 
has ever handled, felt, come into contact with or loved can become a hierophany‖ 
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(Patterns, 10f.), Eliade is quite aware of the difficulty this raises. If anything at all can 
reveal the sacred, can the sacred/profane dichotomy stand? The answer is affirmative 
because while all things can reveal the sacred, not all things do. Not only is there no 
culture which recognizes all the manifestations of sacrality which have been detected in 
various times and locations, but also ―while a certain class of things may be found fitting 
vehicles of the sacred, there always remain some things in the class which are not given 
this honor‖ (13). Thus there is still a real and meaningful distinction here. The sacred is 
still perceived as distinct from the profane.
96
 
 
The term ‗profane‘ all by itself is highly problematic, for there are numerous instances where 
Eliade directly associates the profane with the secular. Secularising the profane intensifies the 
barrier which marks the already sharp division within the sacred-profane dichotomy: ‗the sacred 
and the religious life are the opposite of the profane and the secular life.‘97 Apart from this 
emphasis upon such an oppositional relationship, Eliade does not acknowledge any qualities that 
could possibly stand for the varying degrees of differentiation between sacred and profane. They 
are extreme opposites, yet there is no qualitative spectrum connecting them. The fact remains 
that just because something is not sacred, it does not mean that that non-sacred thing must 
always be an obstruction or even an opposition to the sacred. In other words, distinguishing the 
sacred from the profane by means of rigid severing will not result in a viable method of 
determining the foundational hierophanic structure.  
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Redefining the Avant-garde 
     Even though terms such as ‗tradition‘ and ‗convention‘ possess connotations that seem to be 
severely at odds with the avant-garde, there seems to be a predominant tendency to place the 
movement as distinctly belonging to modernity, to such an extent that binding the avant-garde to 
modernity has become very much of a ‗traditional‘ practice. Rosalind Krauss uses 
postmodernism as a counter-argument against reducing the avant-garde to a mere phenomenon 
attached too firmly to the strings of modernity, implying a disservice in stubbornly positioning 
the avant-garde into a historical box. She is almost alluding to the idea that to define the avant-
garde as a modern movement is to literally impose its forthcoming termination even as early as 
its budding stages, as the modern era itself is bound to come to an end due to the inevitable 
conditions of historical patterns: 
    
In deconstructing the sister notions of origin and originality, postmodernism establishes a 
schism between itself and the conceptual domain of the avant-garde, looking back at it 
from across a gulf that in turn establishes a historical divide. The historical period that the 
avant-garde shared with modernism is over. That seems an obvious fact.
98
 
  
Krauss rather views modernity as a separating tool hindering the avant-garde from any capacity 
to continue on as a movement that could possibly progress beyond the parameters of modernity 
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itself. It is important to identify the limitations that modernity has imposed upon the avant-garde 
as well as the sacred, so that we can then remove those limitations in order to establish a concept 
of the sacred in avant-garde art — a new concept that can stand securely and compatibly as a 
qualitative juxtaposition. Douglas Allen‘s interpretation of Eliade‘s dichotomisation between the 
sacred and the modern offers some insight into what modernity includes and excludes: 
 
Mircea Eliade distinguishes archaic, ―traditional‖, mythic, religious human beings from 
―modern‖, nonmythic, nonreligious human beings. Eliade does not claim that every 
contemporary, Western human being is a ―modern‖ person. He refers to two, general 
orientations or human modes of being in the world: two radically different ways of 
conceiving of human nature, the human condition, and how human beings are 
existentially, temporally, and historically related to reality. In presenting these two 
essential types, Eliade formulates clear-cut traditional versus modern contrasts and 
dichotomies: affirming or rejecting the reality of the sacred; affirming the mythic and 
living myths versus identification with a demythologized reality; devaluing or abolishing 
time and history and upholding atemporal, nonhistorical, exemplary, mythic and religious 
modes versus identification with the temporal and historical dimensions of existence.
99
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Modernity includes the avant-garde and excludes the sacred by eliminating all chances for avant-
garde phenomena to feature, incorporate, or even allude to mythical elements as Eliade sees 
them. The modern avant-garde must only be secular. If we are to hold onto Eliade‘s 
dichotomisation of the sacred and the modern, the sacred in avant-garde art would in fact not be 
able to emerge as a possible theory, because the mere presence of dichotomy would cause the 
sacred and the avant-garde to cancel each other out. Until modernity‘s confining methods of 
assessment are debunked, the sacred and the avant-garde cannot expand beyond them. According 
to J. T. Harskamp‘s essay, there is an implication that avant-garde is dragged into the status of a 
‗tradition‘ along with modernity that has lost its own cultural applicability: 
One of the military metaphors contemporary criticism has borrowed from the nineteenth 
century is the notion of avant-garde. The metaphor of course is closely connected with 
the idea of modernism in art. In fact, modernism and avant-garde have become 
interchangeable terms. It has been argued that modernism has lost its sting and vitality, 
because it is no longer a critical attitude but a codified convention… Avant-garde itself 
has become tradition and as such has lost its raison-d’être, because it has no longer any 
radical function to perform. The epoch of modernism has become the domain of the 
historian and the critic.
100
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
characteristics of modernity, but also as more in touch with human nature and the transhistorical 
nature of reality. (p. 268)  
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The conditions of historical time necessitate that modernity would eventually become an era that 
we look back upon. And therefore if there was anything that was once progressive and forward-
thinking about modernity, such qualities would inevitably become placed in the archives of 
history with the passing of time. The only way that avant-garde could possibly not become 
susceptible to the changes brought about by history is to be unconditionally progressive and 
forward-thinking, which means that avant-garde must become a self-preserving constant state 
that transcends the conditions of historical time. The avant-garde association with modernity 
means that avant-garde too would disappear as if there is no trace of its origination, since its 
modern qualification does not see it as being rooted in any constant source beyond the confines 
of historical specificity. Modernity would view avant-garde as not having a broader 
transhistorical status, which in turn means that modernity does not recognise the importance of a 
‗centre‘ or the ultimate interconnection between things. The modern avant-garde would then 
become a mere isolated fragment that happened to be placed in the passing of historical events, 
grasping onto whatever is new at the time without much concern for the appropriateness of the 
new thing, as there would be no grounding criteria that avant-garde would otherwise use to 
assess the qualities of that new thing. With the following definition provided by Krauss as a 
platform for construction of a transhistorical definition of the avant-garde, I intend to put forward 
that originality does not necessarily constitute a severing of ties with the past, but embraces 
innovative potential regardless of the historical period in which such potential can be found: 
    
77 
 
One thing only seems to hold fairly constant in the vanguardist discourse and that is the 
theme of originality. By originality, here, I mean more than just the kind of revolt against 
tradition that echoes in Ezra Pound‘s ―Make it new!‖ or sounds in the futurists‘ promise 
to destroy the museums that cover Italy as though ―with countless cemeteries.‖ More than 
a rejection or dissolution of the past, avant-garde originality is conceived as a literal 
origin, a beginning from ground zero, a birth. Marinetti, thrown from his automobile one 
evening in 1909 into a factory ditch filled with water, emerges as if from amniotic fluid 
to be born — without ancestors — a futurist. This parable of absolute self-creation that 
begins the first Futurist Manifesto functions as a model for what is meant by originality 
among the early twentieth-century avant-garde. For originality becomes an organicist 
metaphor referring not so much to formal invention as to sources of life. The self as 
origin is safe from contamination by tradition because it possesses a kind of originary 
naiveté. Hence Brancusi‘s dictum, ―When we are no longer children, we are already 
dead.‖ Or again, the self as origin has the potential for continual acts of regeneration, a 
perpetuation of self-birth. Hence Malevich‘s pronouncement, ―Only he is alive who 
rejects his convictions of yesterday.‖ 101 
 
The concept of ‗self-birth‘ where ancestral roots have been eliminated remains inadequate in 
defining the sacred in avant-garde art, as Eliade‘s theory of the sacred unwaveringly declares the 
constant influences of primordial roots — constituting a source of origin situated in mythical 
time (outside of and independent from linear, historical time). However, there may yet be a way 
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to resolve the seeming contradiction between Krauss‘s interpretation of self-birth and Eliade‘s 
illo tempore. This resolution lies in the fact that Krauss‘s self-birth operates on a predominantly 
cynical level and Eliade‘s mythical origin operates on an archetypal level (a realm of potentiality 
characterised by abstract patterns of relationships that do not take into account the undesirable 
details of physical everyday life). Even though there are mythical allusions in the idea of 
Marinetti coming out of a factory ditch in a manner resembling emergence from amniotic fluid, 
the cold severing of ties with any and all aspects of the past motivated by extreme rebelliousness 
constitutes reactionary behaviour or a dialectical response, and therefore cannot even be closely 
aligned to the archetypal level. Furthermore, while it is the past organised in accordance to the 
linear concept of time that self-birth is intending to delete from memory, mythical origin does 
not actually take place within that chronological structure of linear time. Thus, the two points of 
origin (1. self-birth which severs ties with the past, and 2. mythical origin which remains beyond 
the dualistic notion of beginning and end) operate quite independently of each other. If we begin 
by acknowledging such differentiations, Krauss‘s self-birth and Eliade‘s mythical origin may not 
be mutually exclusive afterall, as they operate on different levels, leaving little by way of 
comparison, so that technically speaking, they cannot contradict one another. The archetypal 
level does not bind itself to reactionary behaviour motivated by the dramas of everyday 
injustices, unlike self-birth. In other words, the archetypal level is not given to micro-
management. According to Eliade, there is an internal source holding the potential for certain 
experiential capacities — a source which originates during the pre-human era of illo tempore. So 
whether he is referring to ‗archetype‘, ‗exemplary model‘, or ‗paradigm‘, all such terms describe 
instructive blueprints encoded in the consciousness that inform, constrain, and direct certain 
human attitudes and perspectives: 
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In the course of the book I have used the terms ―exemplary models‖, ―paradigms‖, and 
―archetypes‖ in order to emphasize a particular fact — namely, that for the man of the 
traditional and archaic societies, the models for his institutions and the norms for his 
various categories of behavior are believed to have been ―revealed‖ at the beginning of 
time, that, consequently, they are regarded as having a superhuman and ―transcendental‖ 
origin.
102
 
 
What Eliade refers to as archetypes, exemplary models, and paradigms are essentially innate 
guides assisting homo religiosus in their interpretation of sacred phenomena. The interlinkage 
that archetypes do have with avant-garde lies in the remedial potential and positive aspects that 
arise from the avant-garde‘s observation of what is undesirable. In other words, where there is an 
awareness of the unwanted, a proportionate registering of what is wanted emerges in its place, 
although this emergence of the desirable equivalent at first takes place in the archetypal level of 
pure potentiality. The archetypal level then contains the presence of very real positive elements, 
even though the presence of such ideals rests at a pre-manifestational stage. Douglas Allen 
suggests that these ideal structures do manifest themselves during the most creative moments 
where an individual‘s consciousness is aligned with the pure, archetypal homo religiosus:   
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In the dialectic of hierophanies, homo religiosus intuits that which is paradigmatic, 
‗perfect‘, the ideal structure, ‗the pure case‘. The ideal religious structure is not found in 
the particular, spatial, temporal, historical, conditioned facts…What ‗verifies‘ the sacred 
model, the paradigmatic structure, for homo religiosus is that he or she can use it to 
illuminate the nature of the particular existential situation; to give meaning to the chaotic, 
isolated, finite, ‗impure‘, ‗imperfect‘ facts of his or her profane existence. 
 
…Eliade‘s position seems to be that the ideal religious structure is actually experienced 
by homo religiosus in at least a few cases. The religious structure is not revealed in the 
profane facts qua profane facts. And it is not revealed fully in the vast majority of 
religious phenomena. But at certain highly creative moments in the history of humankind, 
homo religiosus did conceive fully the ‗pure case‘, the ideal religious meaning of 
ascension, of agriculture, of the moon, etc.
103
 
 
So we can see that Eliade‘s idea of a mythical origin is not actually contradicting Krauss‘s idea 
of self-birth, primarily because the two are driven by very different sets of qualities that are not 
always comparable. Or more simply put, mythical origin is positively driven while self-birth is 
negatively driven. Eliade‘s archetypal level of consciousness rests consistently in an idealised 
state — especially as the mythical origin is situated within a divine realm — and the 
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imperfections and suffering so typical of profane existence only go to show how far the profane 
has diverted from the sacred. Krauss‘s self-birth is essentially dialectical, that is, motivated by an 
opposition, the intention to achieve victory over an opponent, and an ideal or greater cause that is 
meant to overcome the opponent. While Eliade‘s illo tempore upholds a divine past, Krauss‘s 
self-birth is intent upon the cleansing of every trace of the past, precisely because the past 
represents an authority external to the individual (Krauss uses the metaphor of ‗ancestors‘ to 
describe this authority in her example of Marinetti‘s Futurism) that has inhibited freedom of 
expression. The more important point however is that while Eliade‘s mythical origin and 
Krauss‘s self-birth are both driven by their own ideals, the former seems to be upholding the 
archetypal level as a holder of higher solutions developing at a stage of pre-manifestation (hence 
Allen‘s interpretation that archetypes and paradigms shed insight and meaning into the 
extremities of the undesirable constituting a major characteristic of profane existence; it is the 
equivalent opposite of such unpleasantness that the archetypal level is registering in its constant 
state of purity). Yet Krauss‘s self-birth — even in its focus upon the ideal of forward movement 
— remains attached to the problem and the negativity that had motivated the vision of self-birth 
to begin with. If the focus upon the initial problem was significantly reduced, there would be no 
need for such an obsession with annihilating every single trace of the past.    
 
     In order to effectively analyse the sacred in avant-garde art, the task then is to construct a 
definition of avant-garde that embraces both mythical origin and self-birth, while focusing as 
little as possible upon the negative status quo that had initially motivated the intention of 
rebellion. In other words, the new definition of avant-garde must restore the remedial aspects 
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that self-birth in its radical spirit of rebellion is essentially seeking. That is because over-thinking 
the problem that had given rise to such avant-garde sentiments would have a tendency to 
exaggerate the scale of the problem to the extent where even the notion of mythical origin taking 
place in primordial time is turned into a problematic status quo, for it must still be noted that 
self-birth is a metaphorical elimination of all ancestors. And yet, it is the symbolic death to ties 
with the past that may quite ironically hold a greater potential towards a more inclusive 
definition of avant-garde. Here, we must return to Krauss‘s quoting of Romanian-born patriarch 
of modern sculpture, Constantin Brancusi: ―When we are no longer children, we are already 
dead.‖ 104 Such an idea bears much resemblance to Rob Halpern‘s theory of ‗the new‘ where he 
suggests that even though the new is a child of the old — the old constituting a greater whole 
from which the new is a branching extension — the new is still very much an independent child 
who has been alienated to the extent that the new no longer wishes to return to its roots: 
 
Unlike ―the newest thing,‖ or nouveauté, which like ―the news‖ gives way to its own 
obsolescence and substitution, ―the new‖ as such appears abstract in its very 
concreteness, cut-off from its own history and everything familiar. A materialist 
conception of ―the new‖ might find an unexpected homologue in the fragmented part 
produced by the factory worker whose divided activity maintains the most abstract 
relation to the total process in which it functions. The part alone, in its inaccessible 
relation to the whole, appears irreducible to what is known; it resembles nothing familiar, 
even as it bears the imprimatur of an entire system of production that extends beyond 
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cognition‘s reach. Its sudden appearance as if from outside that system might then 
suggest a species of ―the new‖. Put somewhat differently, ―the new‖ can be said to be 
alienated from the conditions that make it what it is, while simultaneously registering 
those conditions in an unprecedented way.
105
 
   
Halpern‘s analogy of the disconnected part of a large-scale system of factory production sheds 
insight into the mechanical character of the relationship between the more preferable new and the 
undesirable old, alluding to a cold and unsympathetic perspective that the new would have 
towards the entity that had birthed it. Here, the new does not seem to want to acknowledge the 
influences of its own roots, possibly due to its singular determination to transform itself into an 
original assemblage whose qualities should not at all resemble those of its roots. Yet, the new is 
far from superficial. It is not a fast-food throw-away commodity that is always going to become 
outdated upon being replaced by another attention-grabber, hence Halpern‘s specification that 
the new cannot be equated to ‗the news‘. The new is a state that is always renewing and even 
reinventing itself into endless variations — a creative constant. The new may in fact open up 
wider avenues towards a consideration of the old in progressively critical ways, as opposed to 
resting upon a blank judgment that the new is just another stubborn child callously rebelling 
against a parent. Halpern describes this illuminating potential of the new as a ‗registering [of] 
those conditions [of the old] in an unprecedented way.‘106   
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The Mummification Metaphor 
If the plastic arts were put under psychoanalysis, the practice of embalming the dead 
might turn out to be a fundamental factor in their creation. The process might reveal that 
at the origin of painting and sculpture there lies a mummy complex. The religion of 
ancient Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as depending on the continued 
existence of the corporeal body. Thus, by providing a defense against the passage of time 
it satisfied a basic psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time. To 
preserve, artificially, his bodily appearance is to snatch it from the flow of time, to stow it 
away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life. It was natural, therefore, to keep up 
appearances in the face of the reality of death by preserving flesh and bone.
107
 
 
The death of the new from the old then leads to a symbolic convergence between the plastic arts 
and mummification, as expressed by film critic and theorist André Bazin (1918 – 1958) who 
suggests that visual creations constitute an escapist form of immortalisation. Mummification is a 
renewal — and indeed a reinvention — of the body into a symbolically frozen state transcending 
the maneuvering hands of time. Preserving the body into a semblance of physical permanence 
after the last breath had been drawn constitutes a progressive aspect of avant-garde in that such a 
preservation 1.) elongates the materiality of the body — inevitably causing the body to compete 
with linear time, as the mummy‘s purpose is precisely to outwit time — and 2.) conducts the 
body to take a direction completely divergent to, almost violating of, the irreversibility of time. 
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The image of what was once a living and breathing body is captured into what resembles an 
eternally sleeping status where it can be kept and cared for, as if the spirit that had once inhabited 
that body is not actually treated as a memory but rather as an eternal presence, especially since 
the spirit‘s own image (the mummy) is here to stay in a supposedly permanent manner. The body 
no longer reflects the imperfections of the human to whom physical death was an absolute 
certainty. On the contrary, the mummified body must have attained a certain level of perfection 
— afterall, among the many reasons to mummify a body is the fact that it must have belonged to 
person who was distinguished in some way — in order to be worthy of being preserved through 
methods especially designed to prevent decay.
108
 Whether the mummy symbolises the 
reversibility or transcendence of time, it is living proof that time‘s linear determinant has been 
snatched away. Time no longer has the power to age something nor to deteriorate it into 
inevitable perish. Viewing painting, sculpture, and other plastic arts as metaphors of 
mummification is to recognise that an image of a certain moment in time has been extracted and 
preserved — saved even — from the passing of time. The physical dimension may indeed be 
governed by the very fact that time cannot be stopped; but in the consideration of the 
mummification metaphor, time truly must come to a stand-still, as the plastic arts bring forward a 
new dimension that is always branching away from time‘s irreversible, yet conventional, 
behaviour. The mummification metaphor turns the forward movement of time into an old 
pattern, while the mummy‘s preservation of the body — which is a very literal packaging of a 
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moment in time — constitutes a new interpretation of how time can be manipulated. It then 
comes as no surprise that the mummifying aspect of the plastic arts becomes even more 
exaggerated in photography and cinema: 
 
Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image of the object that is capable of 
satisfying the deep need man has to substitute for it something more than a mere 
approximation, a kind of decal or transfer. The photographic image is the object itself, the 
object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, 
distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, 
it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it 
is the reproduction; it is the model.
109
 
 
Rather than viewing images as reproduced imitations of reality, Bazin suggests that photography 
and cinema constitute models of a deep-seated need to keep reviewing memories, as though they 
are not memories of times past but more like captured moments concurrent with the actual 
moment in which the individual is being exposed to the images. The flaws and deficiencies in 
photographic images remain secondary to the fact that those images serve as an embalming of 
memories — concretised transformations of moments that would normally and even worse, 
helplessly, pass by otherwise. Thus, Bazin does not consider the external quality of the images to 
be as important as their innate meanings, causing him to relate an image‘s inner essence to the 
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enchantment of old family pictures. Evidently, he was writing in an era when photography and 
cinema were mostly monochrome. Yet it is this precise quality that shows what the normal naked 
eye cannot do, and that is to interpret the world in black-and-white with a very wide range of 
greys incorporating all manner of subtleties and contrasts. Because of this differentiation 
between monochrome photography (and cinema) and the coloured nature of external physical 
reality as translated through the senses, he interprets family portraits as ghostly, strangely 
captivating, and transcending naked vision: 
 
Hence the charm of family albums. Those grey or sepia shadows, phantomlike and 
almost undecipherable, are no longer traditional family portraits but rather the disturbing 
presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration, freed from their destiny; not, 
however, by the prestige of art but by the power of an impassive mechanical process: for 
photography does not create eternity, as art does, it embalms time, rescuing it simply 
from its proper corruption.
110
 
  
Ultimately of course, there is no separation between photography and the rest of the arts, for it is 
the concept of eternity we are considering, photography just as much as the other arts has every 
capacity to imprint itself upon that aspect of memory which remains detached from linear time 
(e.g. illo tempore). What does distinguish photography (and in that connection, cinema) is its 
recording mechanism that captures far more than the external appearances, causing photography 
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to constitute much more than plain imitation. Photography retains the intertwining of mental and 
emotional states — all the subtle energies that have assembled to create that unrepeatable 
moment — that very strangely connects the spectator with the subject of the photograph, 
regardless of whether or not the subject (be it person, place, or object) still carries on a physical 
existence. Thus, nostalgia comes in to play a significant role in the basic need to treat specific 
moments in the past not as an actual past, but rather as cherished records that can be re-played 
over and over indefinitely. Photography and cinema prove that (captured) models of those 
moments can be selected. The selection of images and the methods by which they are composed 
determine the nature of photography and cinema, further showing that these are media where the 
exhibition and sequencing of images are subject to control or at least to deliberate creative 
organisation. Such media convey preferences and ideals that have undergone processes of 
selectively sifting and sorting through — the editing process being the clearest example (and of 
course in our contemporary times, photographic manipulation is possibly at its height). And still, 
everything boils down to the element of ultimate simplicity, and that is the recording function — 
the proof that nostalgia cannot remain a mere yearning for the more idealistic aspects of the past, 
but is instead transformed into a visual embodiment of a temporal ‗pause‘ — a pause in every 
sense of the word because the flow of time is halted in a photographic image. The allusion here 
to Eliade‘s concept of paradisiac nostalgia becomes all the more evident: 
 
…Eliade finds that ‗the paradisiac myths‘ all speak of a ‗paradisiac epoch‘ in which 
primordial beings enjoyed freedom, immortality, easy communication with the gods, etc. 
Unfortunately, they lost all this because of ‗the fall‘ — the primordial event which caused 
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the ‗rupture‘ of the sacred and the profane. These myths help homo religiosus to 
understand his or her present ‗fallen‘ existence and express a ‗nostalgia‘ for that 
‗prefallen‘ Paradise.111 
 
Significantly, the symbolic return to the primordial occurrence — which is through ritualistic 
hierophany — resembles the mummification metaphor in many aspects, especially in the 
intention to step outside of normal time in order to enter into another dimension where the rules 
of linearity and sequential chronology do not govern. Physical death of the body is evidently a 
‗fall‘, but what mummification does is return the body to its ‗pre-fallen‘ state. Does it follow 
though that the physical life that had once inhabited the mummified body can be considered a 
symbolic equivalent to the state of pre-fallen paradise? There is no straight-forward answer, as 
there is nothing to guarantee the quality of the life that had once inhabited the body, while 
‗paradise‘ would always refer to an idealised state (‗freedom, immortality, easy communication 
with the gods‘112) that is generally consistent and not bound to the suffering of loss and grief. A 
round-about answer however is that the mummification metaphor stands for an eternal state of 
intactness, a description which can just as easily apply to the idea of paradise. Thus, the 
mummified body symbolises that state of paradise towards which the life that had left it is 
destined. If the mummification metaphor constitutes a new interpretation of how time can be 
manipulated considering that its powers of irreversibility are now stolen from it, then paradise — 
an elevated state situated in illo tempore, which is a mythical time eternally resting outside of 
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ordinary, linear time — would just as easily be subject to new interpretations. Bazin‘s 
association of the mummification metaphor with the plastic arts goes to show that the 
predisposition to progress beyond any and all imposed changeabilities and consequences dictated 
by time is certainly a pre-modern one, which also means that the avant-garde tendencies inherent 
in the mummification metaphor are just as pre-modern. Forward movement as a general principle 
of progressing beyond known borders therefore does not necessarily comply nor align with the 
incessant forward movement that is bound to the specifications of time. We must keep in mind 
here that linear time constitutes the ‗rules of the game‘ governing the physical dimension, 
causing such linearity to become a very rigid construct. And it is not in the nature of avant-garde 
to conform to rigidity of any order, again considering that avant-garde can essentially be defined 
as creative rebellion. Bazin‘s mummification metaphor deeply reflects a much broader, more 
encompassing definition of avant-garde, especially since mummification constitutes an exception 
to the consequences of linear time, and the avant-garde is about creating exceptions to the rules. 
Just as mummification expands our conceptions of how time can affect us and the rest of 
physicality, being an exception to the consequences of linear time opens up endless possibilities 
as to how illo tempore can encompass newness and originality. The fact that the ways of the 
archaic are much more closely aligned with mythical patterns is almost irrelevant to the avant-
garde principle that newness and originality (even as they take the form of influential 
movements) can be found in a vast range of phenomena, regardless of the historical period in 
which they take place. Forward movement, within a more inclusive definition of avant-garde, 
would mean progressing beyond certain conventional and indeed limiting terms and conditions 
in order to seek new and improved states that are constantly expanding in themselves, for the 
newness itself must become a constant.   
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The Cross-cultural Avant-garde 
     The majority of literature concerning avant-garde still places avant-garde in a solely 
Eurocentric context.
113
 If we are to hold to the definition that avant-garde is creative rebellion, a 
Eurocentric restriction that suffocates intercultural exchange does not at all align with such a 
definition which proposes a constant expansion of creative boundaries. In the Introduction to Not 
the Other Avant-garde, James Harding and John Rouse clearly lay out that the name of their 
anthology is designed to question conventional sources of authority, especially to establish a new 
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avant-garde model operating beyond Eurocentric biases: ‗…this title suggests new cultural 
directions and invites a consideration of the work of experimental artists from around the globe. 
Playing upon the notion of ―the Other‖, it suggests that we reconsider the cultural boundaries that 
have historically demarcated scholarly conceptions of the avant-garde, for in doing so we can lay 
the foundation for a substantially retheorized notion of the avant-garde.‘114 The task is to 
accomplish a greater inclusiveness expanding avant-garde territory:
115
 ‗Our aim is to move from 
                                                          
114
 James M. Harding and John Rouse, eds., Not the Other Avant-Garde: The Transnational Foundations 
of Avant-Garde Performance (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 1-2. 
115
 Considering such erratic tendencies that sway the meanings of the label, it would then come as no 
surprise that the term ‗avant-garde‘ has always been confronted with skepticism which questions what 
exactly such labels actually stand for. Charles Baudelaire‘s criticism of the label describes avant-garde as 
a lame linguistic construct imposing a brainwashing effect on the masses — an inept positing of a 
category that is intellectually impotent, repetitively bland, and almost gratuitous: 
On the Frenchman‘s passionate predilection for military metaphors. In this country every 
metaphor wears a moustache… 
All these resounding expressions are applied, as a rule, to tavern pedants and idlers… 
More militant metaphors: 
‗The poets of combat.‘ 
‗The vanguard of literature.‘ 
The weakness for military metaphors is a sign of natures that are not themselves militant, but are 
made for discipline — that is to say, for conformity — natures congenitally domestic, Belgian 
natures that can think only in unison. (Baudelaire, Intimate Journals, p. 48) 
Baudelaire‘s insertion of satirical mockery that every metaphor wears a moustache clearly shows an 
annoyance with the distorted usage of the metaphor. Making fun of the moustache as symbolic of a 
uniform packaging of every metaphor in the country, it can be interpreted that underneath such societal 
insults is a demand for a constructive definition of avant-garde that can actually be put into practical use, 
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a Eurocentric to a transnational conception of the avant-garde — one which recognizes that the 
sites of artistic innovation associated with the avant-garde tend to be sites of unacknowledged 
cultural hybridity and negotiation.‘116 Thus, it becomes even more important to discern the 
constant principles governing the vast range of phenomena around the world considered to carry 
the avant-garde signature.
117
 Harding and Rouse‘s suggestion of experimentation and 
contestation
118
 in avant-garde phenomena means that boundaries must be translucent, allowing 
open channels of permeation so that components belonging to both sides can freely meet without 
obstruction, and from thereon combine to produce a transformative outcome. Correspondingly, 
Eugene Eoyang‘s essay ‗Polar Paradigms in Poetics‘ offers a rarely acknowledged perspective 
concerning the extreme contrast between the Chinese inclination to use soft, even porous-looking 
lines to compose paintings and the Western tendency to be oriented towards inflexible and 
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confining categorisations. In Chinese ink painting, the contrast between the painted area and the 
unpainted is characterised by widely varying degrees of darkness/concentration and 
dilution/lightness in ink application, and even then the boundary is defined by blurred, indistinct 
edges, unlike the case for the sharp, clearly cut lines used in Western writing and drawing media. 
The water agent integral to ink painting ensures that the degrees of dilution and concentration are 
characterised by infinite diversity and subtlety, with those varying degrees constantly 
overlapping to produce increasingly new combinations — perhaps the most sophisticated 
transformative quality uniquely possessed by the water element: 
In the West, since the introduction of papyrus,
119
 writing has involved a sharp edged, 
beveled instrument, which scratches the hard surface of the bark to make an impression. 
The lines it draws are incised, with only limited latitude in the width of the stroke. In 
China, however, the instrument from at least the Shang Dynasty has been the brush, and 
the ―tablet‖ on which writing takes place is not a smooth surface, like bark or papyri, but 
textured and absorbent, as in rice paper, or silk cloth. The lines of the brush are flexible, 
and the action of the writing instrument is flowing and requires little pressure. Where the 
pen requires force and pressure to make an impression and to make a mark, the action of 
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the brush is quite the opposite: the slightest contact with the surface leaves a mark. The 
modulations of the line are much more varied with a brush than with a pen, and the 
rhythms of a brush stroke are much more expansive: they admit of more stylization than 
is possible with a pen.
120
 
 
In the Western example, the binaries have a pronounced barrier between them, and there is no 
latitude for interpenetration. The barrier does not even allow for a semblance of being porous, 
which goes to show that even though the binaries co-exist, there is no permissiveness for an 
interrelationship as such. Furthermore, the barrier is distinctly narrow due to the pointedness of 
the pen. This inflexible instrument must then scratch or cut into the surface of the bark, causing 
inevitable friction, thus presenting the whole process of writing and drawing as a pressurised 
application where the materials used are harshly rubbing against each other. The angles and 
contours of each line and letter are made distinct, as the pen hardly allows any leeway for more 
subtle designs due to the exposure of hard objects. In the Chinese example, differing qualities do 
not actually have a barrier between them, but more of a metaphorical membrane composed of 
pores and passages allowing the smooth flow of information exchanged between both sides of 
the membrane. An ink painting of a black coat for instance would not actually be completely 
black, although of course one can say much the same thing about European oil paintings of black 
coats. The significant difference lies in the way in which an ink painter would use varying 
amounts of water to create a wide range of ink dilutions and concentrations. The different 
mixtures would then be used to create a painting of a very richly layered black coat, where there 
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are subtle contrasts between the shades, contours, folds, and even the lighting falling upon the 
coat from different angles — subtle in a sense that these details seem to be flowing into each 
other due to sophisticated manipulation of ink dilutions and concentrations. Even the instruments 
exposed to each other to produce ink paintings do not have any hardness about them, as the brush 
and the easily permeated texture of the paper or cloth both embody and generate such pliability 
that the painting process unfolds through lightness of contact. Whereas the pen cuts narrow lines 
into the bark distinguishing the shape of what is drawn or written with sharp engravement, the 
effect of the brush fluidly captures the shape of a character no matter how complex the form. 
Significantly, the Chinese example constitutes an accurate metaphor for the new avant-garde 
model. Just as the ink and the absorbent material upon which it is painted interact intimately to 
create transformative effects unique to such a fusion, the new avant-garde model views 
intercultural interactions as literally and metaphorically ‗melting into each other‘. An example of 
such an avant-garde phenomenon can be found in the writings of André Breton and Antonin 
Artaud, where they propose a solution that lies in the East for many deep-rooted problems of 
intellectual and emotional blockage poisoning the modern Western cultural mentality: 
Orient, victorious Orient, you who have but a symbolic value, do with me as you will, 
pearl-colored Orient! In the flow of a sentence as much as in the mysterious wind of a 
jazz tune, let me recognize your projects for the coming Revolutions. You, the dazzling 
image of my dispossession, Orient, beautiful bird of prey and innocence, I implore you 
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from the depths of this realm of shadows! Inspire me, so that I may be the one who no 
longer has a shadow.
121
 (September 1924) 
 
Correspondingly, Artaud regards the modern West as an ultimate enemy, all the while exalting 
the traditions of the East as the saviour of the West: ‗Grant to us, address to us with your 
wisdoms, in a language which our contaminated European minds can understand, and if 
necessary change our Spirit, fashion for us a perception wholly attuned to those perfect summits 
where the Spirit of Man suffers no longer.‘122 His sweeping idealisation of the perfecting of the 
Spirit as a detachment from the turmoils of the external world — a tradition taught by the East — 
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only goes to magnify Artaud‘s hostility towards the modern secular West. And still, despite the 
intensely discordant nature of his proposition, the Chinese ink painting constitutes an effective 
metaphor for the intercultural exchange
123
 that he had envisioned, essentially because he is re-
conceptualising cultural boundaries to be entirely characterised by the fluid, transparent motions 
that can be likened to abstract lines constantly susceptible to absorbing into each other. 
Moreover, the fluid nature of such boundaries means that they are completely open to being 
moulded and layered into an infinite variety of shapes and forms, forms that are characterised 
still by a wider range of complexities in interrelationships. Thus, Artaud‘s message may have 
been predominantly motivated by his oppositional position towards the culture that had 
conditioned him, but the message itself remains one of seamless fusion of components that may 
outwardly seem to conflict against each other.  
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                                                Chapter 2 
        Artaud’s film theory and theatrical philosophy 
 
The mind moves beyond the power of representation. This sort of virtual power of the 
images probes for hitherto unused possibilities in the depths of the mind. Essentially the 
cinema reveals a whole occult life with which it puts us directly into contact. But we must 
know how to divine this occult life. There are better means than a succession of super 
impressions for divining these secrets of the depths of consciousness. Raw cinema, taken 
as it is, in the abstract, exudes a little of this trance-like atmosphere, eminently 
favourable for certain revelations.
124
 
 
Artaud‘s ‗raw cinema‘ — his idealistic cinema which is synonymous to sacred cinema or 
mythical cinema — is entirely defined by the principle that existence is multi-dimensional, and 
that each dimension influences the one intersecting into its fabric, much like a cooperative web 
of interconnectedness where corresponding imprints (not necessarily identical, but conveying 
some sense of equivalence) are produced across dimensions. An image from this raw cinema 
should convey the intense power and meaningfulness of a filmed object, in such a spontaneous 
yet precise way that the non-physical streams of information that have converged to bestow the 
object with such power can actually be intuited by an audience. This process of intuiting revolves 
around the images‘ resonating powers of generating symbolic correspondences that truly do 
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move an audience without them having to be instructed that they must be affected in any way. 
Intuition must forego those suspicions arising from the intervening faculties of logic as to what 
the image is supposed to mean or what kind of response is it supposed to produce. Artaud‘s ideas 
concerning his scenario The Seashell and the Clergyman suggest that the meanings of an image 
should be latent, coming forth from within the filmed object, as opposed to attaching themselves 
to acquired meanings externally imposed by societal standards of comprehensiveness: 
 
When writing the scenario of The Shell and the Clergyman, I considered that the cinema 
possessed an element of its own, a truly magic and truly cinematographic element, which 
nobody had ever thought of isolating. This element, which differs from every sort of 
representation attached to images, has the characteristics of the very vibration, the 
profound, unconscious source of thought.
125
 
 
Artaud first alludes to a conventional system of acquired symbols that becomes exhausted 
through over-usage, as there are limits to the extent to which misaligned information can impose 
itself upon objects (or persons or places) that already have far more authentic symbolic potential 
bound to an infinite mythical source. He states that ‗The mind moves beyond the power of 
representation‘126, suggesting that once a certain status quo has served its purpose, there is an 
innate predisposition to transgress those long established boundaries, as an individual who must 
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always refer to such a system of acquired representations would more than likely tire of it with 
time. With that, Artaud presents the mythical or the ‗occult‘ level of consciousness — a 
predominantly unchartered realm (‗hitherto unused possibilities in the depths of the mind‘127). 
He proposes a dream cinema that operates from an innate tendency to continuously reach beyond 
immediate physicality in order to attain a self-defined freedom where phenomena can be 
magically conjured through creative direction of the imagination: 
 
It [the magical cinematographic element] surreptitiously breaks away from the images 
and emerges from their association, their vibration and their impact, not from their 
logical, connected meaning. I thought it was possible to write a scenario which ignored 
knowledge and the logical connection of facts, and would search beyond, in the occult 
and in the tracks of feeling and thought for the profound motives, the active and obscure 
impulses of our so-called lucid acts, which always maintaining their evolutions in the 
domain of sources and apparitions. It is to show how far the scenario can resemble and 
ally itself with the mechanics of a dream without really being a dream itself, for example. 
It is to show how far it restores the pure work of thought. So the mind, left to itself and 
the images, infinitely sensitised, determined to lose nothing of the inspirations of subtle 
thought, is all prepared to return to its original functions, its antennae pointed towards the 
invisible, to begin another resurrection from death.
128
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A cinema conveying the structure of a dream ‗without really being a dream itself‘ remains a 
highly ambiguous concept. It seems to imply that the dream itself — likely to be referring to the 
dream which occurs during sleep — has certain limitations that the dream cinema should forsake 
in order to establish its own definition of an authentic dream-state. Afterall, the dream which 
occurs during sleep — while clearly a product of what the deeper levels of the consciousness 
have extracted from waking life — is predominantly uncontrollable, and far less subject to the 
deliberate direction of the individual experiencing such a dream. So if interpreted in this manner, 
the dream cinema may favour spontaneity but tends to exclude the disruption of creative control. 
And yet there are still certain aspects of the dream structure that are imaginatively liberating, so 
it is these aspects that should be adopted in the dream cinema. Perhaps the most effective method 
of interpreting such a contentious ambiguity would be to decipher the following phrase 
concerning this cinema‘s capacity to restore ‗the pure work of thought‘. Emphasis upon the 
purity of the dream cinema means that there would only be a selection of those cooperative 
components that are aligned with the powerful mythical patterns. Here, we must look to Artaud‘s 
theatrical philosophy for further elaboration on the differentiation between mythical purity and 
the redundant information clogging up the passage between the physical and higher dimensions. 
There is an important instance in ―The Alchemical Theatre‖ where he uses the behaviour of 
dolphins as a metaphor for the opening — however temporary or fleeting — towards the oceanic 
depths of the mythical realm, yet also suggesting that such depths would be unreachable by a 
cultural construct dictating the dominance of the physical over the non-physical. In other words, 
the state of consciousness must release itself from falsity that the physical is more real than the 
non-physical, as it is the belief that the latter has no existence that cripples the imagination: 
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Where alchemy, through its symbols, is the spiritual Double of an operation which 
functions only on the level of real matter, the theater must also be considered as the 
Double, not of this direct, everyday reality of which it is gradually being reduced to a 
mere inert replica — as empty as it is sugar-coated — but of another archetypal and 
dangerous reality, a reality of which the Principles, like dolphins, once they have shown 
their heads, hurry to dive back into the obscurity of the deep.
129
 
 
Whether we are considering Artaud‘s sacred cinema (which can also be referred to as true 
cinema, mythical cinema, raw cinema, and dream cinema) or sacred theatre, the bedrock 
principle governing the philosophies of cooperative inter-dimensionality is that physical creation 
begins from a non-physical level, not the other way round. While dolphins momentarily emerge 
from the depths, alluding to the idea that a grand mythical creation extends forth into manifested 
physicality, the ephemeral nature of such an enchanting materialisation goes to show that 
mythical elements would tend to hide from an external reality (often intensely secularised) that is 
incompatible and conflicting with the archetypal/mythical level of consciousness. Then again, if 
we consider the more general concept of hierophanic art (which is precisely what Artaud is 
describing here), the very structure of hierophany necessitates that the mythical dimension must 
to some degree conceal itself from the physical, rather than always displaying itself in full view. 
That is because if there is no concealment whatsoever, there can be no revelation. There is even 
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an implication that the convention of reproducing the mainstream ways of society resembles an 
artificial shell that does not contain any substance underneath that could possibly hold a 
connection with the mythical consciousness residing. Artaud‘s description of conventional 
theatre as ‗empty‘ and ‗sugar-coated‘ suggests that such theatre conveys a falsity, regurgitating 
pedestrian content that serves as mere tautology for societal mundaneness. And yet from another 
alternative point-of-view, perhaps there is still philosophical value in recognising and intensely 
feeling the acute contrast between the mythical and its most unpleasant oppositions. Here, Daniel 
Frampton describes possibly the most traumatic aspects of Artaud‘s early life that had given rise 
to the escapist fantasies inspiring his film theory and theatrical philosophy: 
  
Antonin Artaud was born…in Marseille in 1896, and suffered throughout his life from 
neuralgia and depression (sparked by a severe attack of meningitis when aged four). He 
spent much of youth in a sanatorium — only interrupted by a spell in the army in 1916 
(he was apparently discharged due to sleep-walking). He moved to Paris in 1920 and 
became an actor, playing Jean Paul Marat in Abel Gance‘s Napoleon, and the monk Jean 
Massieu in Carl Theodor Dreyer‘s The Passion of Joan of Arc. Artaud‘s writings of this 
period trace an uneven progress from identifying a hidden life or waking dream in film, 
to finding an expression of the mind, and then the realisation that film is more a 
‗disruption‘ of normal thought and an escape from the mind. Artaud conceived of three 
kinds of cinema, and his version of ‗pure cinema‘ (actively experimental) was the only 
one that took the form of the mind (if lacking emotion). The other two were narrative 
cinema, from basic psychology, executed along literary lines — a sort of ‗venial hybrid 
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art‘; and ‗true cinema‘, a combination of narrative and pure cinema (way ahead of his 
cinematic time, the surrealist and actor was asking for a cinema that was a mix of plot 
and abstraction — as pure abstraction has little relation to the human).130 
 
Frampton‘s interpretation that ‗pure cinema‘ lacks the element of emotion — which would mean 
that pure cinema exercises pure and exclusive mentation — is quite a point of interest, as such a 
state of lack is being used here to describe the kind of abstraction which cannot be identified as 
anything significant (i.e. no identification, which means that it bears minimal to no relation to the 
innate predisposition within the human consciousness to seek meaningful identification). It then 
follows that if there is to be a means of identification, emotion must then become a primary 
foundation in the accomplishment of success in identification, not exclusive emotion as such but 
emotion that is accompanied and qualified by mentation. Here, we must acknowledge the fact 
that the separation of emotion and mentation remains a specifically Western cultural attitude:  
 
Another fundamental modal difference between Western and Chinese poetics relates to 
the ―instrument‖ of feeling and the ―instrument‖ of thinking, the seat of the emotions and 
the faculty of reason, generally regarded in the West as conventionally separable between 
the organ of the heart and the entity known as the mind. In the West, it is axiomatic to 
believe that the mind thinks, and the heart feels…In this premise, there are two possibly 
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factitious assumptions: 1) that emotion and mentation are separate or separable; and 2) 
that each can be assigned to either the head or the heart…These distinctions are left 
meaningfully vague in Chinese, which regards ―hsin‖ as the seat both of emotion and of 
thought.
131
 
 
Pure abstraction (which requires pure mentation) is not a viable option because it is not desirable 
to merely perceive an assemblage of shapes and forms without any consideration for what such 
an assemblage would stand for, as qualified by emotional understanding. There seems to be an 
implication here that human consciousness has an innate tendency to seek higher meanings 
(again, relating back to Eliade‘s homo religiosus), and that if certain shapes and forms do not 
lead to this greater recognition (qualified by emotional upliftment or illumination), then those 
shapes and forms are just as good as redundant. Pure abstraction, as described by Artaud and as 
interpreted by Frampton, is not likely to be conducive towards any significant measure of 
meaningfulness, as the purity of shapes and forms standing for themselves alone would 
predominantly constitute a homogeneous surface — a state of qualitative sameness (which 
amounts to this pure abstraction) that does not invite deciphering and further contemplation. If 
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there is no path towards identification operating within the art form, the perceptual experience 
cannot be one where pleasure can be derived — this pleasure entirely assessed by an emotional 
guidance system which resides within all humanity (I will explain in the Conclusion that 
emotional subjectivity remains a determining foundation of the ways and attitudes of homo 
religiosus). The art form needs a certain degree of identification potential to serve as a 
conceptual anchor that would prevent the associated meanings from slipping into nowhere. In 
Artaud‘s true cinema (synonymous to raw cinema, sacred cinema, and mythical cinema), there is 
no such thing as an image without an objective meaning, which is why Frampton describes this 
cinema as a combination of ‗plot and abstraction‘, as it is the plot that constitutes the core 
structure interweaving the relationships between things. Thus, the plot or the comprehensible 
narrative is the inspiring agent that transforms the abstraction into a system of qualities that 
makes sense, very much in alignment with the principle that there should be a balance between 
mentation and emotion. Pure abstraction all by itself cannot accomplish this balance, as ‗pure 
abstraction has little relation to the human‘132 in its incapacity to generate emotional resonances. 
According to Framption, Artaud‘s concept of true cinema — which is the balance between 
narrative and abstraction — is an attempt to convey the state of consciousness that uniquely 
operates within cinema (Frampton describes this state as ‗how film can think‘). True cinema sets 
the stage for the plot/narrative to mould the abstraction into a powerful manifestation: 
 
In his essay ‗Witchcraft and the Cinema‘ Artaud considers that the direct affect of images 
on the mind may be the key to understanding how film can think: 
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the cinema is made primarily to express matters of the mind, the inner consciousness, not 
by a succession of images so much as by something more imponderable which restores 
them to us with their direct matter, with no interpositions or representations…There will 
not be one cinema which represents life and another which represents the function of the 
mind. Because life, what we call life, becomes ever more inseparable from the mind
133
.
134
 
 
Through the film form, the non-physical is transmuted into what can be physically sensed 
(Artaud describes this inter-dimensional oneness as the ‗life‘ that is ‗inseparable from the mind‘). 
What was formerly not filtered through the perceptual faculties becomes interpreted through the 
poetic sight, as opposed to the plain sight. Only a transcendent state of consciousness, referred to 
as ‗trance‘135, can truly experience the inspiration that the higher dimension is offering to the 
physical dimension — an instance where physicality becomes a tangible receptacle of the 
revelation. More importantly however, the revelatory qualities of raw cinema would necessitate 
it to possess a seductive style that can in fact transform the state of consciousness of whoever is 
watching into one that is more illuminated and open towards receiving information delivered 
across dimensions. Artaud describes this transformative quality as the ‗imponderable which 
restores‘ mythical images and symbols to our receptive faculties ‗with no interpositions or 
representations.‘ He is here proposing that the human consciousness already possesses a latent 
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mythical level that can become activated through this raw cinema (and in this connection, 
through his idealistic vision of sacred theatre). Art becomes sacred art, as is the case for Balinese 
theatre, where the art form itself is influenced by, inspired from, and even channeled from the 
perspective of the gods. His writings on Balinese theatre uphold the kind of art that cannot be 
separated from the divine, meaning that there can be no art which lies outside of divinely 
inspired art; so non-sacred art then cannot be considered art: 
 
It is a theater which eliminates the author in favor of what we would call, in our 
Occidental theatrical jargon, the director; but a director who has become a kind of 
manager of magic, a master of sacred ceremonies. And the material on which he works, 
the themes he brings to throbbing life are derived not from him but from the gods. They 
come, it seems, from elemental interconnections of Nature which a double Spirit has 
fostered. 
What he sets in motion is the MANIFESTED. 
This is a sort of primary Physics, from which Spirit has never disengaged itself.
136
 
 
Artaud proposes a lack of distinction between the artist‘s creation and the divine creation. He 
specifies his definition of a divinely inspired creation as one which is directed by forces of nature 
operating with extreme directness in such a way that shows the unseen intensely accumulating its 
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energy to transform itself into the seen. These forces of nature possess an infinitely broader 
intelligence — its perceptual range far broader than the physical human senses. Artaud insists 
upon referring to such an intelligence as a ‗double Spirit‘ whose powers of creation are 
significantly more magnified in efficiency than the normal human efforts to make things happen. 
Or more precisely, he is attempting to put aside the human struggle to make things happen as 
well as the human tendency to only monitor the concrete manifested results, rather than practice 
at being sensitive to the intuition that constitutes an important component of divine guidance — 
although of course the state of consciousness must adjust itself to become receptive to such 
guidance, hence Artaud‘s referral to the ‗origins [of a theatre that are] alike in a secret psychic 
impulse which is Speech before words.‘137 In other words, this receptiveness can be 
accomplished by a withdrawal into a state that has virtually emptied itself of any acquired 
information and external conditioning that could hinder the divinely inspired intuition — very 
much like unlearning the unnecessary. He is not writing off the human as inferior as such, but 
there is an implication that the artist must get out of the way — as in, put aside the baggage of 
mental/emotional resistance — in order to be fully inspired by the relevant forces of nature. The 
artist then becomes a cooperative component to such a design whose intricacies reflect that of the 
interconnected web of nature, to such an extent that the word ‗channeling‘ may be appropriate in 
describing this process by which the artist interprets such grand patterns of organisation, much of 
which cannot be seen by the naked eye. Leonard Pronko provides an account of how such an 
inter-dimensional process plays out in a Balinese performance: 
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The Balinese performer, like the creators of the dances and dramas themselves, is in a 
sense anonymous. There are no stars…, and when the dancer takes the stage — which in 
Bali is anywhere — he becomes possessed by his part. Although occasionally he may 
dance for hours without realizing what specific character he is portraying (since the 
stories are sometimes decided upon only after the performance has begun), the dancer 
always serves as a vehicle for the dance; he never expresses himself. After having 
watched certain patently magical or ritualistic dances, one will be told that a god or a 
demon was dancing in the performer, who was entirely possessed. There are, indeed, 
little girls who, without ever having received dance training, perform the most 
complicated dances while in a state of trance, sometimes standing on the shoulders of 
male attendants.
138
 
 
The question then is how avant-garde qualities can be discerned from such a phenomenon where 
a god or a higher power is being channeled through a medium, especially since Artaud‘s theory 
of revelation through sacred art and Pronko‘s supporting description do suggest that the medium 
loses their individual capacity through acting as a channel. The answer lies in Artaud‘s statement 
that ‗They [the Balinese] victoriously demonstrate the absolute preponderance of the director 
(metteur en scène) whose creative power eliminates words.‘139 Here, he is associating the power 
to transcend conventional narrative with artistic originality, while conforming to such 
conventions constitutes a severe lack of originality. While the most meaningful of imaginations 
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may incorporate some elements of the linear structure of action and reaction, linear narrative 
would come far secondary to the innate predisposition to transmute mythical images and 
symbols into innovative manifestations: ‗an image, an allegory, a figure that masks what it would 
reveal have more significance for the spirit than the lucidities of speech and its analytics.‘140 He 
then presents an analogy of the ephemeral setting sun, hence inspiring the imagination to 
cooperate with the memory especially to continuously recreate such a transitory occurrence: 
‗This is why true beauty never strikes us directly. The setting sun is beautiful because of all it 
makes us lose.‘141 The setting sun is a mythical symbol of a cyclical transition into a nocturnal 
phase which the world undergoes on a daily basis; so the actual occurrence is undeniably 
repetitious. However, despite the fact that the memory of the setting sun is being replayed, the 
fleeting aspect of a phenomenon which takes place during the transition from one part of the day 
to another is all the more cause for the imagination to continuously recreate variations of such a 
majestic and richly colourful nature-scape. This is so that the memory of an otherwise common 
and assured phenomenon (such as a sunset) can be kept alive, or more precisely can be kept in a 
constant state of renewal. Thus, the setting sun — or more precisely, the imaginative 
interpretation of the setting sun — constitutes an analogy for the imaginative aspect of the 
mythical level of the consciousness which remains inseparable from the broader perspective of 
the divine. In other words, the mythical consciousness is not strictly repeating its own archetypes 
and symbols, but is designed especially for imaginative interpretation. Artaud‘s concept of a 
mythical consciousness suggests that the individual has an innate capacity to become a divine 
creator: ‗…far from believing that man invented the supernatural and the divine, I think it is 
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man‘s age-old intervention which has ultimately corrupted the divine within him.‘142 He uses the 
idea of an ‗inner consciousness‘ to describe that profound level of the consciousness which has 
limitless access to information from a transcendent source: ‗To use it [raw cinema] to tell a story 
is to neglect one of its best resources, to fail to fulfill its most profound purpose. That is why I 
think the cinema is made primarily to express matters of the mind, the inner consciousness…‘143 
He is not proposing to do away with story-telling altogether, although he is clearly encouraging 
an alternative approach to expressing the most meaningful imaginations with more poetic 
accuracy.
144
 This means a greater detachment from societal standards of content organisation 
(i.e. the presentation of content in ways which society deems as proper and comprehensible):  
                                                          
142
 Artaud, ‗Preface: The Theater and Culture‘, in The Theater and Its Double, p. 8. 
143
 Artaud, ‗Witchcraft and the Cinema‘, in Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 66. 
144
 If for instance a certain film is to entirely feature a reciting of a religious text, there would be no 
denying that this particular film features sacred content. However, it would be a far stretch to consider the 
actual form as a sacred film form, precisely because of the entirely textual nature of the recording which 
hardly makes any use out of the cinematic visuality. Thus, the reciting of the religious text may as well be 
recorded into a non-visual medium, and there would be no denying that the recitation is fully delivered. 
Artaud indeed proposes that form does include content; content is a supporting component of form, but 
form itself is composed of unique properties that are not dependent upon the contribution of content 
(content which for all intents and purposes is not specific to any one form). If the unique properties are 
not present, the form would lose its identity, and thus no longer be the form that it is meant to be. An 
example can be found in Artaud‘s proposition to reduce the role of speech and the dominance of the 
written text in theatre (and also in film), precisely because these aural aspects are not at all medium-
specific. The over-usage of aural aspects can come to diminish the authenticity and uniqueness of the 
respective medium in which they are featuring: ‗It is not a matter of suppressing speech in the theater but 
of changing its role, and especially of reducing its position, of considering it as something else than a 
means of conducting human characters to their external ends…‘ (‗Oriental and Occidental Theater‘, p. 72)  
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The film image, in its interlocking with the reality of the mind (as envisaged by Artaud), 
radically undermines the type of visual experience which can be associated with the 
mode of inscription characteristic of appearance…Artaud used the cinematic visual 
signifier in order to achieve a direct, immediate access to things, interrupting the 
mechanism of mediated representation and of reference. In fact, the unique cinematic 
quality, so closely related to the possibility of generating thought (according to Artaud), 
can neither be found in the indirect mode, the referential character of the appearance, nor 
can it be described in terms of ‗semblance‘, i.e. ‗a modification of the manifest, of 
something manifest which it pretends to be but is not.‘ In its ideal, unique manner, which 
Artaud endeavoured to disclose, film image eliminates both the semblance — i.e. only 
pretending to be, rather than actually being — and the mode of appearance — i.e. that of 
reference, of mere representation.
145
 
 
Fotiade in fact succeeds in simplifying the main components of conventional cinema, according 
to Artaud: semblance and appearance, both of which are based upon an acquired comprehension 
previously instructed by societal norms concerning how things should or should be understood. 
There is a significant implication of the limitations associated with indirect methods of imposing 
meanings or rather indirect representation, again entirely characteristic of conventional cinema. 
On the other hand, Artaud proposes that the idealistic theatre (and in that connection, the 
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idealistic cinema) arises from a latent mythical state, as though the performance itself (or in the 
case of cinema, the power of the images, their relationships, and the methods by which the 
images are composed and arranged individually and collectively) constitutes a creative 
interpretation of primordial memory. From this idea alone, we can already see the inspiration 
behind Eliade‘s illo tempore — the grand intentional source where ritualistic patterns are 
embedded. Paul Stoller traces Artaud‘s sacred theatre to a pre-manifestational dimension referred 
to as the ‗pre-theatre‘ where a non-physical stage had already been set, especially to provide a 
basic structure — a system of meanings — for the manifested performance: ‗He [Artaud] wanted 
to revert to what André Schaeffner called the ―pre-theater‖, a ritualized arena of personal 
transformation, a project for a ritualized stage.‘146 This statement does imply that conventional 
theatre does not recognise such ritualistic patterns as carrying any validity, even though Eliade 
himself would be of a position that the mythical remains beyond resistance and contradiction 
resulting from analytical reasoning, an idea I had alluded to in Chapter 1. It must be specifically 
contextualised here that analytical reasoning is not entirely a hindering process that violates 
mythical intuition and imagination. However, analytical reasoning does have certain disruptive 
aspects that complicate the intuitive process that is always trying to reach into the mythical level 
of the consciousness. This innate yearning for a glimpse into one‘s mythical origins goes to show 
that there is a certain level of human consciousness that does indeed realise its own divine 
aspect, despite any and all external conditioning against this realisation.
147
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Mythical origin and sacred life force 
The library at Alexandria can be burnt down. There are forces above and beyond 
papyrus: we may temporarily be deprived of our ability to discover these forces, but their 
energy will not be suppressed. It is good that our excessive facilities are no longer 
available, that forms fall into oblivion: a culture without space or time, restrained only 
by the capacity of our own nerves, will reappear with all the more energy.
148
 
 
Artaud suggests that there is a life force that can never be destroyed, even though its physical 
manifestations extending forth from the mythical origin undergo their own transitory phases of 
creation, growth, decline, and destruction. His description of an ancient culture, such as the 
library of Alexandria, that continues an even more purified existence after its physical 
destruction goes to show that he is a believer in the reincarnation of civilisations (i.e. the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‗clear thought‘ (‗Witchcraft and Cinema‘, in Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 66) which is subject to the 
fickleness of societal change and instruction — ‗clear‘ in this sense very much read as shallow, lacking in 
originality and insight due to its dependency upon the trends of societal norms. Acquired symbols do not 
come with the recognition that meaning reaches any deeper than the externalised surface of social 
conditioning. On the other hand, innate symbols extend from an ‗imperceptible substance‘ (‗Witchcraft 
and Cinema‘, p. 66), which is essentially the pure sacred source: 
Clear thought is not enough. It allocates a world which has been utterly consumed. What is clear 
is what is immediately accessible, but what is immediately accessible is the mere skin of life. We 
soon realise that this over-familiar life which has lost all its symbols is not the whole of life. And 
today is a time for sorcerers and saints, a better time than ever before. An imperceptible substance 
is taking shape, yearning for light. The cinema is bringing us nearer to this substance. (p. 66)  
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reincarnation of collectives altogether, not merely the reincarnation of individuals). A destroyed 
civilisation making a return to the physical plane with even more power than before means that 
the non-physical dimension possesses a potent restorative quality. If the non-physical is a source 
from which physical manifestations emerge forth and to which their life force returns upon 
disintegration of the physical form, it follows that such a source would naturally compensate for 
what was taken away during the physical incarnation. Artaud further states that when the 
civilisation comes to re-emerge into a physical state, it will do so with even greater excellence in 
artistic and intellectual method and expression,
149
 because the non-physical source to which such 
a civilisation had returned had fully replenished what this civilisation was previously deprived 
of, having undergone a cataclysm during its physical existence. According to Ofelia Ichim, the 
idea of a latent source containing powerful mythical patterns from which sacred manifestations 
arise (and withdraw into/return to when the time comes) has entirely influenced Eliade‘s illo 
tempore: ‗Artaud‘s innovative ideas manifested in many different forms of experimental theatre, 
like Living Theatre, Open Theatre, The Performance Group, Environmental Theatre are accepted 
by Mircea Eliade and find their way, with a real enthusiasm for this type of theatre, into the 
novel Nineteen Roses as well as short stories like General’s Uniforms,  Incognito at Buchenwald,  
Adieu!...Eliade — the novelist — also theorizes on the essence of performance art in The 
Forbidden Forest (we must not forget that he was also a playwright).‘150 Ichim further observes: 
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‗Mircea Eliade‘s work is a retrieval of the mythical memory; two possibilities of reaching the 
primordial reality are religion and the theatre performance.‘151 Ichim also suggests a 
chronologically backward movement on a linear timeline in order to retrieve and creatively 
resurrect what had long been lost. This chronological backwardness does not at all mean that it is 
qualitatively backward; on the far contrary, the recollection of themes and images from a 
mythical past comes to generate artistic progress more than anything else: ‗The theatre 
performance is a sort of a catalyst for obtaining the anamnesis effect. Everything that happens on 
the stage is aimed at reintegrating the routine life into the sacred, thus revealing some essential 
moments from illo tempore or forgotten feelings.‘152 Within the idea of reintegration is an 
underlying avant-garde principle that even a re-assemblage of old components would produce a 
new result. An ‗old‘ thing always contains potential for newness — as in, we may indeed find 
new seeds in old soil. The expression of originality and innovation through anamnesis also 
implies that there is a significant difference between the ‗old‘ and the ‗outdated‘. Even though 
the ‗old‘ cannot be chronologically retrieved, the quality of being ‗old‘ does not necessarily 
mean that it is also ‗outdated‘ — meaning no longer a viable option to be put to further 
innovative use. It must be noted however that mythical/primordial time is not necessarily situated 
in the ‗past‘ in the linear sense, although Ichim‘s association of illo tempore with anamnesis 
(creative recollection) means that direct exposure to the mythical dimension would come as a 
result of well-practiced introspection — a direction of the focus inward, precisely to discover 
what had formerly seemed to be externally lost.  
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Artaud’s Animistic Cinema 
     Artaud‘s ideas on film and theatre present both media as potential revelations of a higher 
intelligence, one which is both human-like and transhuman (as in, transcending the scope of 
human perceptual faculties). This animistic principle implies, if not directly proposes, that the 
divine life force resides in all manner of manifestations — people, objects, and places — causing 
such manifestations to have a greater purpose which expands beyond ordinary identification. 
Artaud‘s idealistic cinema not only makes no distinction between animate and inanimate, but 
whatever qualities of life normally assigned to the former, cinema may directly attribute them to 
the latter without any considerations of socially constructed restraints (restraints that would 
normally separate the animate from the inanimate): 
 
In the cinema I have always distinguished a quality peculiar to the secret movement and 
matter of images. The cinema has an unexpected and mysterious side which we find in no 
other form of art. Even the most arid and banal image is transformed when it is projected 
on the screen. The smallest detail, the most insignificant object assume a meaning and a 
life which pertain to them alone, independently of the value of the meaning of the images 
themselves, the idea which they interpret and the symbol which they constitute. By being 
isolated, the objects obtain a life of their own which becomes increasingly independent 
and detaches them from their usual meaning. A leaf, a bottle, a hand, etc., live with an 
almost animal life which is crying out to be used.
153
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The dullest, most commonplace thing is but one example of a depiction of an ordinary object, 
although of course not all things ordinary are ‗arid‘ and ‗banal‘. Such descriptions convey 
ordinariness to a certain extremity (perhaps to the point where the very extremity of the 
ordinariness quite inevitably places the ordinariness outside of its conventional ordinary terms) 
where the meaningless, the most devoid of interest, and that which is mundane to the point of 
incapacity to captivate are being extracted from their usual associations of unremarkability (in 
fact, boredom). In Artaud‘s idealistic cinema, such extreme forms of ordinariness are sharply 
(and rather ironically) contrasted with their own potentiality to be transformed into images and 
film sequences imbued with sacred significance. The implication here is that the sacred potential 
lies latent in all things, even amongst those things that do not outwardly appear to carry any 
special or distinguished meaning about them (Artaud refers to such pedestrian, monotonous 
things as ‗the most insignificant object‘154). If an object normally considered inanimate such as a 
bottle can be shown through the film form as possessing and expressing an animistic life force 
(Artaud also refers to this force as ‗an almost animal life‘155), then sacred cinema has 
accomplished its purpose. Sandy Flitterman-Lewis implies that to convey an inanimate object in 
such a powerful way as to make it express the authentic ‗life‘ within itself is also to extract it 
from its mainstream secular context, erasing from it all societally constructed (i.e. profane) 
associations which no longer serve the object‘s ultimate sacred purpose: 
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The important thing to note here is Artaud‘s intuitive sense of the cinematic apparatus as 
a mechanism which confers upon the film image the ability to signify non-referentially. 
Not a simple-recording — or even reproducing — device, the film apparatus isolates 
objects out of their habitual context, and giving them to us with a ―singular force‖, enable 
their representations to take on a life of their own, generating new meanings, meanings 
apart from conventional signifying systems or symbolization.
156
 
 
Flitterman-Lewis‘s interpretation implies that the sacred life force of an object must be allowed 
to express itself through the film form, that it is not at all something that can be forced. The idea 
that Artaud‘s animistic cinema is entirely based upon intuitive understanding as well as non-
referential signifiers goes to show that such directness and spontaneity in meaning-making do 
not necessitate any effort that would counter natural creativity. This is the kind of effort and 
control that would normally be involved in the (socialised) process of constructing referential 
signifiers (the external instruction that A must mean B, regardless of whether such instruction 
aligns with intuitive interpretation). Intuiting the innate meaning of an object (i.e. non-referential 
meaning-making) is an allowing of the life force to reveal itself without any need for external 
instruction. Eliade presents a similar perspective that — in an environment where the overt 
display of religious symbols and ceremonies is not commonplace (usually in a modern, secular 
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setting) — the sacred remains latent (it can never possibly disappear altogether) yet camouflaged 
amidst appearances that are otherwise not known to constitute obvious exhibitions of sacredness: 
The sacred and mythic are camouflaged in the banalities of everyday contemporary life. 
Eliade compares this with the traditional Japanese tea ceremony which — ―like all other 
‗paths‘ (do): painting, poetry, floral art, calligraphy, archery, etc. — also constitutes a 
spiritual technique, for it places he who practices it in a ‗nirvanic‘ state in his everyday 
life.‖ After providing some of the Japanese Buddhist context and how ―the most natural 
and insignificant gestures become soterial actions,‖ Eliade concludes with the 
contemporary character of such conceptions and techniques. ―It has never been more 
essential than it is today to reveal the transhistorical meaning and importance that is 
hidden in the depths of an existence condemned to be carried out exclusively in immanent 
and opaque banality. Its spiritual and religious significance, and thus the ‗salvational‘ 
message of all experience, is camouflaged in the profane, in the flow of daily activities. 
To discover a transhistorical significance in them would be to decode them, to decipher 
the message they conceal.‖157 
 
The focus here is not so much upon the exposure of the physical senses to those things that 
outwardly display religious qualities in a manner that sets those sacralised objects and events 
apart from the surrounding ordinary environment. While we can normally differentiate between 
the more subtle hierophanies and the obvious hierophanies that are more distinct due to specific 
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external properties, we must also recognise that hierophanies of the former kind tend to blend 
themselves into ordinariness much more smoothly, almost as an adaptive measure to minimise 
cause for disapproval and resistance from secular societal norms. However in the more subtle 
hierophanies (which Eliade and Allen are describing in the above quote), the metaphorical 
‗ripple‘ that the sacred creates upon the fabric of everyday life is comparatively calm and quiet 
with gradual effects. Thus, Artaud‘s animistic cinema and Eliade‘s idea of the sacred‘s 
camouflaging capacities both dictate that there is no such thing as something that is inanimate. 
The sacred life force permeates all, and is constantly seeking to be expressed in infinite diversity. 
So without the construct of the inanimate (in fact, the very idea of the sacred life force would 
very much reduce the inanimate to a false construct), there can be no separation as such between 
animate and inanimate, and by extension sacred and profane (for there is no way that we can 
make a blanket assertion that the profane is ‗lifeless‘). Nothing can be completely absent of 
sacred/animistic potential, precisely because everything that is anything exists in a reality that — 
in one way or another — can come to be described in cosmic terms. Eliade sums up the inherent 
— in fact, unsusceptible to being severed — relationship between an ordinary experience and a 
higher cosmic sacrality as ‗the ‗salvational‘ message of all experience.‘158 In fact, the keyword 
here is ‗all‘, referring to the foundational principle that the embedding of the sacred potential 
cannot be divided in such a way that favours imbuing sacred qualities into one area while 
discriminating against another. Afterall, Allen‘s interpretation and Eliade‘s theory (however 
contradictory within itself) may not fully articulate the idea of an all-pervasive, omniscient 
sacred life force, but the above passage certainly implies it, while Artaud remains the champion 
of the theory of such a life force. 
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Redefining the “Dream” 
If the cinema is not made to interpret dreams or what pertains to the realm of dreams in 
conscious life, it does not exist…It [the cinema] must come closer and closer to fantasy, 
to a fantasy which appears ever more real, or else it does not exist.
159
 
 
Artaud‘s true cinema suggests an exclusive class of fantasy — exclusive in a sense that if cinema 
does not convey this class of fantasy, it cannot be considered true cinema. The important point 
then is to decipher what he means by the term ‗real‘ which he uses to describe this idealistic 
fantasy. This is where it must first be noted that if the fantasy conveyed in true cinema is 
considered real, then the fantasy conveyed in conventional cinema would be considered unreal, 
keeping in mind that conventional cinema and the idealistic cinema are opposites. One way of 
interpreting this opposition between the real and the unreal is that the real is a constant value. 
The real remains so regardless of any and all external variables, while the unreal has no 
constancy and is loosely subject to and pulled into whatever directions dictated by external 
variables. Thus, the most significant point of contrast between conventional cinema and the 
idealistic cinema is that it is extremely difficult — if not impossible — to determine the 
foundation of conventional cinema, while the idealistic cinema does have a solid foundation that 
is constant. This oppositional relationship between the real and the unreal inevitably leads to 
Eliade‘s very similar position on the matter: 
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We will limit ourselves to the statement that, among the ―primitives‖ as among the 
moderns, the sacred is manifested in a multitude of forms and variants, but that all these 
hierophanies are charged with power. The sacred is strong, powerful, because it is real; it 
is efficacious and durable. The opposition between sacred and profane is often expressed 
as an opposition between the real and the unreal or pseudo-real. Power means reality 
and, at the same time, lastingness and efficiency.
160
 
 
Ultimately, the nature of the mythical would come to offer thorough insights into the meaning of 
the ‗real‘.161 Here, it is important to discuss the extensive description of the idealistic theatre‘s 
‗absolute‘ qualities (the absolute being synonymous with the true and the real), this considering 
that Artaud‘s idealistic cinema and idealistic theatre are inextricably linked (‗There is no 
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difference between the cinema and the theatre‘162). The idealistic theatre that Artaud upholds 
with exaggerated passion comes in the form of the Balinese theatre where the orchestration of 
images and gestures resonates so profoundly on the intuitive level that he seems to be alluding 
that such theatrical components become manifested extensions of that which has already been 
arranged and choreographed on a higher mythical level — the ‗dream‘ level: 
   
There is an absolute in these constructed perspectives, a real physical absolute which only 
Orientals are capable of envisioning — it is in the loftiness and thoughtful boldness of 
their goals that these conceptions differ from our European conceptions of theater, even 
more than in the strange perfection of their performances. 
 
Advocates of the division and partitioning of genres can pretend to see mere dancers in 
the magnificent artists of the Balinese theater, dancers entrusted with the representation 
of unexplained, lofty Myths whose very elevation renders the level of our modern 
Occidental theater unspeakably gross and childish.
163
 
 
Artaud suggests that the Balinese dancers serve as direct interpreters of powerful primordial 
patterns that unconditionally influence and inform the human consciousness, regardless of 
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whether we are consciously aware of it (Balinese theatre uses this very awareness to transform 
their performance into an avenue for the channeling of information between dimensions). 
Psychological drama, when confronted with such moving expressions of mythical phenomena, 
becomes trivial.
164
 The idealistic theatre (and in that connection, the dream cinema) conveys 
images and symbols that echo certain patterns within the mythical consciousness, causing such 
echoing to be immediately intuited by the spectator without the need for empirical justification: 
Artaud wanted to break the hold of narrative film on the spectator‘s gaze and 
consciousness through a brand of cinema that would preserve the emotionality, passion, 
and spirituality of the creative process within the artifact, the completed film. As critic 
Sandy Flitterman-Lewis writes, Artaud wanted his films:  
 
to create the impact of the dream instead of simply reproducing its irrationality. For him, 
then, the representation of a ‗dream state,‘ in which the spectator‘s involvement was one 
of active participation, was the primary aim of his scenario [for The Seashell and the 
Clergyman]. 
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This marked for Artaud a return to a primordial moment that precedes symbols and the 
grammar of formal language. His cinema was concerned most specifically with the 
original source of the symbol, the primordial state in which image, thought, gesture, 
sound, sense, and emotion have not yet emerged in a definitive, symbolic form of 
linguistic expression, have not yet taken shape within a tightly ordered logical grammar, 
or language, of the ―narrative‖ film.165 
   
The clinging on to constructs of ordered language is presented here as an artificial, hindering, 
and even distorting practice that obstructs the directness that should characterise dream images in 
all their authenticity. The kind of language that Artaud undermines falls into the category of 
socialised language around which everyday dramas and disputes revolve.
166
 Socialised language 
is not a programming that is (predominantly) exercised by those in the most preliminary stage of 
their development (e.g. newborn infants). To deny or suffocate the primordial mythical state 
which had existed prior to all such external instruction is to damage the imaginative 
consciousness at its base (‗a primordial moment that precedes symbols and the grammar of 
formal language‘167). The impoverishment of pre-verbal (or pre-aural) reality deprives the human 
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from being a whole human being — one who is not only defined by surface occurrences and 
interactions, but who embraces their own multi-dimensionality, encapsulated here in the term 
‗life‘: ‗To break through language in order to touch life is to create or recreate the theater…This 
leads to the rejection of the usual limitations of man and man‘s powers, and infinitely extends the 
frontiers of what is called reality.‘168 Correspondingly, Ramona Fotiade observes that ‗According 
to Paul Ramain, another film critic of the 1920s, the identical nature of dreams and cinema finds 
theoretical support in Freud‘s remark that dreams remain ‗untranslatable in words, [and] can only 
be expressed by means of images‘.‘169 For while socialised language operates according to linear 
chronology (this is especially so that it can makes sense of a wider audience), imagination 
operates in a manner resembling frames roughly marking the boundaries of film images. Those 
frames are not necessarily organised according to a linear timeline but can be shuffled about 
freely and arranged into diverse combinations. Linda Williams cites a small segment from one of 
Artaud‘s film scenario‘s, describing an actor who has sunken into a state of mental incoherence 
where the capacity to organise images and events into a linear chronology has diminished:  
Artaud‘s own attitude toward film is encapsulated in the fate of the hero of his first 
published scenario. In it an actor ―has been stricken by a strange malady. He has become 
incapable of keeping up with his thoughts…He is at a loss for words; they no longer 
answer his call, and all he sees is a procession of images, masses of contradictory, 
disconnected images.‖… 
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This failure of words and the reasoning thought processes carried out by language is 
central to all of Artaud‘s work, not only his work in films.170 
 
According to Williams‘ interpretation, what Artaud is attempting to undermine is the linearity of 
content more than anything else. Linearity in this sense refers to the way in which content — 
especially as verbally and aurally constructed — is organised according to a set of markers, all of 
which constrain the direction of time into a rather inflexible mode of past, present, and future. 
What Artaud is proposing however is an art form composed of images and occurrences that are 
concurrent, where linear time does not apply or applies only minimally. A certain thing is not 
merely a consequence of something that came before, but a certain thing affects multitudes of 
other things in a manner resembling liquid absorbing through any number of delicate, translucent 
layers. The former phenomenon of an effect logically following a cause undoubtedly conforms to 
the sequential nature of linear time. However, if we are considering the latter phenomenon of 
concurrent images in completely linear terms, the images would not make sense and may even 
appear to contradict each other, as can be seen in the case for the character‘s experience in 
Artaud‘s scenario. Since linearity does not provide all the answers to how such images should be 
interpreted, it is to the intuitive level that we must look. Here, Artaud‘s ideas on The Seashell 
and the Clergyman suggest that a film experience should seek the fusion between the objective 
meaning of an image and the resonating meaning generated from the intuition: 
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The Shell and the Clergyman plays with created nature and tries to make it yield an 
element of the mystery of its most secret combinations. So we must not seek a logic or a 
sequence which things do not contain, we must interpret the intimate meaning of the 
images, the inner meaning which moves inwards from without. The Shell and the 
Clergyman does not tell a story, it develops a sequence of states of mind deduced the one 
from the other, as thought is deduced from thought without this thought reproducing the 
reasonable sequence of facts…Nothing exists except in terms of shape, volume, light, air 
— but above all in terms of a detached and naked sentiment which slips between the 
paths paved with images and reaches a sort of heaven where it bursts into bloom.
171
 
   
An object depicted in an image should not be confined to the status of an ordinary object, but 
should be used to convey a greater state of being, hence his metaphor of the film image 
embodying a state of ‗heaven‘. Thus, we must not view such an object as limited to its 
immediate shape and form, but rather we should consider the object‘s expanded, multi-
dimensional purpose. While the object depicted in an image serves as a vehicle through which a 
higher state of being reveals itself, the depiction almost places such an object in a position 
similar to that of a hieroglyph which conveys a sophisticated seamlessness between the outward 
structure and the inner essence. That is why Artaud insists to not impose meanings upon depicted 
images, but to seek the ‗inner meaning‘ that lies latent within the object, waiting to be revealed.   
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Mythical Poetry 
     Artaud associates conventionality with a confinement of application where only aural 
compositions produce poetry,
172
 without any consideration of the aesthetic methods by which the 
actual written form is created. In other words, conventional writing does not take into account 
the possibly correspondence or disparity between the internal meaning of the writing and the 
external structure of the written form (e.g. the arrangement of letters, the organisation of the 
syllables in words as well as the length of each word). Artaud however does propose the 
imaginative expression of the innate convergence between structure and meaning, alluding to it 
in his analogy of Chinese acupuncture where affecting certain points in the physical body directs 
the course of the most subtle energies, much of which cannot be seen by the naked eye: 
 
I propose to return through the theater to an idea of the physical knowledge of images and 
the means of inducing trances, as in Chinese medicine which knows, over the entire 
extent of the human anatomy, at what points to puncture in order to regulate the subtlest 
functions.
173
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Artaud is here attempting to translate such an idea of physicalised spirituality into theatrical 
terms (and in that connection, cinematic terms). He also uses the analogy of hieroglyphics where 
the supreme importance is placed upon the artistry of their written forms. His idea of 
hieroglyphics rests upon an idealisation of the succinct way in which a pictorial character 
observes the phenomenon it is encapsulating by displaying seemingly self-evident details 
directly associated with the respective phenomenon. He establishes a convergence between 
hieroglyphics and a theatrical language such as the pantomime, which he asserts should be a 
gestural reflection of the corresponding inner state:  
 
By ―unperverted pantomime‖ I mean direct Pantomime where gestures — instead of 
representing words or sentences, as in our European Pantomime (a mere fifty years old!) 
which is merely a distortion of the mute roles of Italian comedy — represent ideas, 
attitudes of mind, aspects of nature, all in an effective, concrete manner, i.e., by 
constantly evoking objects or natural details, like that Oriental language which represents 
night by a tree on which a bird that has already closed one eye is beginning to close the 
other.
174
  
 
The written character representing night is an example of the fusion between poetry and 
intuition, as the character shows an outwardly simple depiction while alluding to night as a 
transitory phase placed along a grand temporal continuum. The poetic quality in this depiction (a 
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bird with one eye already closed and is beginning to close the other) lies in the way in which the 
bird retains a partial openness of one eye, suggesting that in its immediate state expressing all the 
subtleties of drifting between being awake and falling asleep, the bird is not completely closing 
itself to the outside world. The transition between dimensions has not yet been sealed. And so, 
the nocturnal phenomenon represented by such a written character is not at all defined by a 
temporal isolation severing the night from the other transitory phases which together compose a 
single day. Thus, it is the sense of soft and serene interconnection with the rest of the temporal 
realm — a partial but relaxed retaining of the remains of the day — which determines the poetic 
quality of the hieroglyph. In his application of this principle of physicalised spirituality, Artaud 
then proposes a ‗superior idea of poetry and poetry-through-theater which underlies the Myths 
told by the great ancient tragedians, capable once more of entertaining a religious idea of the 
theater (without meditation, useless contemplation, and vague dreams)…‘175 Such an idea of 
mythical poetry may sound as though it belongs to a distinguished order, as in being practiced in 
defined intellectual and social classes. Artaud does make a reference to the status of the ancient 
tragedians from whom myths were distributed among the greater community, so the idea of 
mythical poetry taking its place in higher intellectual life cannot be discounted. However, he 
does not at all turn such a powerful method of expression into a form of snobbery (unless of 
course, his position of using mythical poetry to undermine modern societal norms can be 
considered snobbish discrimination against the mainstream). Quite the contrary, he is 
significantly proposing that mythical poetry is within us all, and that there is no need for any 
imposed mediation for such poetry to be accessed intuitively. 
                                                          
175
 Artaud, ‗No More Masterpieces‘, in The Theater and Its Double, p. 80. 
135 
 
                  Chapter 3 
    The Sacred in Film Poetry 
  
To change the role of speech in theater is to make use of it in a concrete and spatial 
sense, combining it with everything in the theater that is spatial and significant in the 
concrete domain; — to manipulate it like a solid object, one which overturns and disturbs 
things, in the air first of all, then in an infinitely more mysterious and secret domain but 
one that admits of extension, and it will not be very difficult to identify this secret but 
extended domain with that of formal anarchy on the one hand but also with that of 
continuous formal creation on the other. 
 
This is why the identification of the theater’s purpose with every possibility of formal and 
extended manifestation gives rise to the idea of a certain poetry in space which itself is 
taken for sorcery.
176
 
  
I am using Artaud‘s concept of spatial poetry as a theoretical platform for this chapter, especially 
to first establish that there is no differentiation between the sacred life force and the essential 
state of poetry. The idea that spatial poetry generates concrete consequences goes to show that 
hierophany is essentially poetic, and therefore must be experienced using a poetic approach, 
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regardless of whether the experiencer is consciously aware that this is the approach they are 
taking. The notion that poetry must be confined to written and aural usage is conventional and 
outdated, as well as constituting a barrier between the written/aural medium and visual inter-
dimensionality. This latter is a sophisticated ideal that Artaud intends to uphold, although it must 
be noted that visual inter-dimensionality as he conceives of it affects far more than the physical 
sense of sight, that it also reaches towards multi-sensory as well as extra-sensory awareness. The 
written and aural form does not at all need to be isolated, but can in fact extend itself to interact 
creatively with other media (without the need for each medium to lose its own unique 
properties), especially so that poetry becomes a mythical state that can be revealed and expressed 
through multitudes of perceptual faculties. Mythical poetry then is a conscious energy — a non-
physical intelligence at its core — possessing a certain capacity for self-determination and self-
direction in its potential to be shaped and moulded in such a manner that fills up a certain 
concrete space, while at the same time bestowing the respective occupied space with a life force 
that can be ‗felt‘. The poetic force vibrates itself into a physical manifestation that can be seen 
and touched, and upon such a manifestation remain circulating in its own poetic manner within a 
concrete space. An artist who creates a poetic art form by using the components of mass, 
volume, and width of spatial relations is essentially harnessing a poetic force that is already 
available to be accessed from a non-physical dimension.  
 
     Maya Deren is perhaps one of the earlier filmmakers and theorists who sought to make use of 
the non-linear nature of poetry by expressing it in a medium entirely conducted by the 
arrangement of shifting frames and moving images. I will later show that this poetry not only 
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reveals a very unconventional notion of time, but it is also a chronology-defying poetry that has 
full capacity to allude to mythical or sacred time which, according to Eliade, does not operate 
linearly and therefore has no beginning nor end. This does not at all mean that non-linear poetry 
does not convey any sense of past, present, and future; it is not as literal as that. The more 
important point is that when considered in very general terms, poetry places time in a position of 
being primarily defined by perception rather than by objective reality: ‗Deren developed with the 
Anagram a unique theory on film form in which she describes the modern film image in terms of 
poetry, i.e. in relation to a poem‘s vertical structure and significant depth (profoundeur 
signifiante).‘177 Julie Beaulieu attempts to explain what is referred to as the vertical structure of 
Deren‘s film poetry, in acute contrast to the horizontal structure which is the linear descriptive 
narrative — a convention that Artaud also persistently undermines throughout his writings. The 
vertical structure is unified by a core concept rather than a chronological sequence. It is a 
centralised structure that operates very much like a web interconnecting themes, images, and 
symbols from widely differing corners and directions. Thus, this metaphorical web exhibits 
images that may seem temporally inconsistent, even though the determining core concept 
remains a constant interwoven throughout the interplay of dreamlike images: 
Deren‘s investigation of poetry clearly influences her vertical conception of the modern 
filmic image. It is during the ‗Poetry and the Film‘ symposium held in 1953 by Cinema 
16 that Deren reveals to the audience her reflection on the vertical image: ‗In a vertical 
development, it is a logic of central emotion or idea that attracts to itself even disparate 
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images which contain that central core, which they have in common.‘ Deren relates 
poetry to film in terms of both media‘s relation to the lived experience of the artist who 
sees, feels, and understands the world from a unique point of view. She therefore pays 
less attention to the rules of classical poetry; she puts her emphasis on the point of view, a 
key element in her conception of the modern filmic image: 
 
Now poetry, to my mind, consists not of assonance; or rhythm, or rhyme, or any of these 
other qualities we associate as being characteristic of poetry. Poetry, to my mind, is an 
approach to experience, in the sense that a poet is looking at the same experience that a 
dramatist may be looking at.
178
 
 
In Deren‘s mind, the poet embraces the same reality as the dramatist or the novelist, but 
the way reality is depicted definitely changes with the medium and the artist‘s 
subjectivity. Like symbolist poets, Deren believed that the poetic image can be a 
synthesis of intellectual and emotional qualities, emerging from its own structure. That is 
to say, the form is of utmost importance for the form is intimately linked to its content. 
For Deren, the vertical organization of a work (a literary text, a film, etc.) does not 
correspond to a logical or a linear series of events characteristic of a linear and dramatic 
development (A to B to C, etc.) — these things mainly constitute a horizontal 
development in Deren‘s mind. Poetry, however, proceeds via resonances that are deeply 
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grounded in a vertical structure or line. The repetition and variation patterns in Deren‘s 
film Meshes of the Afternoon (MA) offer an illustration of this vertical structure, the 
hallmark of which is non-linear narration.
179
 
  
That is not at all to say that poetry which is bound to rhyme and assonance is lesser in status as 
an organised written and aural form, for there are always going to be instances where such 
specific methods of composition generate profound effects upon those reading or listening. The 
more important point is that Deren views poetry as being far more expansive than such rules of 
aural composition, especially since to translate poetry through visual images would most likely 
mean a shedding away of such rhymes and assonances, potentially profound as their aesthetic 
effects may be. As Deren suggests and Beaulieu interprets, the essential state of poetry is entirely 
defined by freedom of subjective expression, which means that such expression does not need to 
take into account societally imposed rules of how things should be presented (and that includes 
the incorporation of rhyme and assonance into poetic compositions). Freedom of subjectivity 
also means allowing the non-linear aspect of personal experience to reveal its dream structure, 
which is clearly a structure that remains independent of conventional chronology, again a 
temporal concept corresponding to Eliade‘s mythical or sacred time. Furthermore, it must be 
noted here that there is no way of quantifying the diverse directions that the creative 
consciousness can possibly take — except to say that even though chronological sequencing is 
one valid method of recording the ways and means by which occurrences take their course, 
chronology constitutes but one method of thought, one among an infinite variety. The inner 
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imagination, especially as Deren conceptualises it to be in Meshes of the Afternoon (1943), not 
only does not show any recognition for linear arrangement, except to occasionally allude to the 
passing of time. Here, the imagination operates according to a network of images, none of which 
reveal where the depicted persons and objects come from, nor the destination towards which they 
are headed. The storytelling appears fragmented due to the extreme ambiguity concerning how 
things came to be the way they are. At the same time, the storytelling remains unified by the core 
concept of a brief moment one afternoon whereby both day-dreams and dreams occurring during 
sleep activate the latent meanings behind the way things are on the surface. Objects that appear 
ordinary are in fact not ordinary at all, for they embody a sacred significance — or more 
precisely a sacred life force orchestrating the placements of such objects and the events that 
follow on as a consequence of such placements.  
 
     A clear example at the beginning of the film comes in the form of a hanging arm whose hand 
is holding a flower. While the hanging arm does not appear to be at all attached to a body, we 
remain unsure of whom the arm belongs to or how the arm came to be hanging down the middle 
of the image, slowly lowering itself. Deren herself stars in the film, but there is no indication that 
it is her arm — or even a representation of her arm — that we are seeing in this particular image, 
especially as it is not a human arm. It is an artificial arm attached to an artificial hand — the arm, 
hand, and fingers purposely elongated and hanging stiff and solid in such a way as to make clear 
that it is not a human subject that is lowering the flower onto the paved road. The sacred 
significance here lies in the unusual method by which the flower lands on the ground. To begin 
with, the sight of flowers lying on the ground outdoors is always going to be commonplace and 
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relatively ordinary, especially if the immediate environment is allowing of such occurrences. The 
most common ways for a flower to land on the ground would be via the winds that have carried 
it from the tree/plant of origin, or if a passerby drops a flower regardless of whether it is 
intentional.  However, this image of the artificial arm and hand lowering the flower upon the 
ground shows a non-human or rather transhuman orchestration. The arm and hand are shaped 
just like those belonging to a human, causing them to be human-like, but they remain non-human 
nevertheless — even though from a technical standpoint, an actual human arm and hand could 
just as easily have been used to compose the image, but such actual human limbs were purposely 
not used to convey the higher direction of transhuman influences. So the otherworldly medium 
that is placing the flower upon the ground is both human-like and non-human. The 
anthropomorphising of the vehicle (composed of the artificial arm and hand) mobilising and 
relocating the flower has important implications. We can quite confidently say that it is non-
human precisely because we already know it is artificial; but because it is human-like, this 
likeness personifies certain invisible forces that have conducted the flower‘s materialisation upon 
the road. The invisible forces embodied by the artificial arm and hand deliberately place an 
object upon a chosen position. The importance lies in the deliberation which seemingly involves 
strategic planning as to how the flower will rest upon the ground, as well as a calculation of the 
occurrences associated with the flower thereafter. If we consider other ways and means by which 
the flower could have landed on the ground, such as the wind or even an accidental dropping by 
a pedestrian, neither occurrence could have exercised such deliberation of purpose and action. It 
may be too far-fetched to say that the artificial arm and hand personify a near-omnipresent force, 
although the suggestion of higher intervention is very much present. The unknown origin of the 
hanging arm further magnifies the idea of an invisible conductor. 
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Immediately after the flower is placed on the ground, the hanging arm and hand instantly vanish 
without a trace. We then see the shadow of Deren walking towards the flower to pick it up. The 
symbols have such an ordinary appearance that rather diminishes their supposedly distinguished 
status. However, the assemblage of the image components creates an unusual quality of extreme 
proportions, imbuing such ordinariness with a sense of wonder, an idea also alluded to by 
Michael Bird: ‗…in order for cinema to have a means by which it can open us to the dimension 
of the sacred, this means would have to be directed to the discernment of the holy within the real, 
rather than leading away from the real as in the case of art that abolishes reality.‘180 
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Rethinking Poetry 
I say that the stage is a concrete physical place which asks to be filled, and to be given its 
own concrete language to speak. 
 
I say that this concrete language, intended for the senses and independent of speech, has 
first to satisfy the senses, that there is a poetry of the senses as there is a poetry of 
language…181 
 
Artaud was intent upon exposing the extreme fallacies of restricting poetry to any one form. 
Even though this aspect of his theory mainly concerns the visual and spatial dimensions of 
theatrical poetry, they do elaborate in fine detail using effective metaphors the sacred nature of 
poetry that can be considered near-omnipresent due to its capacity to reveal itself through an 
unlimited range of sensual phenomena. His example of theatrical poetry only goes to show that 
the essential state of poetry can be moulded and sculpted into a concrete form which occupies a 
quantifiable space, a principle which also applies to film (only that he articulates the same 
principle much more soundly and elaborately in his theatrical philosophy). In his metaphorical 
statement that the stage ‗asks to be filled‘, there is an implication that the state of poetry which is 
essentially non-physical has the capacity to vibrate itself into more tangible physicalised forms. 
Just as importantly, the space in which that poetry is vibrating itself into concreteness is also 
vibrating in active interaction with the poetic life force, almost as if there is an inter-dimensional 
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law dictating that in order for different components to participate in a process of co-creation 
(especially one where both, or more, are on equal standing in terms of their willingness and 
focus), those components involved must be vibrating on compatible frequencies: ‗it [concrete 
poetry] combines with the other means of expression; and the consequences of these 
combinations, of their reactions and their reciprocal destructions, are easy to perceive.‘182 If 
poetry is filling in a concrete space, such a process of filling in necessitates that some of the 
poetry‘s properties transform themselves into something that can be physically quantified, while 
maintaining its core essence of a metaphorical fluid that can be poured into many different 
vessels. In other words, poetry is a very broad energetic force vibrating at multitudes of varying 
frequencies, each frequency allowing the state of poetry to manifest itself into a specific form. 
Artaud does not so much undermine poetry in the written, recited, and spoken forms, but he does 
emphasise that such a medium-restrictive practice does not fully use the potential resources that 
poetry has to offer. One of the main purposes for human to possess the range of physical senses 
that they do is so that they can experience and hence formulate perspectives through those senses 
that are available, and such perspectives include the cultivation of poetry through such a palpable 
sensory range. He continues to list many other forms that poetry can take, although the following 
list is by no means an exhaustive compilation of poetry‘s more tactile potential: ‗This very 
difficult and complex poetry assumes many aspects: especially the aspects of all the means of 
expression utilizable on the stage, such as music, dance, plastic art, pantomime, mimicry, 
gesticulation, intonation, architecture, lighting, and scenery.‘183  
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     The manifestation of poetry in such select forms goes to show that the conventional attitude 
that poetry can only take on textual and verbal forms must be put aside due to the severe 
limitations such an attitude imposes upon the avant-garde creative process. Poetic qualities are 
essentially felt without any need to be explained in words, which is why Artaud suggests that 
poetry transcends aural language in every respect (‗this solidified, materialized language by 
means of which theater is able to differentiate itself from speech‘184). While there certainly is 
such a thing as genuine aural poetry (Artaud distinguishes this class of passionate aural 
expression as being far superior to the aural content which he considers to be excessive and 
redundant), the essential state of poetry is by no means dependent upon aural expression as a 
specific channel. He openly states that confining poetry to a specific form — while ignoring or 
omitting the fact that this state of poetry also expresses itself through multitudes of other forms 
— is no different from suffocating the infinite potential of poetry. He even goes so far as to 
suggest that restricting the poetic form is a very outdated approach with which we would 
inevitably become dissatisfied, due to the fact that we have an innate predisposition to recognise 
the universality of this state of poetry that also determines the nature of the sacred:    
 
We must get rid of our superstitious valuation of texts and written poetry. Written poetry 
is worth reading once, and then should be destroyed. Let the dead poets make way for 
others. Then we might even come to see that it is our veneration for what has already 
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been created, however beautiful and valid it may be, that petrifies us, deadens our 
responses, and prevents us from making contact with that underlying power, call it 
thought-energy, the life force, the determinism of change, lunar menses, or anything you 
like. Beneath the poetry of the texts, there is the actual poetry, without form and without 
text.
185
 
 
We cannot take Artaud completely literally when he says that written poetry is not worth reading 
more than once. The more important point is that the poetic life force residing in such a vast 
range of phenomena holds the potential for poetry to be revealed through infinitely diverse 
expressions. While Artaud lays out the sacred/poetic life force as a constant principle (he even 
associates the life force with universal cycles such as the moon and menstruation), he puts 
forward with equal significance that the diverse expressions of the life force are brought forth 
from the very principle that the life force is one of commonality, not exclusivity in the sense of 
being snobbishly discriminating.
186
 The life force in turn has the capacity to poeticise the vessel 
in which it resides. The poetic life force becomes magnified and manipulated through those key 
elements constituting the foundational film form — in other words, what the film form cannot do 
without: the recorded image, camera angles (including the heights at which the camera is 
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placed), lighting, image composition, edited lengths of shots, cuts, and fades. The camera‘s 
distinct accuracy is assessed by the automatic quality of its recording process — an automatic 
quality that serves to captivate the poetic life force with exceptional spontaneity, a spontaneity 
possibly absent or minimally present in the pre-cinematic arts such as painting, drawing, 
sculpture, or even the literary arts. I am now presenting a scene that seamlessly fuses different 
dimensions with ordinary-looking components that at first glance would not at all appear out of 
place in an ordinary environment, although the sacred significance of such components lies in 
their capacity — the special quality of such a capacity lying in its modest, down-to-earth 
semblance — to come together to create otherworldly results.  
 
     In Jean Cocteau‘s Orpheus (1950), the Lady of Death takes Orpheus‘s wife Eurydice to ‗the 
other world‘.187 This scene is almost entirely composed of ordinary components placed into the 
setting: a dead-looking woman lying on her bed, another woman who is an authority figure 
watching over her body, and a mirror. However, certain cinematic techniques are executed in 
such a radical yet simple-looking manner that transforms any and all ordinary components within 
the scene into a dream. Such a dream is liminal — as in entirely characterised by ‗in-between‘ 
qualities — because it conveys a rite of transportation from Orpheus‘s bedroom to another world 
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operating through different laws, a world designed to receive those who have undergone their 
physical death. At the same time, this scene clearly shows an inter-dimensional moment that 
remains grounded within those habitual things that constitute everyday life. Thus, the ordinary 
becomes poeticised in such a manner that allows us to see the enchantment beneath the coldness 
and meanness displayed by the Lady of Death. Those everyday things such as bed and mirror are 
transformed into revelatory vehicles carrying out the active intersection between the normality of 
a domestic bedroom and another much darker dimension inhabited by guardians of the dead.     
 
Here, Eurydice appears dead, and is about to be summoned by the Lady of Death who commands 
her: ―Arise!‖ Eurydice does not get up naturally as one would normally do after waking up. 
Upon Death‘s orders, Eurydice suddenly stands upright, without giving her own limbs any time 
149 
 
to adjust to her newly adopted robotic position. The drastic, unnatural shift from lying asleep to 
erecting oneself into a soldier-like stance goes to show that her body no longer belongs to the 
physical human dimension as we know it. It is almost as if her life force has withdrawn from the 
physical world, even though the exact same body and dress are retained to depict both the living 
and the dead Eurydice. Thus, the inter-worldly transition is more than evident while outward 
appearances remain unchanged. Yet her manner and personality show that Eurydice is 
transformed into a walking corpse robotically following the Lady of Death‘s orders.  
 
This simple instance of an unnaturally erected body all by itself shows an intensely magical 
moment taking place amidst ordinary surroundings. Even the inhabitants from ‗the other world‘ 
look completely normal by the standards of the immediate culture into which they have 
150 
 
presented themselves. In fact Cocteau is among the few film theorists who suggest the avant-
garde nature of the magical, especially in the context of such a cultural environment where the 
magical/fantastical remains a marginalised way of thinking. He describes a poetic approach to 
the filmmaking or indeed the film-watching experience whereby mythical/sacred ideas are 
treated as an everyday occurrence rather than as something which remains outside the realm of 
normality. Thus, it is the normalising of the sacred/mythical that becomes an avant-garde 
phenomenon, especially amidst a modern cultural environment where the sacred/mythical is not 
normally recognised as having any significant bearings by the mainstream. The sacred/mythical 
then becomes the new normal, not merely to be incorporated into the everyday but to actually 
become the core essence conducting everyday life: ‗The cinema-poet‘s first concern should, 
therefore, be to treat a tale or a legend as an everyday device and to believe in acts of magic as he 
does in the most routine actions.‘188 Such a principle of uniting the magical with the ordinary to 
the point where the relationship between the two becomes seamless is just as much expressed in 
Eurydice‘s transportation to ‗the other world‘ via the mirror in her bedroom. The Lady of Death 
first breaks the mirror with her fist, and then leads the way into what has now become a 
‗doorway‘ into the afterlife. Eurydice and another ‗guardian of the dead‘ — whose appearance is 
not in the least different from any normal everyday person — follow into the dark space. This 
simple-looking act of destroying part of a piece of interior furniture, especially to form an 
opening that can be put to further use, is possibly a very normal occurrence in a site of 
architectural construction or interior re-decoration. Thus, there is nothing outwardly alien or 
removed about this inter-worldly transition. 
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Once all have entered into the dark space, the broken pieces of the mirror magically reassemble 
themselves into one and the same whole. The mirror now returns to its intact state, sealing the 
passageway into ‗the other world‘. In the mirror‘s reflection, we now see Eurydice asleep on her 
bed, all the while knowing that only a very brief moment ago, Eurydice had just risen from her 
bed and followed the Lady of Death into the mirror. Here, there is a much more significant 
implication than the mere phenomenon of one and the same person being in two places at the 
same time. The scene shows great deliberation in cutting to a close-up of a sleeping Eurydice 
immediately after she herself has entered into the inter-dimensional ‗doorway‘, especially so that 
she embodies the seamless interconnection between the physical human world and the world of 
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the afterlife, seeing that her body is present on ‗both sides‘. The mirror itself is an exceptionally 
expressive form of liminality — in this scene, a very literal ‗threshold‘ serving as a boundary, at 
once transparent but solid, which simultaneously defines the reaches of both territories 
concerned but also dismantles the artificial construct of demarcations. In fact, the mirror reverses 
the constructs of ‗here‘ and ‗there‘, causing ‗the other world‘ to lose its sense of ‗otherness‘.  
 
A mirror‘s function is to double an image, and here we see that such a function is exaggerated 
and far-reaching to the point where even Eurydice‘s own body is ‗doubled‘. Eurydice herself has 
become a symbolic mirror embodying the potent intersection between dimensions that normally 
run parallel to each other. Like the mirror that is at once a virtual space and a reflection of 
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another clearly tangible space, she is in two places at the same time, and so becomes quite 
‗placeless‘ as her consciousness is focused in multiple locations — a translocal phenomenon 
that, in full avant-garde form, defies any and all conventional definitions of a physical place.      
 
This scene also puts into practice Cocteau‘s vision of an art form that causes one to believe in 
what is formerly unbelievable by portraying ‗the other world‘ and its inhabitants (in this case, the 
guardians of the dead) as having full capacity to blend into the immediate human culture that 
they are literally and symbolically intersecting with. Not only do the otherworldly inhabitants 
appear as normal-looking people, but even their relationships with each other directly reflect 
human social hierarchy, especially that of authority figure and follower. This principle of inter-
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dimensional assimilation is even more magnified in the above image‘s power to capture the inner 
warmth of a face and body to which we remain unsure whether to consider a corpse or a 
‗sleeping beauty‘ waiting for her spirit to return to her body. The close-up whereby the light is 
resting peacefully between two sides of dominant-looking shadows almost causes Eurydice‘s 
face to glow, warming her presence on the bed and pillow to such a point where one has to 
wonder whether her passage into the afterlife only a moment ago was actually for real. Yet again, 
this physical human side of the mirror is just as real as the other side of the mirror where the soul 
of the dead woman is being transported. The scene very much succeeds in challenging any 
definition of reality that would normally confine it into a combination of time and space as well 
as whatever happens within such a chronotope. Cocteau‘s vision further emphasises the idea that 
the magical/fantastical does not at all need to be considered abnormal as a mainstream 
secularised culture would dictate it to be. Normalising the magical/fantastical is only a matter of 
activating certain inclinations within the consciousness that are latent and waiting to be explored: 
 
In the long run, mankind has accorded itself the right to create a world that is 
superimposed on the visible one and to make visible a world that is ordinarily invisible. I 
believe that this world not only exists in the same sense as the other and constrains the 
incredulous to be wary, disquieting them to the point of revealing dormant senses within 
them; but also that it precedes manifestations that are still abnormal, and are likely to 
become normal with time.
189
 
 
                                                          
189
 Cocteau, The Art of Cinema, p. 38.  
155 
 
According to Cocteau, the physical extends forth from the non-physical; and therefore if the non-
physical dimension has every capacity to make the magical/fantastical a predominant norm, then 
it follows that the physical dimension has just as much capacity to do the same. However, as 
cultural conventions impose severe restrictions upon imaginative expression, the avant-garde 
must then break through such intellectual and artistic confines. The cinematic potential to 
normalise the magical/fantastical constitutes a forefront method in dismantling such conventions. 
In fact, André Bazin discusses similar ideas in his essay ―The Virtues and Limitations of 
Montage‖ where he begins by presenting children‘s films of the time (1940s) as examples of 
cultural limitations rather than as expressions of the inner child latent within the consciousness:     
 
In fact, anyone wishing to set up a film library or to compile a series of programs for 
young children would be hard pressed to find more than a few shorts, of unequal merit, 
and a certain number of commercial films, among them some cartoons, the inspiration 
and the subject matter of which were sufficiently childlike; in particular, certain 
adventure films. It is not, however, a matter of specialized production, just of films 
intelligible to those on a mental level under fourteen. As we know, American films do not 
often rise above this level.
190
 
  
Bazin‘s discontentment with the available children‘s films of the time leads him to compare such 
unsatisfactory creations with children‘s literature whose quality, however rarely it reveals itself, 
he very much idealises. Such literature conveys a purity of imagination resembling that which is 
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constantly practiced by an innocent child who sees magical beauty in even the most ordinary of 
things. This imagination of the inner child — that he suggests should be just as much conveyed 
in a wanting medium such as film — has not yet met with resistance acquired through social 
conditioning as well as observation of the societal dictates of what is appropriate and what is not. 
The inner child — if considered in the context of certain innate structures embedded within the 
consciousness — remains an unconditional state that can never be outgrown, and therefore can 
be accessed if one makes an effort to peel through the layers of contradictory conditioning. An 
example of such conditioning is what Bazin terms as the state of being ‗puerile‘ that is normally 
assigned to the childlike imagination. That is why he makes a point of stating that such an 
imagination is not at all childish and silly in the way that mainstream society has dictated it to be:      
 
It is obvious that [children‘s] films of this sort are in no way comparable to children‘s 
literature properly so called, and of which there is anyhow not a great deal…All the 
same, it is certainly not necessary to employ psychoanalysis to discover the delicious and 
terrifying profundities that are the source of the beauty of Alice in Wonderland and the 
fairy tales of Hans Christian Andersen. These authors had a capacity for dreaming that 
was equal in kind and intensity to that of a child. There is nothing puerile about that 
imaginary world. It was pedagogy that invented harmless colors for children, but to see 
the use they make of them is to find your gaze riveted on green paradises peopled with 
monsters.
191
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Bazin‘s metaphor of green lands inhabited by monsters and its application to the usual colours 
taught to children as part of their education together suggest that seemingly ordinary things can 
be composed into combinations that are far beyond ordinary. To see the wonder within such 
colour combinations is much like seeing the world through the lens of a child who has not yet 
been conditioned with resistant thought patterns, such as ‗monsters don‘t exist‘ for example. If 
such resistant conditioning can be peeled away or rather completely unlearned, we would return 
to a primordial state of consciousness where what is conventionally considered to be impossible 
may become recognised as a possibility. Bazin suggests that authors of the most influential 
children‘s literature do have an intense recognition that fantastical phenomena, such as green 
lands inhabited by monsters, do exist in dimensions that may not be immediately accessible by 
the physical human senses — or at least exposure to such dimensions may be obstructed by 
resistant social conditioning. If the human consciousness can remain open, there may develop a 
recognition that such fantastical phenomena constitute a reality in their own dimension — a 
dimension that could potentially expand conventional definitions of what reality actually is. 
Small children seem to be able to naturally intuit that such phenomena as green lands inhabited 
by monsters are waiting to be accessed via the most allowing channels within the consciousness 
that conduct the exchange of information between different dimensions. This is possibly the 
reason why fairy tales such as Alice in Wonderland and those of Hans Christian Andersen are so 
well-loved, for they express without inhibition the abundance of childlike imagination that 
mainstream society normally discourages (hence, the artistic poverty displayed in the children‘s 
films of Bazin‘s time). If green lands inhabited by monsters can become a predominantly 
accepted idea within society (adult society, especially) — instead of being sidelined into the 
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restrictive category of unrealistic fantasy with no relevance to everyday life — then the poetic 
imagination which always possesses the childlike purity would be allowed to enrich many areas 
of intellectual and creative expression
192
: ‗The authors of genuine children‘s literature, then, are 
only rarely and indirectly educators…They are poets whose imagination is privileged to remain 
on the dream wavelength of childhood.‘193 Thus, Bazin‘s notion of poetic imagination does not at 
all focus upon what is impossible, but instead offers a much broadened vision of possibilities of 
other existences. He proposes an extreme malleability of reality — assisting the consciousness to 
become much more pliable and adaptable — more than anything else. Clare O‘Farrell provides a 
similar interpretation of Artaud‘s poetic imagination, further relating it to a profound recognition 
of things that modernity does not instruct to actually have an existence at all:   
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The modern version of a ‗useful‘ and ‗truthful‘ imagination requires that it must 
somehow mirror and reflect back on an existing physical and social reality not radically 
recreate and reform those rules and certainly not refer to a dimension which appears 
different from those realities. Artaud proposes a return to the ‗mentality of the Middle 
Ages‘: a reactivation of an older poetic and spiritual imagination, free of the dreary 
necessities of restricting itself to ‗improving our social lot‘, free of the idea of art as 
completely bound by the dictates of ‗social work‘ and political reform, in other words an 
imagination of the fantastic, of other worlds, of non-material existences. It is also an 
imagination, which as the historian Jacques Le Goff suggests in his fascinating book The 
Medieval Imagination, is not simply limited to the world of books and literature. It 
weaves itself into the very fabric of the everyday. Medieval scientists were quite happy to 
include strange and imagined or semi‐imagined plants, animals and places in their 
scientific classifications. Such things were regarded as marginal and exceptional 
phenomena but were not untrue for all that.
194
   
 
Artaud‘s proposition of a return to the collective imagination of the Middle Ages is only another 
example of his more general intention to incorporate the idea that there are multitudes of 
dimensions to the universal existence. This idea of multi-dimensionality defies the modern 
attitude that is so deeply anchored into the concreteness of physicality, to such a point where 
physicality seems to have a monopoly over existence in general. It may be true that the medieval 
cultural attitude places boundaries between what is considered normal and what is strange and 
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unusual, but Artaud‘s theoretical material as well as O‘Farrell‘s interpretation do suggest that 
such boundaries are fluid and transparent more than anything else. Even scientific classifications 
include things that have been imagined, but this only goes to show their openness towards the 
notion that the poetic imagination has the power to channel information from dimensions beyond 
the physical, while modern science would strictly ban such an outlandish idea. Johan Huizinga 
also suggests that there is a source of power whose constant and perhaps unconditional purpose 
is to bestow ‗life‘ even upon objects that are normally considered inanimate, causing us to have 
to rethink what the concept of ‗life‘ actually means. The idea that certain inanimate objects 
possess a personified aspect goes to show that they incorporate another dimension that can 
potentially reveal the fantastical content beneath the immediate surface appearance: 
 
To represent the incorporeal and the inanimate as a person is the soul of all myth-making 
and nearly all poetry. Strictly speaking, however, the process does not follow the course 
just indicated. There is no question of first conceiving something as lifeless and bodiless 
and then expressing it as something that has body, parts, and passions. No; the thing 
perceived is conceived as having life and movement in the first place, and such is the 
primary expression of it, which is no afterthought. Personification in this sense arises as 
soon as the need is felt to communicate one‘s perceptions to others. Conceptions are thus 
born as acts of the imagination.
195
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Significantly, Huizinga clearly suggests that animism is at the heart of myth and poetry, and so it 
is mythical poetry that has the capacity to establish a new definition of ‗life‘ in a way which 
encompasses its multi-dimensionality and potential to be expressed in vast diversity, instead of 
restricting the notion of ‗life‘ to those obvious beings that have active sense perceptions. 
Animism very much contributes to defining mythical poetry as the art of revealing the stream of 
conscious energy from which the more tangible forms arise — as if to say that despite 
obstructions to perceiving such a conscious stream, whether such obstructions are caused by 
social conditioning or personal resistance, the stream of ‗life‘ as an all-pervasive force should not 
be something that is considered hidden from plain view. Correspondingly, Rachel Moore 
provides an interpretation of Sergei Eisenstein‘s theory that cartoons are projections of human-
like characteristics upon living drawings — many of which do not depict human figures —
imaginatively designed to please and perhaps even to nurture the inner child: 
 
Reusing and rethinking material with which he had been occupied since his trip to 
Europe, America, and finally Mexico, Eisenstein points to the way the cartoon awakens 
and momentarily satisfies the human desire to become something else with its 
metamorphosing drawings. Like the playful nature of his subject, Eisenstein‘s text 
consists of fragments and free associations around myriad examples taken from a wide 
cultural and temporal range of images. Key features of this unfinished monograph are the 
child, the phenomenon of fire, and animism.  
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…Disney‘s figures, neither entirely animal nor certainly not human, are free to move, 
grow, and transform beyond ―once and forever prescribed norms of nomenclature, form 
and behaviour.‖ Animated cartoons are totally irresponsible; there are no actors, no 
biological or physical laws. ―Like the sun, like trees, like birds, like the ducks and mice, 
deer and pigeons that run across his screen,‖ Disney simply is, Eisenstein puts it, ―beyond 
good and evil.‖196 
 
Cartoons are given a virtual yet fully alive physical form, allowing the artist (i.e. the cartoonist) 
generous opportunity to create qualities, behaviour, and activities that a virtual body would be 
inclined to perform. Cartoons embody an intensely liminal state of being simultaneously bound 
to and free from a physical body. Still, they are not at all determined by physical laws — causing 
cartoons to embody ideals where the artists as well as those watching cartoons have complete 
freedom to imagine what it would be like to step outside the immediate body, but still inhabit a 
virtual body all the same. Eisenstein‘s description of Disney cartoons implies that animism 
fulfills our most elementary instincts, and that mythical poetry — far from being an intellectual 
luxury — is in fact a basic need. Cartoon characters‘ independence from moral and social 
responsibilities deeply reflects our desire for a means of escapism from a routine life that is 
predominantly defined by all such responsibilities and constraints. Through experiencing the 
lives played out in cartoons, the bindings to such societal terms and conditions are temporarily 
relaxed. We can relate to the cartoons, as they are to a certain extent designed to be human-like, 
yet we also desire to embrace the fantastical liberties so prevalent in the cartoon existence.   
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Cinema’s relationship to sacred time and spatial poetry 
     There may be substantial productivity in discussing the case for poetic architecture, as it is 
one of the most evident examples of spatial poetry. Defining spatial poetry becomes an important 
step towards establishing poetry‘s application to cinema, especially as film images are always a 
recording of things that occupy visual space more than anything else. Once the poetry of physical 
space is properly defined, we can then proceed to define the poetry governing spatial relations 
within a filmic scope. If one is examining the poetic nature of a piece of architecture, one would 
intuitively absorb the atmosphere created by the assemblage of interior and exterior components. 
An example of a more subtle form of poetic architecture can perhaps be observed in the placing 
of a bathtub in oasis-like surroundings where, for instance, a very large clear sheet of glass 
window is placed between the interior bathroom space and the garden outside — possibly a 
window that is substantially larger than normal. While there is a boundary marking the contrast 
— at least the functional contrast — between interior and exterior, the absolute transparency of 
the glass window serves to show that the differentiation between indoor qualities and outdoor 
qualities is significantly blurred, conveniently allowing for the imagination of poetic metaphors 
interlinking the interior and exterior. An atmosphere such as this is especially conducive towards 
poetic imagination because the bathtub itself is a contemplative area — almost like a microcosm 
— designed for rites of relaxation and cleansing. Here, spatial poetry (and even poetry in 
general) can be defined as an imaginative establishment of metaphorical interconnections — 
connections that are latent, but are then revealed through the articulation of the peculiar aspects 
of otherwise hidden relationships. Quite invariably, poetry becomes an appropriate way of 
describing hierophanies because such embodiments of inter-dimensionality require an 
imagination of the state of things beyond their surface appearance. Hierophany interlinks 
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multitudes of physical and non-physical dimensions, but there must also be a recognition that the 
perceptual faculties are not restricted to the physical senses. Larry Shiner‘s interpretation of 
spatial hierophanies emphasises the metaphorical interconnections between the divine world and 
the world that is perhaps less than divine (or possessing a dilution of divine qualities): 
 
Techniques of orientation are particularly important in the selection or construction of 
high holy places such as central ceremonial grounds, sanctuaries or cities. Here an 
additional aspect in the consecration of sacred space comes into play, since these 
ceremonies are seen as a repetition of the work of the gods. By repeating ―the archetype 
of the sacred space in illo tempore‖ the chaos of the unknown or uncultivated territory is 
transformed into a cosmos, a world. The chief symbolism in all these consecrations, 
according to Eliade, is the symbolism of the Center. Whether village or city, grove or 
mountain, house or sanctuary, any place consecrated by the hierophany may come to be 
honored as the navel of the cosmos, the junction of heaven, earth and underworld. In 
Eliade‘s interpretation then, the principle characteristics of sacred space are that it (1) 
marks a break in the homogeneity and amorphousness of hitherto undifferentiated space, 
(2) these breaks provide a spatial orientation especially when they bear the symbolism of 
the Center as almost all major breaks do, (3) the Center is also an axis mundi, a break in 
plane which creates an opening between cosmic levels…197   
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In order to analyse spatial poetry‘s application to hierophany — especially visual hierophany 
such as that occupying the composition of and relationships between film images — I am 
organising my analysis into two parts, all of which are initially based upon Shiner‘s 
interpretation of Eliade‘s spatial hierophany. The first part of my analysis concerns poetry‘s 
intimate relationship with Eliade‘s illo tempore. It is important to note here that it may be 
appropriate to consider the concept of gods completely literally in some instances, but not so 
much in others. Shiners‘s interpretation and perhaps even Eliade‘s immediate usage express gods 
very much as a metaphor — as a divine state or even as cooperative collectives of divine 
energies more than anything else, rather than as literal godly figures possessing whatever manner 
of appearance and personality. During illo tempore, divine energies referred to by Eliade as 
‗gods‘ imprinted patterns of meaning within the cosmic order that paved the path for the 
establishment of sacred meanings: ‗…as the rite always consists in the repetition of an archetypal 
action performed illo tempore (before ―history‖ began) by ancestors or by gods, man is trying, by 
means of the hierophany, to give ―being‖ to even his most ordinary and insignificant acts.‘198  
 
     The second part of my analysis focuses upon the idea that the poetic imagination views the 
structure of existence as full of interplay between the different strata — or rather, patterns of 
intersections very much resembling Eliade‘s axis mundi. There is no need to approach axis 
mundi as completely literally as to always define it as a conjoining pivot between Heaven and 
Earth, or whatever labels one cares to assign to such cosmic planes. It is important to note 
however that spatial poetry, which is essentially a consideration of sacred space, views space as a 
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porous fabric — an entirely penetrable network of inter-dimensionalities — as opposed to a flat 
surface whereby physical locations are marked (in fact this latter approach is very secular). Larry 
Shiner offers an interpretation of Eliade‘s spatial hierophany, suggesting that the human 
consciousness is innately programmed to conceive of space as interwoven concentrations of 
sacred energy patterns. The concept that different segments within a spatial area are interwoven 
through a system of seemingly invisible relationships goes to show that what may at first appear 
to be a literal disparity (e.g. the societally assigned distance between the toilet and the garden) 
can in fact be re-aligned symbolically (e.g. the garden serves to compost and recycle waste, 
symbolically returning digested matter to the earth from whence it came). And even if one would 
choose not to use proper symbols to make sense of the relationships between persons, places, and 
objects, the recognition that certain phenomena are a manifested result of the convergence 
between invisible forces exists as an embedded structure on an archetypal/mythical level:  
 
Homogeneity means that every point is of equal value to every other point, that no 
direction has any privilege over any other, that space is continuous and infinite. Human 
spatiality will be presented as if this view represents less a faithful account of our native 
experience of space than a special kind of abstraction. Of course, there is no doubt that 
even the unreflective everyday spatial experience of literate Westerners is strongly 
influenced by this concept of space as a homogenous and qualityless medium…Yet if we 
look more closely and without prejudice we will discover riches of spatial orientation and 
conception which do not fit the conventional geometricized approach. The variegated 
phenomena of territoriality in men and animals, the spatial explorations of architecture 
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and painting, the differences in social distance and urban organization from society to 
society, the temporalized space of relativity theory — all these suggest that within 
Western culture there is more to space than meets the measuring eye. And when we turn 
to cultures quite different from our own, whether to a non-lineal archaic society such as 
that of the Trobriand Islands or to traditional Japanese culture which treats the interval 
(ma) not as a characterless void but as possessing form and significance of its own, we 
are forced to admit that the ―common sense‖ view of space does not represent the 
essential spatiality of our world.
199
  
  
Whether we are considering hierophany or avant-garde — both of which embody the contrast 
between that which is superior (or in some instances, supreme ideals) and that which is lesser 
(lesser in this instance can mean anything ranging from ordinary to conventional to even 
downright unpleasant) — there is no place for homogeneity in what Eliade describes as ‗being, 
the real, and the meaningful‘200. Furthermore, as avant-garde essentially means that which has 
not been created before, such a definition completely necessitates that the system of meanings 
and meaning-making cannot operate in a uniform manner. So if anything can be considered 
conventional (the opposition to avant-garde), it would be homogeneity (the counter-state of 
hierophany) — the monotonous area where no innovativeness can break through the hard surface 
of unquestionable conformity. As Shiner suggests and as Eliade would uphold, even the modern, 
                                                          
199
 Shiner, p. 427.  
200
 Eliade, ‗The Sacred in the Secular World‘, in Mircea Eliade: A Critical Reader, ed. by Bryan S. 
Rennie (London and Oakville: Equinox, 2006), pp. 74 – 91 (p. 58). 
168 
 
secular Western organisation of space is not as homogeneous as it outwardly presents itself to be. 
A modern city still associates specific areas with higher purpose (e.g. the urban garden that is the 
centre for relaxation and communion with nature) and certain other areas with the most ordinary 
purpose (e.g. traffic lights). The multiple levels of meaningfulness constitute an initial platform 
for seeing things in a layered, complex manner — that such things have far broader inter-
dimensional consequences that are not confined to surface interactions. Shiner‘s mentioning of 
the Japanese ma leads to a further consideration that the poetry characterising architectural forms 
applies just as profoundly to theatre, music, and film. Ma constitutes a sacred poetic moment in 
which there is an oasis-like space exempt from the normal course of linear time. Ma significantly 
alludes to Eliade‘s illo tempore, as ma captures that precise moment which cleanses itself of the 
pressures and obligations normally attached to the irreversibility of linear time, causing the 
conventional view of time to completely dissolve without justification. The creative potential 
held by ma almost has an infinite quality about it (as in, constituting a component of spatial 
relations but not at all governed by space). The emphasis here is upon a transcendental divine 
state that as yet has no need for a manifested embodiment or vessel. Ma remains a contemplative 
‗gap‘ until the timing becomes appropriate for the invisible qualities held by ma to reveal 
themselves in a perceivable embodiment during the course of the art form. Such a divine state is 
primarily composed of silence and nothingness that are as deeply buried roots giving rise to 
eventually manifesting consequences:  
The word ma basically means an ―interval‖ between two (or more) spatial or temporal 
things and events. Thus it is not only used in compounds to suggest measurement but 
carries meanings such as gap, opening, space between, time between, and so forth. A 
room is called ma, for example, as it refers to the space between the walls; a rest in music 
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is also ma as the pause between the notes or sounds. By the same token it can also mean 
timing, as in the comic recitation art called rakugo where ma is quite explicitly a part of 
the craft and skill.
201
 
 
Ma then can be described as the nothingness that holds all poetic potentiality. If linearity (the 
logical reactionary construct of cause and effect) is considered the opposite of poetry, then ma 
offers a resting place where all such bindings to linearity are released, especially so that the 
poetic creations emerging from such a restful interval become all the more powerful precisely 
through the act of stepping outside of normality. Thus, ma holds a supreme position of formative 
creativity where things arise and eventually return to, hence ma‘s allusion to Eliade‘s illo 
tempore defined as the pre-human era ‗before ―history‖ began‘ and ‗the dawn of the universe.‘ 
Both ma and illo tempore rest upon the principle that time is perceptual, that its irreversibility is 
one of the rules of the physical plane of existence, causing linear time as we know it to also be a 
product of the perceptual faculties — systems of processing information that had already 
undergone intensive, long-term programming, also very deeply anchored in the accustomed 
physicality (Eliade would refer to such means of sensory perception as profane). So due to time‘s 
association with such habitual patterns bound to the denseness of physical conditions, the fact 
that habitual patterns can always be released means that time can be exited from no matter how 
binding the conditions of linearity may be.  
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Sacred Cinema and the “Ma” Interval 
…as the rite always consists in the repetition of an archetypal action performed in illo 
tempore (before ―history‖ began) by ancestors or by gods, man is trying, by means of the 
hierophany, to give ―being‖ to even his most ordinary and insignificant acts. By its 
repetition, the act coincides with its archetype, and time is abolished. We are witnessing, 
so to speak, the same act that was performed in illo tempore, at the dawn of the universe. 
Thus, by transforming all his physiological acts into ceremonies, primitive man strove to 
―pass beyond‖, to thrust himself out of time (and change) into eternity.202 
 
Both ma and illo tempore can be described as an exception, a moment of origination, a poetic 
pause. Considering the significant qualitative convergences between the two, it then becomes 
more appropriate to consider the divine as a state that holds sacred patterns, rather than as a 
reference to literal godly figures as such. We must keep in mind that as far as ma is concerned, a 
system of nomenclature as applied to the gods would be considered artificial constructs at best 
and distractions at worst, seeing that the attribution of set labels and personality traits would 
become a confinement or a constraint more than anything else. So it may suffice to describe 
hierophanies as extending from a primordial divine source, rather than literally saying that they 
are inspired by godly figures — simply due to the fact that this is a case where literal references 
are far less relevant than the essential state which stores sacred blueprints. Ma is also a state of 
nothingness that invisibly stores the information of all things that precede and follow (ma is 
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essentially beyond chronological sequencing; however, for the sake of analysing an art form, we 
still have to resort to discussing compositional components in terms of what comes before and 
after, if only so that our explanations can make sense as much as possible to a wider audience). 
Thus, ma resembles an ultimate source of creation. The in-between space that constitutes ma 
allows one to return, whether literally or symbolically, to that oasis-like place where those things 
that come together to create the art form remain latent and serenely composed: 
 
In Japanese linked verse (renga), for example, it is less the scenes depicted than the 
space-time between the linked verses that produces its aesthetic effect. ―Put your mind to 
what is not said,‖ the poet Shinkei (1406 – 1475) said…Zeami Motokiyo (1363 – 1443), 
the founder of Noh theater, argued that it is ―the moments of no-action‖ (senu tokoro), 
which occur between (himu), that are most enjoyed in Noh… ―What [the actor] does not 
do is of interest‖ (senu tokoro ga omoshiroki) (Komparu 1983, 73). 
 
The Japanese refer to these interstitial spaces or times as ma. Ma is said to have come 
from the Chinese, the character for which shows the sun in the middle of an open gate. It 
was originally used only for space but came to refer to time as well. It may be translated 
as ―space, spacing, interval, gap, blank, room, pause, rest, time, timing, or opening‖ 
(Komparu 1983, 70)…Roland Barthes (1982) has attempted — in an overly mannered 
and deeply French (and therefore ethnocentric) way — to figure the ma within his 
poststructuralist understanding of Japan. He uses expressions like ―pregnant nothing‖, ―a 
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dismembered decentered, dislocated reminiscence‖, an ―emptied sign‖ left over from the 
―fissure of the symbolic‖ to evoke what he does not name. Japanese artists, scholars, and 
architects have argued that it resists translation. They stress its ambiguity, the fact that it 
has to be understood from within a uniquely Japanese configuration of space and time 
that cannot be separated from each other, and a sense of spiritual energy or power (ki or 
ch’i) that resonates within the space-time between and among. It is a negative, albeit 
fecund, chronotope — a stillness, an emptiness — that anticipates (and is anticipated by) 
the ―positive‖ space-time of action, say, in a Noh play.203 
 
Ma becomes a source of sacred poetry precisely through the determining principle that — while 
it contains the virtues of non-physicality and meditation that remain independent of material 
constructs — ma remains a potent seminal energy that exists especially to be moulded into 
manifestations of widely varying degrees of tangibility. Ma is the space where the art form in 
question is literally and metaphorically ‗taking a rest‘, as ma allows the art form to withdraw into 
its source of origin where all the potentiality that would come to compose the art form 
surrounding ma rests in an interval of peaceful repose. At the same time, ma is an ungraspable 
non-locality (I am using this term to express the contrast with the more conventional idea of 
spatial locality) where nestles the highest concentration of liminal qualities, as it is 
simultaneously creative in nature as well as being a state of material non-existence. Thus, ma 
symbolises a gestation period where occurrences are allowed to be contained within a dormant 
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state. This momentary inactivity is a place of stillness and poise so that the components of the art 
form can come to replenish, restore, and develop further. Here, Eric Brannigan establishes a 
direct correspondence between Maya Deren‘s vertical structure of film poetry and Gilles 
Deleuze‘s ‗time-image‘, this correspondence qualified by a ma-like detachment from those 
perceptual faculties that normally organise the chronological sequencing between events. 
Deleuze especially seems to be conveying a placeless place where the relevant aspect of the 
consciousness regresses or rather escapes into during those moments when the physical and 
mental capacities become overwhelmed by the unmanageable intensity of the content: 
 
Deren‘s articulation…of an alternative to the narrative drive of classic fiction film 
anticipates Gilles Deleuze‘s definitive treatment of the issue in his cinema books 
(Deleuze 1986 & Deleuze 1989). His model of the ―movement-image‖ describes the 
basis of the linear progression of an action-reaction filmic structure while his ―time-
image‖ was the result of a perceivable ―slackening of the sensory-motor connection‖ of 
the central protagonists in post-war fiction films (Deleuze 1989, 3). Instead of anticipated 
responses from the actors and logical repercussions, the time-image is characterised by 
―purely optical and sound situations‖ that fill the space where something is, for example, 
―too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth 
outstrips our sensory-motor capacities‖ (Deleuze 1989, 18).204 
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Brannigan‘s description of Deren‘s vertical structure and Deleuze‘s time-image as a relaxing of 
physical filters — as well as mental filters for that matter — goes to show, first of all, that there 
is such a thing as a physical mind, as in that aspect of the consciousness that is predominantly 
tied to concrete physicality. This physical mind — so tightly bound to the physical senses and so 
deeply anchored in the denseness of external circumstances — has a limited capacity, hence 
Deleuze‘s qualification of something which may be ‗too powerful‘ or ‗too beautiful‘ for the 
physical mind to handle. It must be noted however that while the physical mind can certainly be 
trained to perceive beyond physicality, mainstream norms of a secularised society do not at all 
assist in such an expansion. The time-image then serves as a receptacle for those qualities that 
are possibly too extreme or too grand to be processed by the physical mind. This role of highly 
selective receptacle very much resembles ma in the time-image‘s containment of the sublime 
amidst immediate factors that are over-burdening (e.g. those experienced by the protagonists of 
post-war films). However, again very ma-like in its operation, the time-image transcends what 
Brannigan describes as the ‗action-reaction filmic structure‘205, causing the transcendent qualities 
contained within the inherently harmonious receptacle to further magnify their own sublimity 
due to such acute contrast with the surrounding oppositions. Just as Vincent Crapanzano explains 
that the Chinese character for ma shows the sun in the middle of an open gate, while there is a 
threshold indicating the transition between one area and another, the passageway between 
dimensions is open for selected information to stream through. Ma then becomes a period of 
retreat allowing inter-dimensional information to be exchanged. The reason such information is 
‗selected‘ is because ma is the ultimate purity, and therefore cannot be on the same wavelength 
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as, say, intellectually toxic data that would otherwise contaminate the haven-like interval, again 
relating back to Deleuze‘s idea of such lofty or even splendourous information which ‗outstrips 
our sensory-motor capacities.‘206 Suppose if ma were an architectural structure within the interior 
of a residence, it would be very much womb-like, especially if it is an enclosed space that is 
purposely designed to remain independent and perhaps even oblivious of the outside world. 
Being womb-like suggests an extreme form of protection and concealment, yet open for the most 
nourishing elements to pass through so that the content within continuously increases in positive 
abundance. Richard Pilgrim puts forward that the Chinese character for ma indicates an opening 
for cosmic light — such as that offered by the sun or moon — to shine through, suggesting that 
that which is contaminated or polluted and therefore not of the light cannot enter ma: 
 
Perhaps the most appropriate way to begin…is to create an image out of the Chinese 
characters that constitute the written word ma. It is made up of two elements, the 
enclosing radical meaning gate or door…and the inner character meaning either sun…or 
moon…The visual image or character, therefore, suggests a light shining through a gate 
or door. If we were to take the gate itself as representing the things or phenomena and 
events of the world, the opening in the gate becomes a ma or interval between things. Yet 
ma is not a mere emptiness or opening; through and in it shines a light, and the function 
of this ma becomes precisely to let that light shine through. A literary example of this 
image can be found in the twelfth-century novel, The Tale of the Genji by Lady 
Murasaki: ―It was the fifteenth night of the eighth month. The light of an enclouded full-
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moon shone between the ill-fitting planks of the roof and flooded the room. What a queer 
place to be lying in!, thought Genji, as he gazed around the garret, so different from any 
room he had ever known before‖.207 
 
Although there is nothing new and unusual about moonlight flooding a garret, what is new and 
unusual is the moonlight‘s transformation of the space that Genji is inhabiting, causing him to 
experience an original poetic impression that had never occurred to him before. Such an 
atmosphere of spontaneous illumination constitutes a ma moment, as the moonlight is streaming 
through the roof‘s loosening planks rather than widely flooding through without any components 
concealing some parts of the entering light. The significant point here is that while ma 
symbolises an open passageway, it is only partially open especially so that the sense of mystery 
is constantly preserved. It is not at all because ma must be confined as such, certainly not 
confined in meaning. In fact it is quite the opposite, as the metaphor of light streaming through a 
partially concealed space means that there is a fusion between the transparent and the hidden, 
causing new directions of multi-layered meanings to expand forth from such a fusion. As ma is 
an interval between things, it comes to symbolise the intersections and crossings between phases 
or dimensions, causing ma to embody extreme fluidity and flexibility to the point where it 
becomes a moldable abstraction. It is an intangibility that can be molded into concrete 
manifestations as well as constituting the invisible space to which such manifestations dissolve 
back into during those moments of meditative repose. The example of the moonlit garret where 
an ordinary setting is transformed into a completely new experience for Genji goes to show that 
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ma holds potential for unexpected communion between oneself and the higher dimension. The 
higher dimension in this case is the celestial moon itself, although the quality of ‗higher‘ does 
not necessarily mean physical height. More precisely, it refers to an inner ascension — a 
constant development in seeing the sacred or the magical in ordinary things. Significantly, ma 
may have boundaries, but those boundaries are not at all fixed nor are they clearly defined. The 
idea that ma seeks to dismantle the distinctions between space and time, and even between 
objectivity and subjectivity, goes to show that ma does not recognise such categories to be 
anything more than artificial constructs. Ma‘s non-material status as the unifying source where 
all manifestations forsake their concreteness means that dualities — such as space-time, 
objectivity-subjectivity, and reason-emotion — are no longer dualities as such. Those so-called 
dualities that are labeled as space-time and the like affect each other in such penetrating ways 
that they overlap each other as varying points on the same continuum.  
 
     Furthermore, Daniel Frampton provides an interpretation of Jean Epstein‘s lyrosophy of the 
camera lens (which Frampton later relates to photogénie) that fuses reason and emotion in such 
an original, in fact socially independent manner that such dualistic constructs (often a product of 
societal imposition) do not apply to the vision of the lens. The fusion between reason and 
emotion then leads to the consideration of a corresponding fusion between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Both dualistic relationships concern analysis of a situation by stepping outside of it 
(a process that uses reason and objectivity) as well as sympathetic involvement entirely based on 
a personal point-of-view (a process that uses emotion and subjectivity): ‗But most presciently, 
Epstein saw a future of film where subjective and objective viewpoints could be shown together, 
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as one.‘208 So in such a fusion, subjectivity becomes a primary creator of objective reality, while 
the objective reality that accomplishes a rendezvous with the subjective position becomes a 
manifested result of corresponding subjective patterns of thought and emotion. There is no such 
thing as a separation between subjectivity and objectivity, and cinema‘s purpose is to maintain 
an independence from such a hindering construct of separation. Epstein proposes and Frampton 
interprets that the camera lens remains independent in such an elevated way which does not 
recognise the differentiation inherent within the dualistic structure: 
  
He [Epstein] drew a theory of lyrosophy, a singing of knowledge, producing reason and 
emotion in one fell swoop. For Epstein film has that unique quality, ‗that of being an eye 
independent of the eye, of escaping the tyrannical egocentrism of our personal 
vision…the lens is itself.‘ And when he notes that ‗…Truly, the cinema creates a 
particular system of consciousness limited to a single sense,‘ he is not finding a 
duplication of the work of the eye, but searching for a way to understand cinema‘s neo-
eye quality…Epstein also included the concept of photogénie, being that sublime, 
indefinable, ineffable quality given by film to the objects and people within it (and found 
most readily in close-ups and slow-motion).
209
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Frampton‘s observation that Epstein sought a neo-eye quality inherent in cinema does suggest 
ma-like tendencies, especially in the camera‘s vision of unity where objective reality comes to 
serve as a reflection of the individual‘s (subjective) imaginative patterns. The principle here is 
that an objective reality cannot come to be immediately exposed to an individual if such a reality 
is not already somehow germinating within the individual‘s consciousness in the first place: 
‗…this idea of simultaneously showing subjective and objective viewpoints brilliantly sums up 
the power of film-thinking in many ways — that film offers another view…For Epstein film 
breaks free of human perception and moves towards revealing an omniscient eye — perhaps 
revealing the workings or ‗logic‘ of the subconscious.‘210 Ultimately, such a perspective that 
sheds away the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity would lead to an alternative line 
of questioning as to whether it is the subjective imagination which governs all the objective 
reality to which the individual comes to be exposed. If so — in other words, if it is the case that 
‗as the within, so the without‘ — then the camera lens becomes an overseer orchestrating the 
playing out of the objective components: ‗Film sees transsubjectively: one ‗eye‘ seeing 
objectively and subjectively.‘211 Thus, Frampton observes and Epstein proposes that cinema 
should be as an elevated director who is not confined by the filters of the perceptual faculties, 
whose vision is so broad and quite possibly near-omniscient in the cinema‘s capacity to imagine 
how something is operating, regardless of whether that something can be immediately accessed 
by the physical senses
212
 — ‗an eye independent of the eye,‘213 a quality which corresponds to 
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the ma principle. Significantly, ma is a symbolic encounter — a translocal place where 
cooperative components have gathered and melded into whatever assemblage before any 
manifestation corresponding to the potentiality within the gestating interval is actualised outside 
of ma: ‗Ma refers at once to ―something‖ and the experience of that something. It is neither 
objective nor subjective but a coalescence of the two, for, insofar as ma deconstructs all 
boundaries, so it has (I suppose) to eliminate those between the objective and the subjective.‘214 
 
     Crapanzano‘s earlier suggestion, however, that ma cannot be understood from outside a 
Japanese cultural context proves inaccurate. In fact Maya Deren‘s theoretical material does show 
that there are poetic states identified as non-linear moments which focus upon the ways in which 
a phenomenon embodies expansive dimensions transcending the surface appearance of that 
respective phenomenon. Annette Michelson‘s interpretation of Deren‘s theory focuses upon this 
precise point of the poetic moment that develops without the need for coherent organisation, as 
opposed to linear drama characterised by a chronological sequence of events. Deren refers to this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
necessarily meaningful power, power that itself derives directly from the alien nature of the sensibility 
that delivers it to us: ―I would even go so far as to say that the cinema is polytheistic and theogonic. Those 
lives it creates, by summoning objects out of the shadows of indifference into the light of dramatic 
concern, have little in common with human life. These lives are like the life in charms and amulets, the 
ominous, tabooed objects of certain primitive religions. If we wish to understand how an animal, a plant 
or a stone can inspire respect, fear and horror, those three most sacred sentiments, I think we must watch 
them on the screen, living their mysterious silent lives, alien to the human sensibility.‖ ‘ (Moore, Savage 
Theory, p. 73) 
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linearity as a ‗horizontal structure‘ — quite apt as the linear organisation remains flat and 
inflexible, serving as a temporal marker of occurrences that does not allow for those occurrences 
to be re-organised or ‗re-shuffled‘. The poetic moment, on the other hand, is referred to by Deren 
as a ‗vertical structure‘ precisely because it not only counters such linearity but also remains 
independent of it. The vertical structure rather presents the irreversible timeline as occupying a 
very minor segment of universal existence, even going so far as to allude to the possibility that 
most dimensions do not operate through such a timeline and that only very few do: 
 
The distinction of poetry is its construction (what I mean by ―a poetic structure‖), and the 
poetic construct arises from the fact, if you will, that it is a ―vertical‖ investigation of a 
situation, in that it probes the ramifications of the moment, and is concerned with its 
qualities and its depth, so that you have poetry concerned in a sense not with what is 
occurring, but with what it feels like or what it means. A poem, to my mind, creates 
visible or auditory forms for something which is invisible, which is the feeling, or the 
emotion, or the metaphysical content of the movement. Now it also may include action, 
but its attack is what I could call the ―vertical‖ attack, and this may be a little bit clearer if 
you will contrast it to what I would call the ―horizontal‖ attack of a drama, which is 
concerned with the development, let‘s say, within a very small situation from feeling to 
feeling. Perhaps it would be made most clear if you take a Shakespearean work which 
combines the two movements. In Shakespeare you have the drama moving forward on a 
―horizontal‖ plane of development, of one circumstance — one action — leading to 
another, and this delineates the character. Every once and a while, however, he arrives at 
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a point of action where he wants to illuminate the meaning to this moment of drama, and 
at that moment he builds a pyramid or investigates it ―vertically‖, if you will, so that you 
have a ―horizontal‖ development with periodic ―vertical‖ investigations which are the 
poems, which are the monologues.
215
 
 
Considering that Deren is so intent upon developing the inter-dimensionality of a poetic moment, 
it would be more accurate to define such a moment as a magnification of feelings, however 
fleeting or subtle such feelings may be. The poetic moment is more accurately a microcosm 
whereby a convergence of expanding patterns of meanings is captured in an intuitively moving 
instant. Deren‘s concept of a poetic moment closely resembles ma in that the subtle method by 
which the moment is composed causes the invisible to be felt on levels that transcend all surface 
appearances. This is not an instance where the content is spelt out obviously and instructively, 
but more of a very lateral expression where multi-layered meanings branch out and extend into 
many possibilities that are not necessarily presented in a straightforward manner. Such an idea of 
a poetic phenomenon designed to reach far into those dimensions that normally slip through the 
filters of the physical human senses becomes especially evident in her example of the ‗vertical‘ 
moments in Shakespeare‘s works. These are contemplative interstices — that, metaphorically 
speaking, may be ‗physically empty (as in, empty of the action-reaction structure) but non-
physically luxuriant‘ — offering the forward-moving narrative a resting place from its own 
drama, which may prove exhausting if there are no such poetic breaks to distract from the linear 
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momentum. The poetic moment in turn gives the audience an opportunity to take a mental and 
emotional step back from the linear drama in order to formulate alternative perspectives — 
possibly even to seek and allow spontaneous moments of inspiration to unfold — before the 
drama resumes. In a dramatic piece where there is a relatively balanced combination of 
‗horizontal‘ and ‗vertical‘ elements, the vertical moments allow the segments just played out a 
completely unrushed opening to reflect and mature, much like a nourishing period for the soil to 
rest especially so that what is planted can grow abundantly thereafter. In a manner of speaking, 
the poetic moment is an interval of creatively fecund meditation that purposely steps outside of 
the temporal narrative setting and even the time constraints of the dramatic piece. Deren does not 
go so far as to say that the vertical structure constitutes a form of time travel, but there does 
appear to be a rather close implication. Her ideas on the poetic moment suggest somewhat of a 
contortion against the conventional timeline. Very much resembling ma in many significant 
ways, the poetic moment is a culmination of that which has already been and that which can 
potentially be, all the while omitting the consideration of past, present, and future as well as their 
conventional irreversibility. Deren herself recognises that while film has the capacity to operate 
both ‗horizontally‘ and ‗vertically‘ in her terms, a film where the horizontal structure of 
sequential chronology is predominant would in turn cause any vertical qualities present to 
suffocate, and perhaps even vice versa — a film that shows poetic moments almost entirely 
would not be able to preserve with any substance the linear drama: ‗[Distinctions are] important 
in the sense that they give an audience, or any potential audience, a preparation, an approach, to 
what they‘re going to see. In the sense that if they‘re thinking they are going to see an adventure 
film, and if they are confronted with a poetic film, that‘s not going to go very well.‘216 In so 
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being, Deren‘s most widely studied short film Meshes of the Afternoon does not feature a single 
moment of conventional logic. And even if there is an attempt to squeeze in an instance of linear 
drama, it would prove to be severely out of place. In fact the scene that conveys the most 
inventive ma qualities is the moment where the main character played by Deren rests on a couch 
and closes her eyes before a pathway outside the window. 
 
Considering the porous fabric of existence that is the primary property which makes inter-
dimensionality possible, eyes that are closed may cease the usage of the physical sight. Yet it is 
important to note that a closed eye is not actually sealed. Here, the intimate close-up magnifies a 
closed eye that remains ever-fluid, its temporary detachment from the waking world serving as 
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an increasingly selective filter as to what the vision is inclined to process. With the closing of her 
eyes, the world perceived through the physical senses takes a rest with her. This inter-
dimensional transition is conveyed by a darkening of the image of the pathway outside her 
window, as if a shadow is descending upon the image in a manner resembling the dropping of a 
veil. The same symbolic veil washes over the close-up of her eye. Even the close-up is rather 
landscape-like with the contours of this carefully captured area of her flesh and its varying 
shades. Thus, the closing of her eyes becomes symbolic of a shift in landscape — a radical 
transformation from vision through the physical eyesight to an inner envisioning of the unbridled 
way the imagination creatively processes images. 
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Following the close-up, the camera appears to draw away from the image of the pathway, just as 
a tunnel-like structure — very much resembling a telescope — imposes itself onto the image. A 
figure in a black cloak then appears, her origin unknown. The tunnel stands for a smooth process 
of detaching from the waking world, especially as the camera appears to be drawing backwards, 
gliding solemnly away from the pathway just as the black figure walks into the framed circle. 
The black figure is clearly not of the waking world, characterised by extreme anonymity and 
thoroughly covered in a nocturnal colour from head to toe. It seems purposeful that such an 
exceptionally dark figure is materialising openly on a pathway in clear daylight. The fact that it 
is culturally out of place is not even taken into account.   
 
187 
 
The above cinematic moment conveys sacred poetry through seamlessly overlapping the waking 
world with the dream world. It is important to note here that Deren‘s dream world is not 
temporally bound to the individual‘s outward activity, such as sleeping, napping, or being awake. 
Even sleeping is made to symbolise an inter-worldly transition, rather than remaining as a mere 
withdrawal of consciousness from the waking state. The close-up of the closed eye conveys the 
eye as an autonomous organism — significantly enlarged, inviting focused interaction, and even 
seemingly breathing all on its own — rather than as a small segment of the human anatomy. 
Correspondingly, Epstein elaborates upon what he describes as a divine perspective — an 
intimately attentive eye — assumed by a detail-capturing technique such as the close-up, 
exercised extensively in Deren‘s Meshes of the Afternoon:   
 
Moreover, cinema is a language, and like all languages it is animistic; it attributes, in 
other words, a semblance of life to the objects it defines…There is no need to stress the 
extent to which the language of cinema remains primitive in its terms and ideas; so it is 
hardly surprising that it should endow the objects it is called upon to depict with such 
intense life. The almost godlike importance assumed in close-ups by parts of the human 
body, or by the most frigid elements in nature, has often been noted. Through the cinema, 
a revolver in a drawer, a broken bottle on the ground, an eye isolated by an iris, are 
elevated to the status of characters in the drama. Being dramatic, they seem alive, as 
though involved in the evolution of an emotion.
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The transformation of an inanimate object into an emotional being does not necessitate that the 
usual state of the filmed object must be changed (for example, a broken bottle can remain just 
that, yet certain film techniques can cause the broken bottle to take on dramatic significance all 
the while remaining on the ground). What must be changed is the perspective one takes towards 
the filmed object, as the investigation of an emotional aspect of something is an attempt to define 
very fluid but powerful elements that originate in an invisible realm. The following are some 
examples of the technical uniqueness that film possesses, bestowing the medium with the power 
to radically transform the spectator‘s visionary capacity: the moving nature of film determined 
by edited shots and cuts and even fades, the immense influence that editing has upon the way a 
subject is portrayed, the manner in which the length of a shot can range from a single second (or 
less) to even the entire duration of a film, the camera‘s capacity to move in whatever way and at 
whatever speed and even at varying heights, as well as the camera‘s inclination to magnify or 
distance itself from the filmed objects. Objects otherwise considered inanimate are transformed 
— in other words, poeticised — into living and breathing characters, revealing an emotional life 
that the object is already experiencing, only that such an emotional life may normally be 
overlooked by the naked eye. Epstein then uses poetry to qualify his animistic cinema, except 
here he places emphasis upon uniqueness of expression as a determining criterion. Without this 
uniqueness which is a direct reflection of the artist‘s individuality, an art form would be devoid 
of what he refers to as a ‗soul‘, which is in turn synonymous to poetry: 
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Of course a landscape filmed by one of the forty or four hundred directors devoid of 
personality whom God sent to plague the cinema as He once sent the locusts into Egypt 
looks exactly like this same landscape filmed by any other of these locust filmmakers. 
But this landscape or this fragment of drama staged by someone like Gance will look 
nothing like what would be seen through the eyes and heart of a Griffith or a L‘Herbier. 
And so the personality, the soul, the poetry of certain men invaded the cinema.
218
 
  
Epstein offers an analogy of filmed landscape presenting itself in near-identical versions (near-
identical due to conformity to standardised norms of how landscapes should be filmed), and then 
contrasts such conventional presentations with a landscape piece filmed in such an original way 
that truly does express the unique ‗soul‘ of the artist. This idea of contrasting originality with 
what appears to be common mediocrity is a distinctly avant-garde position in that there is  
1.) an observation of a rearguard trend composed of mass-produced versions (or at least the 
equivalent of being mass-produced) conforming to conventional standards of how 
landscapes are normally filmed, almost as though such landscape versions serve as film-
recorded commodities rather than as authentic art forms; and 
2.) an upholding of a vanguard trend composed of unconventional landscape presentations 
utilising methods that can be classed as truly original.  
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The former does not have a unique ‗soul‘ and therefore has no poetry, while the latter genuinely 
does embody the poetic perspective of the artist: 
 
Now we are approaching the promised land, a place of great wonders. Here matter is 
molded and set into relief by personality; all nature, all things appear as a man has 
dreamed them; the world is created as you think it is; pleasant if you think it so, harsh if 
you believe it so. Time hurries on or retreats, or stops and waits for you. A new reality is 
revealed, a reality for a special occasion, which is untrue to everyday reality just as 
everyday reality is untrue to the heightened awareness of poetry…since we can see the 
clear thread of thoughts and dreams, what might or should have been, what was, what 
never was or could have been, feelings in their secret guise, the startling face of love and 
beauty, in a word, the soul. ―So poetry is thus true, and exists as truly as the eye.‖219 
 
Apart from suggesting a synonymous relationship between poetry and the ‗soul‘, Epstein further 
proposes that poetry is that self-created state of wonder where matter is molded by thoughts and 
dreams, with no or minimal space for random or accidental interventions falling outside of such 
self-direction. Poetry constitutes a higher vision that remains ‗true‘ on the level of pure 
potentiality, regardless of manifested evidence to the contrary. In other words, such a poetic 
reality does not need empirical justification to prove its own ‗realness‘. It exists in an 
autonomous realm entirely regulated by the artist‘s imagination, independent of those factors 
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which we would class as uncontrollable. Even the idea that the course of time can be 
manipulated to the artist‘s own ends means that this poetic reality does not operate according to 
the laws of physicality. It is a reality that creates its own laws; and if poetry is to be lawless, then 
this lawlessness would be subject to the artist‘s own regulation, which is why Epstein describes 
poetry‘s detachment from everyday reality that remains bound by those laws of physicality. The 
‗soul‘ is defined by this poetic reality in a sense that one cannot be a whole human being unless 
this potential of the ‗soul‘ is embraced — that so long as one is not immersing oneself in that 
poetic dimension where the imagination reigns supreme, one is only living half a life. This idea 
bears much similarity with Artaud‘s vision of using the Theatre of Cruelty to balance the upper 
and lower strata of the consciousness: ‗…the Theater of Cruelty will address itself only to total 
man. And it will cause not only the recto but the verso of the mind to play its part; the reality of 
imagination and dreams will appear there on equal footing with life.‘220 Although Artaud does 
not exactly specify what he means by ‗recto‘ and ‗verso‘, there is still an implication that the 
former is the surface consciousness that regularly interacts with everyday occurrences while the 
latter is very much identical with Epstein‘s poetic reality or indeed the ‗soul‘ where ‗the 
movement and gestures of characters [are] enlarged to the statures of gods, heroes, or monsters, 
in mythical dimensions...‘221 The Theatre of Cruelty then becomes a conglomeration of sacred 
qualities in their most concentrated forms, which is part of the reason why grand symbols 
standing for wild and unrestrained states of consciousness (symbolised by monsters, for instance) 
are given so much importance. Furthermore, ‗These gods or heroes, these monsters, these natural 
and cosmic forces will be interpreted according to images from the most ancient sacred texts and 
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old cosmogonies,‘222 again emphasising that the most profound poetry would extract and 
creatively express mythical images and symbols that reveal cosmic sacrality.
223
 Significantly, 
Jean-Luc Godard, upon the death of Kenji Mizoguchi on 24 August 1956 in Kyoto, also 
describes Mizoguchi‘s film poetry as expressing a ‗cosmogony‘: ‗If poetry is manifest in each 
second, each shot filmed by Mizoguchi, it is because…it is the instinctive reflection of the film-
maker‘s nobility…the director…can describe an adventure which is at the same time a 
cosmogony…The art of…Mizoguchi is to prove that real life is at one and the same time 
elsewhere and yet here, in its strange and radiant beauty.‘224 The portrayal of life as 
simultaneously here and elsewhere also shows convergences with Epstein‘s poetic reality, as 
‗here‘ in this case would mean the immediate physical reality while ‗elsewhere‘ would mean the 
imaginative reality. Being in these two places all at the same time suggests that while the latter is 
always extracting information from the former especially to refine its poetic creations, the only 
reason the former has any existence at all is because it originates from the latter. Here, Godard is 
not proposing that Mizoguchi is forcibly making the surface reality and the poetic reality 
interact, but there is certainly an implication that poetry is a life force that manifests itself ‗in 
each second, each shot‘. Thus, the idea of being both ‗here and elsewhere‘ necessitates 
recognition that what is ‗elsewhere‘ is creating what is ‗here‘ from the most seminal level.    
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        Chapter 4 
         Mizoguchi’s Film Hierophany 
 
The most critically acclaimed masterpieces of Kenji Mizoguchi‘s sacred cinema (namely Ugetsu, 
Sansho the Bailiff, and The Life of Oharu) led to international praise that not only placed him on 
the same wavelength as the European masters, but also exalted him as a master of his own 
medium: ‗ ―Like Bach, Titian, and Shakespeare, he is the greatest in his art,‖ enthused the French 
critic Jean Douchet; and not far behind were Jean-Luc Godard, who declared him ―the greatest of 
Japanese filmmakers, or quite simply one of the greatest of filmmakers,‖ and the New York 
Times critic Vincent Canby, who extolled him as ―one of the great directors of the sound era.‖‘225 
Such superlative pronouncements arose from the fact that his films compensated for some highly 
elaborate qualities of historical and artistic depth that mainstream modern Western culture was 
lacking. Mizoguchi‘s films quenched a cultural thirst, granting him an equal status amongst 
international auteurs (according to Phillip Lopate, ‗Mizoguchi belongs in the same exalted 
company as Jean Renoir, Orson Welles, Carl Dreyer, Alfred Hitchcock, Max Ophüls, Sergei 
Eisenstein, Robert Bresson, and Akira Kurosawa‘).226 Yet it is important to note that even though 
he may bask in the company of the European and American auteurs, the primary reason 
Mizoguchi joined such ranks in the first place was because he crafted works of dramatic and 
artistic splendour that did not at all resemble those of the other auteurs. And it is much more than 
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the identifiable cultural differences that were the cause of such distinctions. It is the methods by 
which he transforms historical themes into lavish artistic compositions full of mythical 
undertones. According to Jacques Rivette, Mizoguchi‘s mise en scène constitutes a universal 
language reflecting certain innate structures within the consciousness. Even though aesthetic 
preferences are entirely a matter of subjective tastes, there remains something about mise en 
scène that profoundly resonates with the core mechanics of the human imagination:  
 
…these films — which tell us, in an alien tongue, stories that are completely foreign to 
our customs and way of life — do talk to us in a familiar language. What language? The 
only one to which a film-maker should lay claim when all is said and done: the language 
of mise en scène. For modern artists did not discover African fetishes through a 
conversion to idols, but because those unusual objects moved them as sculptures. If 
music is a universal idiom, so too is mise en scène: it is this language, and not Japanese, 
that has to be learned to understand ‗Mizoguchi‘. A language held in common, but here 
brought to a degree of purity that our Western cinema has known only rarely.
227
 
 
Even though Rivette does not offer a precise explanation of what is meant by mise en scène, it is 
still important to elaborate upon how the term is generally used. Critics of Cahiers du cinéma 
specify the term as a somewhat opposition to editing which means that they tend to favour the 
                                                          
227
 Jacques Rivette, ‗Mizoguchi Viewed from Here‘ (‗Mizoguchi vu d'ici‘), in Cahiers du Cinéma 81,  
March 1958. 
195 
 
association of the long-take with mise en scène, although this is by no means a clear-cut 
standard. If we are to interpret Rivette‘s ideas, however, entirely binding the term to the long 
take is much too confining, because the capacity to affect the universal imagination is certainly 
not unique to the long take which places an emphasis upon that segment which remains uncut. 
What is present within the images, both visual and aural, and the ways in which such internal 
components are arranged are equally of great importance: 
Auteurist criticism forced much closer consideration of the films, regarding not so much 
the explicit subject matter but the ways the films had been transformed by the director‘s 
personality, the themes which recur within and across films, or the themes‘ presentation 
in the visual style on the screen. To support the notion of transformation, a key concept 
used by the auteurist critics was mise-en-scène. 
 
As a descriptive term, mise-en-scène is taken from the theater and literally means 
―staging‖ or ―placing on the stage.‖ As applied to the cinema it relates to aspects of 
setting, lighting, costume, and the behaviour of figures. Implicit in the transference from 
theater to film, however, is the deliberate nature of the act: the director stages the event 
for the camera. This distinction is important, for in the literal sense of the term, mise-en-
scène does not include all aspects of the representation; it would not include, for example, 
durational or photographic qualities of the shot or editing. The mise-en-scène critics 
focused upon the profilmic event (the event staged for the camera) as the director‘s site 
for expressing mastery over the material. A Cahiers critic wrote in the 1960s, ―Mise en 
scène is nothing other than the technique invented by each director to express the idea 
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and establish the specific quality of his work.‖ Cahiers‘ conception of mise-en-scène 
complemented the politique des auteurs in a transformative manner. As Caughie 
describes this interchange, ―It is with the mise en scène that the auteur transforms the 
material which has been given to him; so it is in the mise en scène — in the disposition of 
the scene, in the camera movement, in the camera placement, in the movement from shot 
to shot — that the auteur writes his individuality into the film.‖228 
 
Even though there is an emphasis upon the staging of components and their relationships with 
each other within the scene, mise en scène does not exclude the editing process, especially in 
Caughie‘s statement that mise en scène includes ‗the movement from shot to shot‘, a transitional 
method which completely hinges upon editing itself; in fact this is where Kirihara contradicts 
himself in a minor way. Mise en scène does however tend to favour a reduced usage of cutting. 
The greater emphasis is upon what is presented within each shot, and this is where the auteur 
expresses their signature style. Even so, it is not just any kind of presentation that can be applied 
to mise en scène, but a presentation that profoundly resonates with the archetypal/mythical level 
of consciousness, especially if we are specifically considering Rivette‘s proposition that mise en 
scène is a universal language that needs no translation or mediating explanation. To explain it 
more precisely by analogy, the universal language is very closely aligned with such ideas as ‗the 
eyes must see in order to believe‘ and ‗it is experience rather than words that teach‘. Very much 
along the same lines as Artaud, Rivette is suggesting an intuiting of Mizoguchi‘s mise en scène 
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that should remain independent of external explanatory mediation, which in turn means that an 
intuitively open audience does not need to be informed at any aural length of the cultural 
particularities featured throughout the films.  
 
     Rivette even compares the inter-cultural or rather the transcultural qualities of Mizoguchi‘s 
mise en scène to African fetishes that have the power to move modern artists, quite purely by 
their sculptural forms rather than by the meanings assigned to them by their local cultures — 
acquired meanings that would not be immediately comprehensible to modern artists, yet the 
sacred sculptures naturally affect the mythical imagination nonetheless. Just as the sculptural 
forms express a potency that can be felt through the details of their compositions, so mise en 
scène expresses a similar kind of power through its cinematography, lighting, the arrangement of 
set design, the selective inclusion of the accidental and the improvised, and even the panning and 
zooming methods characterising each shot. The cotton field scene near the beginning of Sansho 
the Bailiff (1954)
229
 is a mise en scène masterpiece set in a field of tall cotton grass that is 
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graceful and aesthetically pleasing in many ways that can be poetically described, almost 
possessing a quiet majesty due to the slow pace woven into the grandeur. Four characters are 
placed between both sides of the field, walking along a narrow pathway that rather belittles 
humans, even though the section of the cotton field framed within the image does not seem to be 
so expansive. What distinguishes this instance of mise en scène from other scenes of a similar 
standard of cinematography is that it is primarily created by simply placing four people on an in-
between pathway. The rest is just a matter of ingenious framing.  
 
The principle feature of this scene is the silky white hair of the cotton tufts set in contrast to the 
much darker background, causing the travelled path to be abundantly populated on both sides 
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with widely spread white clusters that are fragile-looking and perhaps even innocent-looking but 
certainly taking on a prominent presence. The choice of using cotton grass as a primary 
component to literally carpet this scene has significant implications. The colour contrast plays an 
important role in elevating the cotton grass to a status of a living, breathing character, especially 
as the plants are rather human-like with heads of loose hair almost kowtowing to the wind. 
Furthermore, if the cotton field were to be replaced by, say, a corn field, the effect would be 
nowhere near as soft and willowy — and it is these more tender qualities that are most conducive 
towards inter-dimensional fusion, as I will later show is the driving factor of this scene. 
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As the camera pans slowly across the field, it looks as though the four characters are walking 
through waves of clouds, as the seed heads of the cotton grass display fluffy white masses that 
have a delicate appearance, in turn contributing to the light, swaying motions of the vertical yet 
very supple-looking plants standing together in a bounteous blanket formation. The extreme 
pliability of vertical structures such as these constitutes a liminal quality that determines the 
inter-dimensional nature of this scene. The emphasis here is upon the qualities extending forth 
from the slender cotton grass, such as the cloud-like feathery cotton flowers gently fanning the 
way for the travellers, as well as the rushlike plants swaying in a collective movement of waves 
upon waves. Such qualities are determining components of the ma moment entirely conducting 
this scene, ma being the poetic space-time interval that I had discussed extensively in Chapter 3. 
The significance of ma lies in its archetypal or mythical meanings that will then relate the 
moment back to Rivette‘s idea of mise en scène as a universal language. If we can establish the 
ways in which the cotton field scene constitutes a ma moment, then the idea that the scene 
resonates with a universal level of consciousness may not be a theoretical leap at all but rather a 
logical conclusion, as I had shown in the previous chapter that ma is an inter-cultural, in fact 
transcultural, phenomenon. The scene is significantly composed of a narrow pathway serving as 
an in-between space for the characters to walk along as they make their way through a sea of 
fluffy cotton flowers. The determining feature here is the in-betweenness, for if the pathway was 
located anywhere else — say, alongside the cotton field as opposed to running through it — it 
would then be difficult, if not impossible, to interpret this scene as a ma moment. That is because 
it is essential that the characters are conveyed as simultaneously blended into and distinguished 
from the rest of the cotton field, causing the characters to be neither this nor that — obliviously 
shifting between states. With the pathway running through the field, all other components in the 
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scene harmoniously fall into place. Here, it is important to properly define ma as a network of in-
between spaces that allow the flow and exchange of energy between physical persons, objects, 
and places — this energy being essentially invisible, but can still be felt as well as producing 
proportionate consequences directly reflecting the operative patterns within the invisible: 
 
…ma also means ―among‖. In the compound ningen (―human being‖), for example, ma 
(read gen here) implies that persons (nin, hito) stand within, among, or in relationship to 
others. As such, the word ma clearly begins to take on a relational meaning — a dynamic 
sense of standing in, with, among, or between. Related to this it also carries an 
experiential connotation, since to be among persons is to interact in some dynamic way. 
The Japanese phrase ma ga warui (―the ma is bad‖), which has overtones of being 
embarrassed, well illustrates this nuance.
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This relational aspect of ma entirely characterises the cotton field scene where not only are the 
spaces in-between the slender cotton grass constantly shifting in response to the wind, but the 
cloud-like feathery cotton tufts also convey a sense of simultaneous floating and being grounded 
from a unified base. Such liminal qualities magnify the current status of the four characters as 
symbolic inhabitants of an invisible Centre that conducts and regulates the flow of energy 
between things. This Centre can very much be likened to the core of a flower that is the central 
connecting point of many petals — the core where multitudes of directions simultaneously 
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converge and spread out into different paths. The cotton field symbolises a unified field of 
consciousness where separation is only an illusory construct, and where even things that appear 
to be light and airy (such as the cotton tufts) are like everything else that is interconnected by a 
web of invisible pathways. In many ways, the cotton field scene can be considered an example of 
Eliade‘s axis mundi — the symbolic point of interconnection between Heaven, Earth, and the 
Underworld — especially as the scene begins with an inclusion of an island in the middle of the 
sea in the distant horizon. From the island downwards, there is the sea which is layered between 
the sky and the cotton field, clearly showing that the island interlinks the three planes that would 
normally be considered individually had their not been any intention to frame the image in such a 
territorially inclusive way. Even the pathway running through the cotton field identifies the field 
into three layers, directly reflecting the triple planes in the upper portion of the image as well as 
Eliade‘s principle of the ‗three cosmic levels‘: 
 
Where the break-through from plane to plane has been effected by a hierophany, there 
too an opening has been made, either upward (the divine world) or downward (the 
underworld, the world of the dead). The three cosmic levels — earth, heaven, underworld 
— have been put in communication…Here, then, we have a sequence of religious 
conceptions and cosmological images that are inseparably connected and form a system 
that may be called the ―system of the world‖ prevalent in traditional societies: (a) a 
sacred place constitutes a break in the homogeneity of space; (b) this break is symbolized 
by an opening by which passage from one cosmic region to another is made possible 
(from heaven to earth and vice versa; from earth to the underworld); (c) communication 
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with heaven is expressed by one or another of certain images, all of which refer to the 
axis mundi…; (d) around this cosmic axis lies the world (= our world), hence the axis is 
located ―in the middle‖, at the ―navel of the earth‖; it is the Center of the World.231 
 
If we are applying the idea of an Underworld to this scene, it is important that this Underworld 
remains highly symbolic, as in standing for the lower part of the inter-dimensional relationship, 
but not literally taking on the connotations provided by Eliade, such as the reference to ‗the 
infernal regions‘232 for instance. Because there is initially an island in the distant horizon of this 
scene, there is an allusion to a dimension that operates below the surface appearance of things 
(especially as most of an island is below sea level). But that is not to say that the island has a 
literal infernal reference, considering the general serenity of the scene‘s atmosphere. 
Furthermore, the cotton field‘s status as an invisible Centre cannot be restricted to a vertically 
oriented interconnection between Heaven, Earth, and the Underworld, but must be inclusive of a 
web of relationships and passages that all converge with the primary position of axis mundi. The 
field‘s relationship with the skyline shows that the field itself (which is placed in the lower 
position) embodies the potential to expand into greater realms, if only on an invisible level of 
creative expansion seeking the diversity and contrast that breaks through the homogeneity of 
space. Furthermore, geographical boundaries remain far secondary to the symbolism of the wind 
as a wild and free agent that can carry itself boundlessly without any prevention from possible 
physical barriers. The wind is in fact an important character equivalent in the scene — almost 
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anthropomorphised — for however invisible it may be, its clear effects are shown in the 
noticeably deferring motions of the cotton tufts. From the inclusion of the island in the middle of 
the sea onwards, the camera slowly pans across the field, gently zooming towards the fluffy 
cotton flowers while retaining a vision of their collective blanket-like appearance. It is iconic 
inter-dimensional scenes such as this one that inspired André Bazin to propose the idea of richly 
layered films that directly reflect the artistic civilisation in which they are made — a quality 
which he initially contrasts with the lack of traditional identity so typical of Western art. It must 
be noted that he is not so much associating tradition with imitation, but rather he is proposing 
that a work of art should possess certain aspects that bear admirable accuracy with and alignment 
to the collective traditional spirit: 
 
The evolution of Western art, its divorce from the people and its exacerbated 
individualism have combined to mean that the quality of anonymity has progressively 
disappeared from our society since the eighteenth century. The style is that of the man; it 
is no longer that of civilization. We have great painters, great writers and even great 
filmmakers. But we really have no great literature and, even less, great cinema. By this I 
mean no common style, no minimum language of which the most mediocre artist can 
blunderingly make use…Perhaps the cinema has gone through a primitive stage (or 
should we say ‗classical‘?) in every country, the high point of its High Middle Ages. At 
that time, works were often anonymous. In any case, film existed as an entity in spite of 
the talents of its craftsmen. Today, perhaps only Hollywood still offers us — up to a 
certain point — the example of a cinema that is valuable not just in its individual works 
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but also for the language of its ‗commercial‘ productions. There, the cinema is 
homogenous to the civilization that it satisfies and expresses. But in Europe, the cinema 
no longer exists. There are only good and bad films, like books or paintings.
233
 
   
Although Bazin‘s view of Japanese films is idealised, he points out the profound cultural 
expression of Japanese films — regardless of positive or negative content — in distinct contrast 
to European films which he criticises for being one among many art forms trapped in the 
mainstream attitude of modern secularised individualism: ‗Yet it seems that Japanese films differ 
both from ours as well as from those of Hollywood. A country with an old culture and strong 
traditions, Japan seems to have assimilated film with the same ease that it used to assimilate all 
other Western technology. This technology did not destroy their culture but was immediately 
integrated into it, and cinema effortlessly moved over to the level of Japanese art in general.‘234 
Bazin is implying what I had referred to earlier as a ‗cultural thirst‘ in the West that must be 
quenched by exposure to certain means of expression that defy secularised trends; in fact, such 
means of expression must take the complete opposite direction to secularisation, here alluding to 
a continuation of traditions deeply rooted in a mythical past — traditions that can compensate for 
the West‘s spiritual poverty. Much depends upon how the term ‗spiritual‘ is defined, and here 
Bazin does offer a valuable perspective. He puts forward the idea of a collective spirit governing 
an artistic civilisation, and that Western individualism dictating separation as a norm is 
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suffocating that collective spirit, depriving individuals of an internal foundation from which they 
can create with clarity in a centred manner. The analogy here is that a tree with unhealthy roots 
cannot possibly produce quality fruit.  
 
     Even though he is upholding the idealistic aspects of a culture such as Japanese, Bazin is not 
blinded by such an idealisation of a cinema that is homogeneous to its local culture to the point 
where there is no recognition of uniqueness of individual expression. Before one would 
completely write off Bazin‘s ideas as going against the avant-garde cause, it must be noted that 
he does convey admiration for uniqueness, which is why he fully acknowledges that the West 
does have talented artists, but no traditionally grounded art to speak of. He may indeed uphold 
anonymity, putting the work of art before the artist, but that does not at all mean that the artist‘s 
individuality is being violated. He suggests in a later passage that it is the collective spirit in 
Japanese cinema that lays a fine foundation for composition, camera techniques, set design, 
intuitive symbolism, and other ritualistic incorporations that can potentially give a cinema its 
firm cultural identity. It must be noted that Bazin was writing this essay in the 1950s, so it does 
make sense for him to assert that the current trends of Western art did not support the solidifying 
of roots into traditional methods, regardless of the possibility that such traditions may possess 
some creative ingenuity about them which may benefit any artistic media. Bazin appears to 
suggest that this cultural attitude of seeking out the new only for the sake of newness has 
produced such damaging consequences upon even the most positive aspects that hold together an 
artistic civilisation, to the point where being modern is fast becoming a rather dead-end path 
towards a habitual robotic existence that cannot see passed the individual‘s surface personality. 
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Here, he asserts that the modern West views the artist as taking on a far more important status 
than the more collective meanings of the artwork: ‗The style is that of the man; it is no longer 
that of civilization.‘235 Thus, modernity sees the artwork as belonging to an artist, much more so 
than belonging to a cultural tradition. In fact, as far as modernity is concerned, the latter may not 
even deserve a mentioning. Secular individualism becomes isolationist in many ways, thickening 
the barriers between individuals and consequently loosening the ties between them. Artistic 
civilisation, however, is the complete opposite of such chronic individualism, especially as a 
civilisation considered to be age-old as well as possessing a mythical past is always upheld by 
teachings that are collectively inherited. This heritage of knowledge passed down through the 
generations causes a traditional art form to retain its own unique essence. In so being, an artistic 
medium should already be well settled in its own long-established characteristics, this medium 
identity being secure and solid enough in its own specialised skin not to become dependent upon 
the quality of individual craftsmanship. Individual skill fluctuates to say the least, whereas an 
artistic medium remains grounded within its own set of constant properties. For this reason, 
Bazin rather idealises the anonymity of art as a way towards reducing the negative side of 
individualism, considering as well that he cites specific historical periods such as the Middle 
Ages where preserving the anonymity of the artist was more of a norm. 
 
     The avant-garde nature of Bazin‘s ideas lies in the fact that he is attempting throughout to 
posit modern Western art — in all of its obsessions with being new and ‗unrooted‘ — as 
something that is rather conventional in itself. The conventionality becomes evident in the very 
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superficiality of its blind obsession with newness, causing modern art to suffer from severe lack 
of complexity — a complexity that would certainly gain some substance if traditional methods 
were to be given some measure of importance in the artistic creation. Because modern art‘s 
predisposition towards the new only for the sake of being new is considered by Bazin to be so 
shallow, his views on traditional art then acquire a rather unexpected twist — a non-Western 
traditional art, Japanese being a primary example, then becomes the new avant-garde. Here, the 
capacity to create profound expressions of the collective traditional spirit becomes new and 
original quite ironically through its complete lack of desperation to be superficially new. The 
composition of Japanese films in accordance to some of their finest artistic traditions has done 
nothing to diminish the collective spirit of their civilisation. On the contrary, there seems to be an 
implication that the inclusion of a modern technological medium has considerably enriched 
Japanese artistic culture, as idealised as Bazin‘s perspective may seem. Yet such an idealisation 
becomes almost beside the point when considering the overriding idea that Japanese cinema is 
viewed by critics such as Bazin as an intellectual and artistic compensation for the historical 
nuances and multi-layered meanings that modern Western art has long been depriving itself of. 
Thus, the modern nature of the cinematic invention remains far secondary to the fact that it has 
been thoroughly incorporated into the culture‘s richest traditions whose far-reaching roots 
comfortably place such traditions in the area of second nature — that artistic refinement and its 
inherent grace and elegance have been so intensely absorbed into the Japanese cultural fabric that 
those qualities become a widespread spontaneous habit:  
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It would be difficult to find a director so uncouth and unpolished that he would not 
spontaneously compose his shots according to the best plastic traditions of Oriental art. In 
the same vein, there is not one Japanese who could drop a cup of tea on a straw mat, nor, 
in the archipelago, is there a badly pruned cherry tree. And what I say about cherry trees 
and mise en scène is true, quite naturally, of their dramatic expression.
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Bazin‘s metaphorical comparison of mise en scène to tea-drinking and cherry trees is far more 
than a characterisation of mise en scène as poise and suave expertise in ordinary things. Here, the 
prioritised refinement of a modern medium such as cinema has become just as much of a second 
nature in Japanese culture as the consistent cultivation of the other arts that are comparatively 
ancient. Yet even though Bazin emphasises Japanese cinema‘s assimilation into the lofty 
standards of their other fine arts, he is not at all doing away with the contribution of the artist‘s 
individuality, which is why he refers to the director‘s skill of composition: ‗Perhaps the cinema 
has gone through a primitive stage (or should we say ‗classical‘?) in every country, the high 
point of its High Middle Ages. At that time, works were often anonymous. In any case, film 
existed as an entity in spite of the talents of its craftsmen.‘237 Instead of undermining individual 
talent, anonymity sends a clear message that the artist remains beyond any labeling. An artistic 
masterpiece should have an autonomous standing in terms of its own qualities, and should not 
have to be associated with the artist‘s name (a name which more often than not has been 
manipulated by the culture by whatever proportions). 
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Painting and Mizoguchi’s Sacred Cinema 
     Cinematography remains a primary determinant in whether film‘s incorporation of painting is 
at all appropriate. Here, appropriateness refers to whether the fusion between cinema and 
painting does any justice at all to both media in light of the fact that they individually possess 
their own unique properties. Even Bazin claims that the cinematic depiction of painting is a 
betrayal of painting itself, because to view something through a camera is a radically different 
experience from the naked eye‘s direct exposure to the perceived object. Assessing from this 
initial criticism, film already has a tendency to undermine the integrity of painting: 
 
Not only is the film a betrayal of the painter, it is also a betrayal of the painting and for 
this reason: the viewer, believing that he is seeing the picture as painted, is actually 
looking at it through the instrumentality of an art form that profoundly changes its nature. 
This was true from the first of black and white. But even color offers no solution. No one 
color is ever faithfully reproduced; still less, therefore, is any combination of colors.
238
  
 
If we are thinking in accordance to Bazin‘s argument that a cinematic depiction of a painting is a 
betrayal of the painting itself, it may indeed be unwise and problematic to assess such a 
cinematic depiction as if it is an imitation of a direct exposure to a painting. In other words, it 
may be quite pointless to treat the cinematic depiction as if it is a resemblance of the actual 
experience of immediate observation of a painting without mediation from another viewing 
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instrument such as a film camera. Once we come to a realisation that imitation undermines 
cinema‘s creative potential, we can then progress to think of cinematic portrayals of painting as 
far more than depictions as such. We can come to consider such portrayals as an emergence of 
new aspects to film as an art form where the experience of viewing a painting is radically 
transformed through the creative execution of film techniques. The significant point here is that 
these techniques are adapted especially to present painting in ways that would be quite 
impossible to experience through the direct exposure to the painting. Bazin then suggests the 
seeming disparities between how time operates in film as opposed to how it operates in painting, 
Bazin is laying out the difficulties in combining 1.) time that moves forward horizontally through 
the filmic organisation of one frame following another, and 2.) a centred time that focuses itself 
into an individual framed painting that invites prolonged depth of attention: ‗the sequence of a 
film gives it a unity in time that is horizontal and, so to speak, geographical, whereas time in a 
painting, so far as the notion applies, develops geologically and in depth.‘239 Here, Bazin is 
referring to the normal presentation of paintings that involve proper framing, whether it be a 
frame that is imposed upon the painting after the painting‘s completion or a frame that is used to 
stretch the painting canvas to mark the canvas borders which determine the size of the canvas: 
‗the frame of a painting encloses a space that is oriented so to speak in a different direction.‘240 
He is not referring to alternative forms of presentation such as cave and mural paintings that do 
not conform to the above description of framing, nor is he even considering calligraphy scrolls 
that are unrolled and then rolled up as they are being read. The lack of consideration of such 
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alternative presentations means that his conventional definition of picture framing is much more 
easily contrasted with the frame of a film image which he claims does not actually count as a 
frame. An individual film frame captures but a mere segment of the entire film itself. So a film 
frame does not separate nor isolate an image from the rest of the film; on the contrary, a film 
frame serves to interlink an image with other images. The conventional frame of a painting, 
however, demarcates clear boundaries between the painting and the area surrounding the 
painting (which is usually the wall). While film frames allow flow and continuity within the film, 
conventional picture frames draw a barrier of instructed discontinuity: 
 
The outer edges of the screen are not, as the technical jargon would seem to imply, the 
frame of the film image. They are the edges of a piece of masking that shows only a 
portion of reality. The picture frame polarizes space inwards. On the contrary, what the 
screen shows us seems to be part of something prolonged indefinitely into the universe.
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What Bazin is not considering is the fact that pictures frames are not even a determinant in such 
paintings that do not conform to the conventional framing system. Nor does Bazin elaborate 
upon the possibility that film scenes and images can indeed be composed in a manner resembling 
certain alternative forms of painting that are arguably ‗unframed‘. The painterly style of 
Mizoguchi‘s films — which does not limit itself to mere depictions of paintings — certainly 
does not conform to Bazin‘s concept of picture framing. In fact, the most ‗painterly‘ of 
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Mizoguchi‘s films (as in, those that express the most painting-like qualities) bear no relationship 
nor resemblance to the conventional method of framing described by Bazin.
242
 Rather some of 
Mizoguchi‘s films exhibit living paintings — existences transformed into metaphorical paintings 
complete with residents and even visitors who come and go from such painting environments, 
whether at will or by accident. These living paintings significantly correspond to Béla Balázs‘s 
idea that the film experience should resemble that of entering into a painting that lives, moves, 
and shifts according to its own moods and emotions. The visitor then travels into the painting, 
acquires something from deep within it, and then transforms that acquisition into a unique 
creation which causes both the painting and its visitor to no longer be the same again:  
 
The distance that exists between spectator and work of art is, to Balázs‘s mind, culturally 
specific to Europeans. ―The Chinese of Old‖, writes Balázs, ―regarded their art with a 
different eye.‖ He then recounts a tale in which the spectator is so taken by the beauty of 
a Chinese landscape painting that he enters the picture, follows the path to the mountains, 
and is never seen again. ―Another story tells of a young man who saw a beautiful picture 
of lovely maidens disporting themselves in a meadow full of flowers. One of the maidens 
caught his eye and he fell in love with her. He entered the picture and took the maiden for 
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his wife. A year later a little child appeared in the picture‖…This literal absorption by the 
picture serves Balázs as a general model for film identification throughout his Theory of 
Film.
243
 
 
Apart from the fact that dichotomy is completely non-existent in this relationship between 
spectator and work of art, Balázs‘s fusion of the experiences of both film and painting as well as 
Moore‘s interpretation of such a fantastical idea present a clear case of interpenetration between 
dimensions, in such a seamless manner that the differentiation between subjectivity and 
objectivity simply dissolves. The film medium is inherently characterised by the obviousness of 
movement — whether it is movement captured by the recording function, or movement created 
by the actual camera, or movement that the editing process creates upon the interactive 
relationships between images and sequences. Yet the sense of movement in a painting must be 
predominantly imagined, regardless of the skill and clarity with which the painting methods 
actually depict such movement. Afterall, we cannot escape the fact that a painting tends to only 
capture a singular moment in time — a movement frozen and entirely recreated — while film 
has full capacity to capture a far wider range of moments. Balázs metaphorically juxtaposes the 
two media especially to show that film should generate as much imagination as painting 
normally would. The qualitative fusion between film and painting transforms both media into an 
escapist microcosm in which the spectator has the unconditional freedom to immerse themselves, 
causing the spectator‘s imagination and the scene in the painting to have an interactive, deeply 
involved relationship. The animistic qualities bestowed upon the painting means that the 
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interactions between spectator and work of art produce proper consequences, as in the idea of a 
little child appearing in the painting a year after the father entered into the painting to marry the 
mother who was has always been part of the painting. Stories such as these intensely express the 
reality of imagination, that the seeds of imagination have the power to manifest themselves into 
actuality provided that those seeds are nurtured with care.  
 
     The child‘s appearance in the painting — a manifestation of inter-worldly co-creation — 
causes the painting (represented by the mother) and the surrounding world outside the painting 
(represented by the father) to completely overlap without inhibition. Here, the boundaries 
between the two worlds are made ambiguous and transparent; an appropriate analogy would be a 
constant flow of water that makes no distinction between a main river and its tributary. Even the 
fact that the painting is a mere flat surface is unashamedly ignored. The idea of a spectator 
entering a painting — seemingly outlandish as it sounds — bestows the painting with a multi-
dimensional aspect, transforming it into part of the time-space continuum which normally 
characterises the physical world in which we live. Such a transition (embodied in the spectator‘s 
entry) conjoins and blends the worlds inside and outside the painting, immediately taking away 
the painting‘s so-called physical flatness, clearly conveying that the painting itself as an 
animistic entity is not at all confined to the surface upon which it is displayed. Perhaps the most 
evident example of Mizoguchi‘s presentation of characters literally and symbolically entering 
into a living painting can be found in the scene at Lake Biwa in Ugetsu where misty formations 
resembling ink-wash envelop the characters, drawing them into a veiled world of constantly 
shifting boundaries, removing them however momentarily from the surrounding war-torn reality. 
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     In the 1970s, director Kaneto Shindo made a documentary whose translated title is Kenji 
Mizoguchi: The Life of a Film Director, presenting nearly 40 interviews with those who worked 
closely with Mizoguchi. The documentary provides very few interviews with Mizoguchi himself, 
offering the impression that the director was not given to the habit of making himself available. 
Much of what we discover about his thoughts and ideas are offered through the perspectives of 
those who worked with him. In all the attention given to Ugetsu (1953) which is an indisputably 
refined work, little is actually based on the director‘s own words. The closest we come to the 
director‘s own view is by way of the instructions he gave to his cameraman Kazuo Miyagawa: 
  
For him, a film was like a picture scroll, with successive images moving steadily forward, 
never turning back. You follow the story all the way to the end. Some parts are intense 
and exciting, some are touching, and there are parts you should just skim through. He 
said, ‗I want my films to be like picture scrolls‘.244 
 
Lyla Dusing provides an interpretation of Mizoguchi‘s method of collaboration with cameraman 
Miyagawa, suggesting that there are specific film scenes that are structured in alignment to long 
horizontal scrolls so that an individual scene may play out literally and metaphorically in a 
rolling manner with no cuts and no breaks:  
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In Mizoguchi‘s films, traditional Japanese painting strongly influenced Miyagawa‘s 
work. The emakimono or long horizontal scrolls were used to illustrate important works 
of literature. The emakimono were ‗read‘ sequence-by-sequence, as the viewer unrolled 
the scroll in his hands while rolling up the portion that had been viewed. This narrative 
technique in painting inspired Mizoguchi‘s one-scene-one-shot style of shooting a 
film.
245
 
 
The scene that epitomises the emakimono style appears towards the end of Ugetsu (1953) where 
Genjuro arrives into an empty home, exits the hut to encircle it, then re-enters the same space 
where his wife awaits him — all this occurring within a space of less than a minute. Here, the 
metaphorical horizontal scroll becomes unrolled upon Genjuro‘s first entry. He exits through the 
back door, which is where the ‗read‘ portion of the scroll is metaphorically rolled up, seeing that 
the empty space accommodating Genjuro‘s first entry is now symbolically cleared of the initial 
anxiety generated. He encircles the house as the metaphorical scroll continuously unrolls itself 
into new segments. All the while, the camera remains indoors, panning to the window as we see 
him walk passed the window. He finally makes a second entry into the same space that was 
previously empty of living persons where he is now overjoyed to see his wife miraculously 
appear before him. He has just walked a 180-degree arc around the hut, all captured by the 
camera from indoors even though half of the walking was done outdoors. Not only does this 
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encircling resemble the rolling motion of an emakimono, but the rolling metaphor becomes all 
the more effective through the long-take composition of an empty space that ‗rolls itself‘ into a 
transformed space where a ghost-wife awaits her husband. The ghostly presence is in a sense 
‗layered over‘ the empty space, with the audience being unnoticeably deprived of the actual 
process of layering (as in, the process whereby the visiting presence is gently placed into the 
hut‘s interior). Thus, the same space literally and symbolically rolls into new dimensions that 
become completely inclusive of physical and non-physical elements, almost without having to 
posit any differentiation between them — resulting in a cinematic emakimono where transitions 
are executed seamlessly and with the sophisticated simplicity of very down-to-earth set design. 
With the apparition of his wife before him, time is no longer linear and irreversibly forward-
moving. In fact, time metaphorically rolls into a rather cyclical pattern, as not only does the dead 
come back to life, but Genjuro‘s inability to notice the transformation means that there is hardly 
any differentiation between the worlds of the living and the dead.  
 
     Grateful to see his wife safe and sound, he does not notice the miraculous nature of this 
apparition — miraculous in that we do not see her entry into the scene, only that the suddenly 
manifested phenomenon of her cooking in a furnished kitchen has unknown comings and goings. 
Yet for this scene to be profoundly moving in the sense described, it is essential to also examine 
the background of what has happened previously in the film. After Genjuro parts from his 
family, his wife Miyagi is speared by soldiers of a defeated army while travelling with her young 
son on her back. We are unsure of her condition, until towards the end of the film when we 
finally learn that she is dead. However, before this final realisation, the audience is presented 
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with a series of occurrences leading to an initial belief that she is still alive, only so that we come 
to discover later on that what we have just seen is a warm homecoming where the living and the 
dead are made to interact normally on the same plane of existence. This is the image we see upon 
Genjuro‘s return home. He looks around for his wife and child, but they are nowhere to be found.   
 
It is as though two different pieces of reality are metaphorically sewn together, and Genjuro does 
not notice the patterns of stitching. There is here such a fine line between a dream that one 
experiences in the sleeping state and a dream that is the product of imaginative conjuring in the 
waking state. Upon his arrival to the front door for the second time, he sees his wife cooking in a 
kitchen with a well-lit fire — components of the set design that were not present upon Genjuro‘s 
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first arrival. The ma qualities here manifest themselves in the form of an intensely liminal area 
embodying the convergence of an uninhabited space long deprived of the warmth of a home and 
its direct opposite which is an overjoyed family reunion. The same cold, desolate space 
transforms itself within less than a minute — which is roughly the length of time Genjuro takes 
to walk the 180-degree arc around the hut — into a fire-lit space accommodating his wife 
cooking and mending his kimono, as if the emptiness only a brief moment ago never existed. So 
even though we notice the oppositional nature of the two states preceding and then following 
Genjuro‘s encircling of the hut, the duality construct is gently made to dissolve. This 
phenomenon of an entirely self-generated renewal defies the logic of physical reality, causing the 
hut‘s interior to become a point of inter-dimensional convergence where a ghostly figure 
resumes the roles she once had while she was still alive. It is as if the physical body she once had 
was never destroyed, and the seamless continuity from her previous life never disrupted. Here, 
Richard Pilgrim provides an interpretation of ma as a receptive source for entry of kami, which is 
a widely encompassing term inclusive of ghosts and other such non-physical entities. What 
makes such receptivity possible, however, is the state of consciousness of the human participant 
that must be open and fine-tuned to a compatible wavelength with the kami:  
 
An ―atmosphere‖ of sacred presence, after all, depends in part on the person who 
experiences it as such. As Isozaki explains it, ―MA is the way of sensing the moment of 
movement. Originally the word utsuroi meant the exact moment when the kami spirit
246
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 ‗Summarized briefly, it may be said that kami is essentially an expression used by the early Japanese 
people to classify experiences that evoked sentiments of caution and mystery in the presence of the 
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entered into and occupied a vacant space…Later it came to signify the moment of kami‘s 
sudden appearance…[This] gave birth to the idea of utsuroi, the moment when nature is 
transformed, the passage from one state to another…MA is the expectant stillness of the 
moment attending this kind of change.‖ 
 
Ma as a ―way of sensing‖ and an ―expectant stillness‖ implies ma as a particular mode of 
experience or sensitivity, one that is highly attuned to the immediacy of sensual 
experience; one that can, for example, hear the faint sounds of kami presence 
(otozureru)…This sensitivity has become, as Matsuoka claims, ―an archetype of 
‗knowing‘ ‖ that has informed Japanese consciousness, that is, a religio-aesthetic 
paradigm.
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While the apparition scene applies to such a description of ma, the scene conveys much more 
than a kami spirit occupying a space. In order to become the emptiness and stillness constituting 
the ideal conditions that could accommodate the ma moment, the state of consciousness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
manifestation of the strange and marvelous. Like numerous other concepts discoverable among ancient or 
primitive people, kami is fundamentally a term that distinguishes between a world of superior beings and 
things which are thought of as filled with mysterious power and a world of common experiences that lie 
within the control of ordinary human technique. Often the best translation is simply by the word ―sacred‖. 
In this sense it has an undifferentiated background of everything that is strange, fearful, mysterious, 
marvelous, uncontrolled, full of power, or beyond human comprehension.‘ (H. Byron Earhart, Religion in 
the Japanese Experience, p. 11.)  
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human participant, in this case Genjuro, is the determining factor. Upon his first entry into the 
hut, the seeming absence of his family sets off his anxiety, and so this first entry cannot be 
considered a ma interval. In the process of encircling the hut in a literal and symbolic search for 
what he thought he had lost, he very briefly steps outside that initial space that had caused the 
anxiety, partially relieving himself from the baggage of tenseness. Genjuro‘s temporary removal 
from such an uncomfortable space allows the opportunity for such a space to clear itself from 
what we would have thought would become an episode of heart-breaking lamentation. So the ma 
interval here is that oasis-like space between search and grief — the restful space that perhaps 
successfully relieves the burden from both states where sorrow is intensified.  
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Upon learning that she is dead after he has woken from his sleep, there remains a slight 
ambiguity as to whether her apparition was altogether a dream — as in, one that was experienced 
while he was asleep. Although we had indeed experienced some elements of a dream, there is no 
distinction here whatsoever between waking life and the dream world. The scene reveals an 
example of a fantasy that is completely coherent with reality — coherent in that the ghostly 
apparition resembles the normality of everyday life without a single detail out of place. The 
smoothness and tranquility of the wife cooking goes undisturbed, and even with the 
incorporation of specific emotional heights that characterise their home life, the rhythm of 
peaceful regularity is maintained. By way of architectural structures, the doors and windows are 
completely open, especially so that we can see Genjuro walking in, out, and around his hut 
without any obstructions, hence the transparency between his world and the world of his dead 
wife as well as the spontaneity and sympathy with which the two worlds fuse and interact. The 
apparition scene is perhaps a prime example of the demarcation between the living and the dead 
being almost forsaken. As I had explained in the Introduction, the term ‗supernatural‘ is a 
modern Western construct which forms half of the dichotomy between the natural (which is 
profane) and the supernatural (which is sacred). Yet this dichotomy cannot be considered an 
operative concept that is recognised cross-culturally. For this reason, I proposed that the terms 
‗ordinary‘ and ‗sacred‘ are much more effective in describing the relationship between the 
multitudes of worlds which intersect and fuse, especially as such terms openly accommodate a 
cross-cultural model of hierophany with minimal discrimination, if any. This modified model of 
hierophany embodies the differentiation between the ordinary and the sacred as varying points 
on the same qualitative spectrum, as opposed to presenting the relationship between the two 
qualities in dichotomised terms constrained by clear-cut demarcations, oppositions, 
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contradictions, and incompatibilities. Another example of the fact that dichotomised 
classifications cannot apply with any measure of viability can be found in an iconic scene in 
Utamaro and His Five Women (1946) where the living flesh that serves as a canvas is one of the 
most important components of the painting ‗performed‘ on the flesh. There is no attempt 
whatsoever for the painting to hide or disguise the surface being painted upon, unlike the case 
where there is a clear division between painting and medium. On the contrary, the complete 
incorporation of the flesh with the painting shows an intimate interaction with the medium, so 
much so that the painted skin becomes a living, breathing organism in itself where the flesh is 
very much treated as sacred ground. 
 
Here, Utamaro considers the naked flesh that he intends to paint with a sense of wonder. ―I‘ve 
seen many women‘s bodies, but none of them were as beautiful as yours‖, he says to the 
courtesan. Even Utamaro‘s kimono as well as the painting of the egret on the shielding screen 
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next to the courtesan are purposely dark, especially to contrast with the paleness of her skin that 
appears to be glowing. Mark Le Fanu almost alludes that her flesh is considered by the artists in 
the immediate scene to be so sacred that not just any artist can paint on it: 
 
Against the law, the lady in question has expressed her wish to be tattooed, but the 
tattooist is so awed by the beauty of the pale expanse of skin he has to operate on that 
he‘s inhibited from initiating the enterprise. At which point Utamaro appears, and without 
hesitation sketches live on the woman‘s back the perfect design — the only perfect design 
(a depiction of the infant prodigy Kintoki with his long-haired nurse) — that ‗fits‘ the 
unique curves of her body.
248
 
 
Yet it must be noted here that an exceptional design can only be painted on an exceptional body, 
and this scene does go to great lengths to convey the supreme beauty of the flesh on the 
courtesan‘s back. After asking for her permission and before painting, Utamaro touches her back 
as though it is a delicate sculpture that seems to fulfill his fantasy of both beholding and touching 
her seductive flesh. He does however touch her with the kind of tenderness that clearly shows his 
absolute realisation that the naked flesh he is about to paint on is infinitely more precious than 
the glowing porcelain that it resembles. Even the previous artist — who is considered to be one 
of the best tattoo artists in the city, as informed earlier by a character from a previous scene — 
fails to carry out the task of tattooing her body in the first place. While bending forward with his 
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face towards the floor in a gesture of shame, he tells Utamaro that the unexplainable beauty of 
her flesh is far too elevated for his skill: ―I can‘t draw a design that would do her body justice.‖ 
Significantly, this scene puts forward that body painting uses a surface that is the complete 
opposite of any mass-produced media, which in the case of this film come in the forms of paper 
and silk. Body painting is performed on a living person who never was and never can be mass-
produced. The painting must adapt itself to the body‘s contours, causing the medium to hardly 
bear any point of comparison with the consistent flatness and thinness of paper and silk. And 
while the body does possess the three-dimensional qualities similar to those of a sculptural form, 
the body‘s texture shows wide-ranging degrees of hardness or softness, whereas a sculpture 
normally has a predetermined degree of hardness. Such complexities mean that even the body‘s 
possible resemblance to a sculpture is restricted to outward appearances, while an individual‘s 
bodily texture already proves the absolute uniqueness of the painting surface, all this taking into 
account the diverse properties of the body‘s shape and form. 
 
     So the process of tattooing the ‗living texture‘ of the human flesh has important implications 
as far as the unviability of dichotomy is concerned. The fact that tattooing causes the paint to 
penetrate the flesh — while remaining an important argument against the dichotomisation 
between the painting and the painted surface — is not actually a phenomenon unique to 
tattooing, as there are certainly other media that also allow the paint to penetrate the porous 
surface. What is unique about tattooing is the fact that the painting becomes a constant witness to 
whatever happens to the body upon which it is painted as well as an unconditional companion to 
the person for as long as the tattoo remains on their body. The idea that the tattoo ‗experiences 
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life‘ with the person further suggests that art is not merely about how things look, as the tattoo 
comes to take on the life of the person who carries it. Thus, the tattoo comes to possess animistic 
qualities as it acquires the position of seeing the world through the person‘s eyes, literally 
moving with the person‘s body for the entire duration that the tattoo remains upon it. The tattoo 
then becomes a constantly moving art as it aligns in unison with the body‘s voluntary and 
involuntary motions throughout life. The purpose of this scene, however, is to show that the 
tattoo and the body upon which it is painted must share a similar standard of splendour and 
beauty, causing both the process and the finished product to truly constitute sacred art: 
   
Tattooing is only tattooing, of course: a ‗minor art form‘. But for the purposes of our 
discussion the scene is an exquisite allegory. For what Utamaro is engaged in doing, it 
seems, is abolishing at a stroke the traditional distinction (with all its strange longing and 
poignancy) between looking and touching; the ‗live-action painting‘ he has just pulled off 
looks and touches, so to speak, at one and the same time; marries, in some utopian way, 
the respective qualities of desire and possession. And moreover the tattooist‘s art 
(metaphorically speaking) lives, breathes, moves as painting has never done in its 
existence. So the finished design, Utamaro tells Takasodé, will ‗live‘ on her skin, and 
during her lifetime (she is to be tragically short-lived) ‗share the heights and lows of all 
your passions‘.249 
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Le Fanu places an emphasis upon Utamaro‘s spoken line concerning the tattoo‘s status as the 
courtesan‘s faithful companion throughout all the fluctuations of her life‘s passions, here 
implying that she is indeed a woman who has her own dedications and ideals despite her human 
imperfections. She is certainly not an individual of plain and mundane tastes, nor is can she be 
classed as an ordinary woman whose lifestyle and choices must conform to mainstream society‘s 
expectations. The fact that Takasodé is violating the norm that strictly instructs courtesans not to 
be tattooed clearly shows her exceptional and non-conformist character. Utamaro is idealising 
and even idolising her, especially through sight and touch. But then again such sensationalised 
perspectives that uphold the courtesan to rest on a pedestal of artistic superiority constitute an 
important aspect of her sacred qualities — qualities that are not at all limited to the outward 
beauty of her body. The courtesan‘s inner grace radiates through her skin causing those who 
behold her to revere her as a living masterpiece. Even the way she sits for Utamaro to touch and 
paint her is characterised by statuesque poise and elegance that come from within, especially so 
that such qualities express themselves as part of her composure. So what causes her naked flesh 
to symbolise sacred ground is not merely its beautiful appearance, but also includes the inner 
qualities she has developed over a lifetime that contribute to the ethereal luminescence which her 
complexion is emitting. Utamaro does not just see the external cover of the flesh; he also sees — 
much more so with the ‗inner eye‘ than the naked eye — the rich layerings of accumulated 
qualities vibrating beneath as well as through the pores of the courtesan‘s flesh. Through the 
entire process of painting on her skin, he is demonstrating live the skill of his ‗intuitive sight‘ 
more than anything else. So even the outer flesh and the inner qualities are completely 
inseparable from each other — especially as far as the examination of a person‘s aura and refined 
manner is concerned. Angela Dalle-Vacche, however, suggests that the fusion between the two is 
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like a double-edged sword. The tattoo cutting into the courtesan‘s skin is symbolic of the beauty 
that comes to betray her in the end, as it is such an elevation of her already unreachable beauty 
that fuels the motive for her murder. The tattoo stands for the danger that invades and spreads 
through her body — almost like a kiss of poison — causing her to emit invisible signals from her 
being that attract such vicious attacks from the one who is jealous of her. We see here a 
metaphor of a goddess figure becoming a vulnerable target for an evil demon:  
  
Just as the cinema can lead to freedom or constraint, tattooing in Utamaro is a double-
edged medium. In marking the body, it is a form of violence, penetration, and possession. 
Mizoguchi seems to signal the links between tattooing, cutting, and the patriarchal order 
he rejects, by having the tattoo bleed, so to speak, across the narrative, which develops 
along a chain of deadly betrayals. While tattooing can be seen as one of the ways in 
which phallocracy leaves its mark on the individual‘s psyche, this controversial aesthetic 
practice may also exalt the body as art in order to make a highly personal statement of 
fantasy and desire. Utamaro‘s decision to paint the body of Tagasode is not only a radical 
gesture against the Kano school, which often worked on silk, but is also antithetical to the 
reduction of art to commerce. Unlike any other image, which can be serialized and sold 
again and again since the advent of mechanical reproduction, the tattoo cannot be 
separated from the body, and for this reason, it asserts that the individual is unique, while 
it violates important conventions of markets and prices in the institutional art world.
250
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Dalle-Vacche‘s interpretation suggests then that the value of the tattoo is almost entirely 
determined by the individual carrying the tattoo, that unlike other mass-produced media, body 
painting cannot be considered a commodity whose prices are adjusted by market trends. Because 
it is the nature of the person as well as their life experiences that adjust and continually modify 
the value of the tattoo, it is the person‘s individuality that makes the tattoo unique, even though 
there is always a possibility that the design all by itself may be one that has been and will be 
painted over and over many times. For indeed the design may be imitable, but the person is not. 
This is the image that shows Utamaro finishing off the tattoo, and even here the composition of 
the image reflects the courtesan‘s inner state. She is poised before the painted screen depicting an 
egret in the background. Her profile is suspended between the egret‘s feet and wings, causing the 
dark portions of the egret to blend with the neatly combed shape of her hair. It is as though the 
various parts of the egret‘s anatomy are extending forth from the courtesan‘s upper part from the 
shoulders upwards. She becomes symbolically endowed with a bird‘s limbs,251 clearly showing 
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 A discussion of Japanese mythology and folklore concerning the swan, which is another water-bird: 
In…Japan, swans are not so anciently recorded, though they do appear as early as 712 AD in the 
Kojiki and in 720 AD in the Nihonshoki, among the earliest of Japanese literature. Heavenly swans 
flying overhead were credited in the Nihonshoki with having helped the mute son of Emperor Suinin 
to learn to speak and so began the tradition of the imperial court capturing and rearing swans…From 
the indigenous Ainu in the north of Japan…to the Okinawans in the south (where any swans are 
accidental…) there are stories relating to reverence for swans. Their qualities were seen as including 
courage and strength and people offered prayers to them in the hope of emulating their virtues. 
Remnants of that reverence are retained at a handful of ―Shiratori‖ (literally white bird) shrines in 
Tokyo, Nagoya, and Miyagi Prefecture where altars exist to honour swans as protective deities.   
— Mark Brazil, ‗Swan Culture‘, in Journal of Rakuno Gakuen University, vol. 28/1 (2003), p. 80. 
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the sense of liberation that she seems relieved to attain upon the completion of her tattoo — the 
taboo masterpiece that she had been forbidden to carry upon her body. Significantly, this also 
becomes a sacred avant-garde moment, as body art in this case is much more than a symbol of 
freedom to rebel against unjust authority. The fact that the right to paint on the body had 
previously been taken away means that even the individual who owns the body (or at least comes 
closest to owning it) cannot do as they please with their birth-given property. From a mythical 
perspective, the body had been assigned to the individual as a pre-birth agreement and as a 
vehicle through which their life force would be operating. The courtesan taking back that right to 
exercise free will upon her body suggests that she is re-claiming her power to symbolically 
return to that (pre-birth) primordial time to finally embrace her body‘s mythical status (i.e. the 
agreement between her individual life force and the cosmic universe) entirely through creative 
means. All this is finely executed in spite of prevention from oppressive societal norms, 
magnifying the avant-garde nature of this moment to the extreme. 
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While Utamaro and His Five Women portrays body painting as an anthropomorphised art form, 
Ugetsu uses the absorbent nature of ink painting to create mysteriously melding effects that 
transform an entire lake scene into a metaphorical slow-moving painting. Cameraman Kazuo 
Miyagawa explains the challenges encountered in executing Mizoguchi‘s instructions: ―He 
wanted a subdued effect with very little contrast, like in the southern school of Chinese painting, 
with the delicate greys of diluted ink. It was difficult, and we didn‘t entirely achieve it. When we 
printed the negative, it came out flat. We couldn‘t get a deep, warm grey. The negative had to be 
overdeveloped by one or two points.‖252 Miyagawa explains the director‘s vision of smooth 
transitions between the different kinds of greys in the lake scene — smooth in a sense that there 
is a resemblance to ink washes that absorb into each other. The relationship between ink washes 
must be translucent, meaning that the different ink washes depicting each individual shade of 
grey exchange properties diffusely so that the result of such interpenetrations are harmonious as 
opposed to looking like a combination of incompatible properties. Hence, the director‘s intention 
for minimised contrast between the greys, while maximising the semblance of dilution. The 
intention for minimised contrast may not have been considered successful, even though the 
mist‘s resemblance to absorbent ink washes was certainly effectively executed. While the mist 
does have a physical presence, it does not solidly locate itself upon any specific point which is 
why the mist can be moved passed and travelled through as though it is not actually there. Yet 
the mist clearly does produce visible effects creating a majestic cloud-scape surrounding the 
travellers, with cloud-like layers spilling over upon the water‘s surface. Ironically, one would 
expect to see such a phenomenon in a mountain environment or at least a position of great 
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height, but this lake scene has a setting that is contrary to that for there is no indication of height 
whatsoever. Thus, the lake scene displays an unexpected celestial environment, all the while not 
showing any geographical features that could suggest that the boat is still sailing through an 
earthly environment. The range of greys absorbing and flowing into each other even causes the 
scene to convey an abstract sense that the characters are obliviously slipping back and forth 
between the transcendent dimension that remains unaffected by physical vulnerability and the 
physical dimension where human victims are doing what they can to escape war and suffering.  
 
     The scene at Lake Biwa begins with a boat slowly approaching the camera from the far side 
of the water. Even though — according to Miyagawa‘s account — it was the director‘s initial 
intention to reduce the contrast between the varying degrees of greys applied to the presentation 
of the mist, the actual result where the darker greys are rather blackened creates an effect of 
increased reflection between the upper and lower strata of the scene, namely the sky and the 
water. The water symbolises the physical world that is carrying the vessel, while the mist that is 
floating before the sky symbolises the transcendent world in its resemblance to a veil that is both 
parting and concealing. The mist, which very much amounts to a collection of ungraspable 
vapourous formations, cannot be quantified in any kind of physical containment all the while 
being directly exposed to the characters. This simultaneous exposure to and escaping from the 
physical touch qualifies the mist as a metaphor of heightened liminality for the transcendent 
world that is constantly enveloping the human being, very literally through thick and thin. But 
upon the slightest attempt to locate, quantify, or even collect examinable data of this 
transcendental world, it slips through any effort to hold it for identification. Fragments of the 
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dark sky — the sky that unconditionally remains above the human world — reflect the equally 
dark water, and vice versa, suggesting that the transcendental world still bears some resemblance 
to the physical world, and that it is impossible to completely separate the two. Significantly, the 
lake scene constitutes that elevated opening — very ma-like in every respect — amidst the film‘s 
narrative where the celestial and the earthly (i.e. Heaven and Earth) become one, this despite the 
surrounding war invading people‘s homes up and down the land. Even the delicate nature of the 
misty environment prevents the boat carrying the travellers from being isolated as an individual 
vessel, as the boat is subtly melded into the elements that are themselves quite indistinguishable 
from each other due to the aquatic nature of mist and lake alike.  
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This harmonious melding is further emphasised as the mist collects itself more heavily upon the 
water‘s surface, so that as the scene progresses it truly does appear as though the characters are 
travelling through a thickening blanket of cloud-like formations. Here, the celestial and the 
earthly become one, as the characters are literally sailing through an accumulating coverage of 
clouds. The mist hovers in the air like a hanging curtain and also settles upon the lake, this 
simultaneous defiance of and submission to gravity goes to show that the transcendental cannot 
be defined solely in straightforward linear terms. Here, the transcendental allows for the co-
existence of things that initially may appear like opposites (in this case, things that hover and 
things that settle down). This gentle co-existence rather dismantles the construct of oppositions. 
Because of such interpenetration between dimensions, the relationship between physical and 
non-physical comes to resemble overlapping points on the same qualitative spectrum. This 
spectrum stands for the full breadth and range of the degrees of quantifiability by the physical 
senses, with the transcendental (or the overlapping into the transcendental) being the point that 
operates beyond the capacity of the physical senses to reach. In other words, the less quantifiable 
it is by the physical senses — and the more it slips through physical filters — the more 
transcendental it becomes. It is these overlappings that lead to a conclusion that the dichotomy 
between what is considered ‗natural‘ and ‗supernatural‘ is no longer viable as a qualification for 
things that cannot be empirically explained.  
 
     Still, Phillip Lopate‘s interpretation of the lake scene uses the term ‗supernatural‘, while the 
actual meaning of the term is hardly ever made clear: ‗Edited to create a stunningly uncanny 
mood, it [the lake scene] also prepares us for the supernatural elements that follow. The dying 
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sailor on the boat is not a ghost, though the travelers at first take him for one; he warns them, 
particularly the women, to beware of attacking pirates, another ominous foreshadowing.‘253 Even 
in the scene‘s foreshadowing of the tragic events that will soon follow, Lopate recognises that 
there are certain fragments of the future that are already playing out in the present moment, as 
the future is being partially revealed through a sailor who — dying — is about to cross over to 
the transcendental world, if only symbolically. This metaphor of crossing over is conveyed by 
the lake as serving as a means of transportation for the living and the dying to cross paths, hence 
narrowing the gap between the living and the dead which remains a dominant theme throughout 
the film.
254
 As the two boats meet, the mists part as if swept by a gentle brush stroke. ―A ghost of 
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 It hardly needs mentioning that cross-cultural mythical/religious symbols transform rivers and lakes 
into means of transportation for the souls of the dead, the example of the River Styx in classical 
mythology being possibly the most written about aquatic symbol that is tied to the afterlife. Edward 
Schafer provides an interpretation that sheds insight into what makes the lake scene in Ugetsu so 
profoundly affecting. Even though this example concerns Chinese classical literature of the T‘ang 
Dynasty, we can still see universal value in certain human perspectives — that seas and oceans may 
indeed be too wide for souls of the dead to cross over, and streams and brooks may be too easy and 
narrow, but rivers and lakes are an appropriate scale that is has its own epic quality and not too majestic 
as to disrespect the grief and loss brought about by physical death: 
Most T‘ang writers thought of the nature goddesses as the glorified spirits of ladies long since 
dead who had seized, legitimately or not, particular lakes and rivers as their private domains, and 
so were able to have important effects on the lives of men. As they literary men of T‘ang made 
their interminable journeys toward new country posts, or into exile, or on recreational excursions, 
they prayed to these transformed divinities. But they were not addressing eternal natural spirits at 
all — their prayers aimed to move ghostly survivals, supernatural relics of prominent persons of 
the past who had the good fortune to be immortalized in classical literature. The Lo River 
goddess was typically thought of as the earth-bound soul of a dead queen. The goddesses of the 
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the lake!‖ anticipates Ohama. As the boat draws closer, they learn that the man in the boat is 
dying: ―No, I‘m not a ghost. I‘m a boatman from Kaizu. Wherever you‘re headed, watch out for 
pirates. If they see you, you‘ll lose your cargo and your lives. Watch out for your women.‖ The 
boat carrying the two families then disappears into the curtain of mist, as if to slip into another 
world like fleeting ghosts returning to their origin. Both Phillip Lopate and Keiko McDonald 
observe the fusion between multitudes of dimensions, respecting the ambiguity and transparency 
of dimensional boundaries as opposed to plainly asserting that such boundaries are simplistically 
posited without any allowances for diffusion: ‗The most famous proof of Mizoguchi‘s visual 
mastery is the lake scene — beginning with a long shot that exquisitely blends boat and hovering 
mist. Ohama sings monotonously while a drum beats somewhere in the distance. These sounds 
add deft, suggestive touches to the scene in a way reminiscent of the supernatural moods created 
by Japanese suiboku-ga, monochromatic painting in India ink.‘255 The term ‗supernatural‘ here 
may refer to a predominant ghostly atmosphere with all its wondrous and uncanny undertones. 
Yet there is still no indication of demarcated boundaries between the ‗natural‘ and the 
‗supernatural‘. On the far contrary, McDonald describes the lake scene as a painterly long-take 
that blends boat and mist. While the mist itself clearly does occupy space, it literally cannot be 
stored in any container; it becomes one of the extra-fine elements not subject to categorisation. 
Even the thickest mist is a demonstration of the most intensely liminal qualities. While the naked 
eye would consider the thickest mist to be impenetrable by the physical sight, the mist can still 
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be travelled through, primarily because it is physically insubstantial. For no matter how thick the 
mist, it remains an element that is entirely vapourous, meaning that it may obstruct sight but it 
cannot obstruct movement (the fact that people get lost in the fog all the time means that fog 
leads to navigational disasters, but even then the fog cannot prevent any physical being from 
moving around within the area it is blanketing). The mist then becomes a potent embodiment of 
in-betweenness that cannot be penetrated by the sight, but can still be penetrated by the body, 
causing the blankets and curtains of mist to resemble indefinable ghostly bodies that the naked 
eye does not have full access to while the physical flesh can intersect with. While we are certain 
of the presence of the mist, its substance remains something that escapes being pinpointed. 
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Lyla Dusing further discusses cameraman Kazuo Miyagawa‘s training in ‗sumi-e, a Japanese 
artistic technique of ink-painting‘:256 
  
The sumi-e painter creates a subtle atmosphere with only black, white and gray. One of 
the tenets of the sumi-e style which Miyagawa enjoys quoting holds that there is an 
infinite variety of color in the range of ‗gray‘. The sumi-e painter does not fill the entire 
surface of the paper, nor does he arrange his composition symmetrically. Instead, he uses 
the borders of his surface to create separate planes within the space. 
 
This technique has earned Miyagawa the title ‗master of framing‘ by his associates. The 
framing is rarely symmetrical, but is perfectly balanced. The creation of a pattern is often 
based upon objects or people, and with an unusually deep focus he brings the very near 
and the very far into visual alignment.
257
  
  
Again, the lake scene epitomises the minimalist style of a sumi-e painting in that significant 
portions of the scene are virtually ‗empty‘. As I had explained, the mists elude containment, and 
symbolically embody that rather indefinable area where the boundary between physical and non-
physical is at its most transparent. The scene rather anthropomorphises the mist into a living and 
breathing character whose enveloping omnipresence seems to have the power to observe the 
characters‘ every move. Yet the fact remains that the mist cannot be physically grasped, here 
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causing it to identify much more easily with non-physical dimension, for the mist is much too 
fine to be firmly placed as a quantifiable physical substance. If the scene is to be literally 
depicted into an actual ink painting (rather than playing itself out in a cinematic metaphor of an 
ink painting), the space on the paper where the mist features would very likely be left blank or at 
least the mist would be conveyed with such diluted ink that the paper showing through comes to 
play a much more significant role than the actual layered ink. Such an idea is suggested by 
Eugene Eoyang, as I will later explain, but before embarking upon such elaborate theorising he 
first provides a brief footnote that ‗In the course of this study, the statements made about 
China can also be variously applied to Korea and Japan, to the extent that these cultures followed 
Chinese models.‘258 While it is true that Korean and Japanese ink painting followed Chinese 
models, such a following is certainly not as simplistic as to be thought of as plain imitation. Joan 
Stanley-Baker‘s detailed study that traces the evolution of Chinese and Japanese ink painting in 
the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries presents the Chinese yipin which means ‗idealist painting of the 
highest order‘.259 It was during this time that the Japanese equivalent, which is ippin, idealised 
the ‗brushless‘ inkwash, favouring the spontaneously absorbent and spreading effect that requires 
minimum intervention from brushwork. Correspondingly, the scene at Lake Biwa in Ugetsu 
epitomises this abstract style that reduces the compositional role of solid structures, hence the 
importance of briefly studying this particular period of inkwash that seems to have had such a 
profound influence upon the film‘s use of the ink painting effect: 
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However, in eighteenth-century Japan, although yipin (J. ippin) was associated with 
idealist painting, the image evoked by the term ippin was hardly linear. It was rough, 
abbreviated, and wet, an inspired rendering that was linked, through Chinese texts, to the 
Tang master Wang Xia (or Wang Mo of ―spattered ink‖ fame) and Wang Wei, progenitor 
of pomo (broken ink or inkwash) styles…The growing prestige of Yujian (Rofen)-style 
abbreviated inkwash style in sixteenth-century Japan is evidence for a predisposition 
toward a brushless, moist, and abbreviated image long associated with ippin, which, as 
Shimada points out, ―disregarded the law of ‗bone method‘…and whose forms had no 
distinct boundaries‖.260 
 
Stanley-Baker then states in a later passage that yipin (the idealist painting) in China became 
associated with the precision of lines, the distinct boundaries between juxtaposed shapes and 
forms, and therefore a significantly reduced usage of the absorbent and uninhibited qualities of 
inkwash. The Japanese ippin (the Japanese equivalent of idealist painting) took the opposite 
direction in the usage of widely varying degrees of ink dilution to suggest objects, persons, and 
places (as opposed to making them look obvious through the use of distinct thickened ink lines), 
as well as using ink dilution to establish relationships between near and far. This is where, 
according to Stanley-Baker, there came to be a noticeable contrast between Chinese and 
Japanese styles. Therefore, we cannot proceed to make a simplistic blank statement that Japanese 
(or Korean) styles consistently followed Chinese models. In other words, there was certainly a 
following, but such a following was by no means consistent. Stanley-Baker‘s study of this 
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specific historical period alone (17
th
 century onwards) already shows that the tendency to express 
idealistic principles in drastically divergent ways was ever-present, and that the specific style of 
one cultural art form may easily play against that of another for all manner of reasons. The 
influences of Chinese models have always been an accurate observation, such as the inspiration 
that Wang Mo‘s ―spattered ink‖ and Wang Wei‘s ―broken ink‖ had upon the Japanese ippin. But 
influence must never be mistaken for imitation under whatever circumstances (relating back to 
Bazin‘s idea of the collective traditional spirit that does not necessitate actual imitation, but 
instead inspires artistic expressions to be profoundly aligned with the greater spirit); quite the 
contrary, the Chinese influences served as a creative platform for divergent inkwash styles to 
develop in Japan. Furthermore, the popularity and unpopularity of certain brushstroke and 
inkwash trends as featured in wenren (literati) literature must also be taken into account, 
especially as Stanley-Baker‘s following observations quite clearly mark the inkwash style as 
being rather unfashionable specifically in China from the 5
th
 century through to the 18
th
 century, 
even suggesting that inkwash was a rather wayward practice associated with artistic rebels. Thus, 
the inkwash trend that came to acquire enormous popularity in Japan would be considered in 
China at the time (in fact spanning at least 13 centuries) to be branching against Chinese ideals, 
rather than branching from: 
 
Yipin, in short, became associated in China increasingly with dry, linear works while in 
Japan it remained associated with wet, amorphous, nonlinear works of the Muqi and 
Yujian styles, and with Rinpa, which is the antithesis of linearity. In this light it is 
appropriate to compare the respective perceptions of inkwash in China and Japan. The 
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word mo (ink) does not appear in Xie He‘s Six Laws (ca. 490). And although Jing Hao 
promoted ink as one of the Six Essentials in his Bifaji (ca. 920), he did not elaborate on 
potentially reasonable concepts such as mofa, or shuimofa (ink or inkwash method). 
These terms virtually do not occur in Chinese critical or technical literature, whereas the 
term bifa (brush method) has been ubiquitous in wenren literature. Inkwash is represented 
in the terms ran, as in xuanran (inkwash used to enhance a form already defined by bifa). 
However, works relying mainly on an adroit use of ink are called wubi (lacking in brush), 
as said of the Tang master Xiang Rong; or jianbi (reduced and/or abbreviated brushwork 
or strokes) as when Huang Xiufu defines yige (sublime class) or cubi (coarse brush) or 
fangbi ru caoshu (unleashed brushlike cursive script) as in Tang Hou‘s description of 
drapery lines (Huaji, ca. 1170). Tang terms such as pomo (spattered or broken ink) are 
usually associated with undesirable personal traits like qi (unusual), guai (bizarre), or 
often kuang (demented) or feng (mad). Although Song literati described their own efforts 
as ximo (inkplay), later followers inevitably emulated their biyi (brush-spirit), but never 
their moyi (ink-spirit). This testifies to a built-in discrimination in China that upholds 
what was to calligrapher-writers the more familiar discipline of linear expression, or bi, 
as against the less often studied techniques of controlling inkwash, or shuimo. Techniques 
developed by late-Ming painters introducing freer uses of inkwash, such as Xu Wei who 
added glue to ink for controlled seepage, or Daoji (1641 – ca. 1710) who stroked ink or 
color across water-wetted paper, were not dignified with names in China. Indeed, these 
painters were hardly accepted and were considered as heretics in their own times.
261
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Stanley-Baker‘s observations indicate that the brush method had constituted a mainstream 
Chinese discipline from as early as the 5
th
 century, while inkwash was very much a marginalised 
art that was perhaps considered much too free-style and nebulous to be considered of a ‗high 
order‘ by the mainstream literati. Here, it is important to specifically contextualise that there 
were indeed far lesser acknowledged artists throughout those many centuries of Chinese history 
who pursued the inkwash as a signature style, and undoubtedly their works had come to 
influence the Japanese inkwash. Yet, for inkwash to be associated with heresy in one culture 
while becoming a widespread accepted practice in another goes to show that the idea of a 
Chinese model (at least by Eugene Eoyang‘s usage of the term which implies that a model is 
followed as a straightforward formula) must be adjusted to include any manner of complexities, 
the Chinese discrimination of inkwash constituting an example of such complexity. This means 
that the model should stand as one that comes to generate significant influences (domestic or 
abroad) regardless of whether the model was generally accepted within its own local context at 
the time of its execution (and in the case of Chinese inkwash, it was not generally accepted 
within its immediate cultural context, even though it gained increasing popularity abroad). In fact 
inkwash constitutes a distinguished avant-garde case proving the idea that an initially 
marginalised phenomenon (in China) can transform itself into mainstream status (in Japan):  
 
In Japan, however, wash-based, nonlinear methods were appreciated, developed, and 
identified. Techniques acquired names such as tarashikomi (the pooling of dense ink or 
color onto a still-wet surface of lighter wash), bokashi (shading from dark to light), and 
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katabokashi (half charging the watered brush with ink for a bitonal effect of light and 
dark in a single stroke). Japanese painting is replete with misty spaces that rather than 
enhance a mountain‘s height or the depth of a farther plane as in Chinese painting, tend to 
serve as conveyors of poetic emotions. Moods and poetic sensibilities include pathos 
engendered by signs of autumn or the impermanence of things, signs of lovers‘ parting or 
fleeting encounters, etc., where clouds, like shadows cast over rippling waters, suggest 
both a quickening of the life-pulse and the presence of indefinable, unutterable, and yet 
unbounded feelings.
262
  
 
Stanley-Baker describes the inkwash — entirely determined by the amount of water in the 
mixture as well as the point at which the water actually enters into the spreading process — as an 
emotionally-charged technique whereby the details of the method indicate the nature of the 
emotion. There appears to be a suggestion here that the varying degrees of thickness or dilution 
of the ink and the ways it is allowed to spread upon a watered surface have an innate 
correspondence with the subtleties within the range of poetic emotions. She is careful not to be 
referring to any kind of emotional state, as she seems intent upon focusing towards nostalgia, 
feelings that are too expansive for words to encompass, and the sorrow brought about by the 
waning aspects of seasonal changes. Significantly, the delicate ways in which different washes of 
ink dilutions and concentrations meld into each other — literally and symbolically fading any 
construct of distinct outlines and boundaries — accurately convey what Stanly-Baker refers to as 
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‗indefinable, unutterable, and yet unbounded feelings‘263 , as the inkwash tends to melt away 
those hard definitions, in turn encompassing those areas that are so sensitive and so profound that 
words cannot seem to access them, let alone describe them. Thus, an inkwash does have an 
emotional life due to the ebbs and flows involved in the process of its spreading. 
 
     Such a principle can be directly applied to the lake scene in Ugetsu, especially in Stanley-
Baker‘s observation that Japanese painting is saturated with the mistiness that evokes a 
heightened poetry which remains independent of aural explanation. In the lake scene, the 
transcendental world is expressed in a dreamlike manner through the mist which is the element 
that is the least subject to the pull of gravity. For even though the mist is a vapourous earthly 
substance, it does not behave in an earthly way, especially when its vapourous nature defines its 
physicality but its ungraspable, elusive qualities cause it to rest in the non-physical side. The mist 
then becomes a metaphor for physical and non-physical exchanging places. This metaphor is one 
of the factors determining the avant-garde nature of the film, that is if the argument rests upon 
the observation that the film entirely attempts to break down the dichotomy between physical 
and non-physical — a dichotomy that is steeped in the modern Western cultural mentality. The 
lake scene epitomises the idea of the ultimate inseparability of physical and non-physical through 
the image of the ghostly mists that, in accordance to traditions of inkwash painting, possess an 
emotional life of their own — causing the scene to be a depiction of travellers surrounded on all 
sides by animistic forces (the mists) hovering above and spreading blanket-wise beneath them. 
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     If we also consider Artaud‘s ideas concerning the painting of ―The Daughters of Lot‖, we can 
then see that the notion of the emotional life of a painting — or in the case of Ugetsu, the 
emotional life of a metaphorical inkwash painting — has contributed to a cross-cultural history 
of rebellion against the rigid linearity of flat standards. I use the term ‗flat‘ to describe the 
reduction or even lack of nuance, as well as the lack of recognition that there is a range of 
differentiations between multitudes of dimensions as opposed to plain demarcation. In the case 
of the Japanese inkwash, there is a branching against the mainstream Chinese practice of distinct 
lines that identify the concreteness of objects (or what Stanley-Baker refers to as dry, linear 
brushwork which can easily be considered flat when compared to the imaginative abstractions of 
inkwash that are also associated with animistic qualities). Here, an interlinking with Artaud‘s 
ideas on animistic painting can prove an illuminating task, as the painting ―The Daughters of 
Lot‖ seems to express telepathic powers that are distinctly human-like. According to Artaud, the 
painting is vibrating an energy affecting the aural faculties, which is clearly a capacity operating 
outside the externally silent medium of painting. In other words, Artaud is bestowing sacred 
significance to a painting that ‗speaks‘:   
 
This painter is Lucas van Leyden and in my opinion he makes the four or five centuries 
of painting that come after him inane and useless. The canvas I speak of is entitled ―The 
Daughters of Lot‖, a biblical subject in the style of the period. Of course the Bible in the 
Middle Ages was not understood in the same way we understand it today, and this canvas 
is a curious example of the mystic deductions that can be derived from it. Its emotion, in 
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any case, is visible even from a distance; it affects the mind with an almost thunderous 
visual harmony, intensely active throughout the painting, yet to be gathered from a single 
glance. Even before you can discern what is going on, you sense something tremendous 
happening in the painting, and the ear, one would say, is as moved by it as the eye.
264
 
 
The impression of a painting has full capacity to profoundly affect an individual‘s consciousness, 
even before the painting undergoes close examination. While Artaud is not undermining the 
physical materials and technical aspects that have assembled the detailed visual composition, the 
implication here is that the painting is generating its own energy or rather its own life force that 
is not at all confined to its own physical structure. Here, Artaud is suggesting the transcendence 
of the physical senses, or at least the capacity of the consciousness to omit the usual barriers 
distinguishing between each individual sense (e.g. sight, sound, touch). This idea is especially 
emphasised in his assertion that even before proper identification of the subject, multitudes of 
our senses are affected by the status of great importance that the painting seems to be generating, 
almost in the form of signals transmitted vibrationally. As figurative as such an idea may be — 
for taking it completely literally may be considered highly questionable by empirical standards 
— the meaning of the statement does not escape the trans-sensory message that not only can the 
painting be looked at, but it can also be listened to. The notion that the effect of an artwork can 
reach beyond the conventional visuality of its own medium goes to show that if the painting does 
not have consciousness to speak of, it would have no capacity to transcend its most conventional 
property as an object that can only be experienced through the visual functions. The significant 
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point here then is the extremely fluid relationships between physical senses, even though there is 
an acknowledgment on an outward level that those individual senses of sight, sound, and touch 
are differentiated by the usual functions that they normally perform. These fluid relationships 
that conduct the metaphorical free-flowing exchange of certain qualities between individual 
senses take us back to the idea that it is those art forms where water is used as a predominant 
directing agent — whether literally or symbolically — that are most generative of animistic 
qualities. Even in Artaud‘s description of the above painting, he makes a point of emphasising 
the immeasurable life force of the emotionally-charged water element: ‗A drama of high 
intellectual importance seems massed there like a sudden gathering of clouds which the wind or 
some much more direct fatality has impelled together to measure their thunderbolts‘265 and ‗The 
sea in the background of the canvas is extremely high, at the same time extremely calm 
considering the fiery skein that is boiling up in one corner of the sky.‘266 Although inkwash 
painting remains on a very different wavelength from the epic grandeur of the painting ―The 
Daughters of Lot‖ especially in regards to their dramatic scale, what they do share is their usage 
of the water element to express the subtle aspects of the interconnected nature of things. I use the 
term ‗subtle‘ to refer to those seminal components that are too fine to be perceived by the naked 
eye, and as a consequence are melded into the water agent that expresses those extra-fine 
components in ways that allude to the most poetic of emotions. 
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     As Artaud appears to be suggesting, Lucas van Leyden‘s painting is a living being; he 
conveys this idea by equating the painting to a conscious being with the power to interact with 
other conscious beings (for instance, those individuals studying the painting). If we posit both the 
work of art and the observing individual as conscious beings, the ‗glance‘ is then a conscious 
exchange occurring on the level of impressions. By the term ‗impressions‘, I am referring to pure 
intuition independent from the faculty of reason normally used to analyse. Impressions are very 
much a sensing of the overall energy of someone or something — metaphorically speaking, that 
cloud-like or mist-like essence that precedes the concretisation of a certain form — and do not at 
all involve the analytical examination that would closely take apart the components of the object 
or person in question. Thus, impressions constitute a broader perspective and can occur from a 
distance — distanced objects in a painting often depicted with heavily diluted inkwash, as 
Stanley-Baker would very likely suggest. And so, the point of harmony between the painting and 
the observer is predominantly the area of intuition where the emotional effect is completely 
spontaneous and does not necessitate empirical verification to prove the existence of the life 
force within the painting. The fact that this example concerns a painting rather than a work of 
film or theatre is completely secondary to Artaud‘s philosophy that a work of art, regardless of 
the medium, should be an interactive conscious being with the power to profoundly affect the 
consciousnesses of those exposed to it. Correspondingly, Stanley-Baker further elaborates upon 
the emotional life of inkwash paintings, this time directly relating back to the cloud-like 
formations created by the flooding of the mist in the lake scene in Ugetsu:  
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By the eleventh century there evolved in Yamato-e painting the inconstant and poetic 
cloud-form, or kumogata, which is imbued with powerful, welling emotional content and 
which I have termed emotional cloud. It appears as background motifs for decorated 
calligraphy papers, in wet pools or sprinkled pigment in Yamato-e, Rinpa, and Tosa 
traditions. A favorite feature in Heian gardens, the kasumigata mist-formed island, 
comprised cloudlike islands placed as if floating in the man-made sky-reflecting ponds, 
built up entirely of white sands (Tachibana 1094), 793b). The role of ink, and of wet 
inkwash in particular, is in Japanese perception intimately related to such free-form, 
emotive-expansive imagery and expression. Conversely, the relatively peripheral 
significance of such forms in Chinese perception may account for China‘s comparatively 
underdeveloped wash-related ―brushless‖ traditions. This difference is reflected in 
contemporary scholarship in the West where the counterpart to the term brushwork, i.e., 
―inkwork‖, does not exist. In Japanese art history, a whole category of medieval painting 
(of the Muromachi period) is known as suibokuga (inkwash painting).
267
 
  
Stanley-Baker‘s ‗emotional cloud‘ suggests that such subtle but generous forms (generous due to 
the spontaneously spreading nature of inkwash on wetted paper) contain the seminal source of 
emotional nuances. Inkwash expresses those seminal qualities, as the water-directed nature of the 
style reduces the concreteness of painted forms, and therefore places much more of an emphasis 
upon that preliminary phase of emotional development that is metaphorically still shifting and 
swirling in fluid potentiality. In other words, the inkwash style touches upon that nebulous stage 
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where emotional patterns have not yet taken on a distinct, solid guise (examples of such solid 
guise would be facial expressions as manifested emotional displays or even bodily gestures that 
express accordingly). Stanley-Baker makes another important observation that the linear style 
which upholds distinct lines depicting the solid guise (summarised in the term ‗brushwork‘) 
remains a predominant feature in the Chinese traditions (while Japanese traditions upheld the 
‗brushless‘ techniques). But more significantly is her further observation that Western 
scholarship concerning brushwork does not recognise the counterpart to such a method which is 
inkwork, clearly reflecting a general attitude which dismisses the more subtle, delicate aspects of 
artistic creation — those aspects that border into the non-physical realm of origination that the 
naked eye cannot reach but the imagination can encompass. The most thickened brushstrokes 
(i.e. the least diluted) show the most acute contrast between the paper and the applied ink. 
However, no matter how clearly defined the contrast between paper and applied ink, the fact 
remains that a medium such as Chinese or Japanese ink painting on rice paper or silk ultimately 
does not conform to the Western construct of dichotomy that demands the barrier between 
binaries to be completely sealed off, forbidding interpenetration as a consequence. Here, Eugene 
Eoyang discusses the drastic contrast between traditional Western painting which is intent upon 
painting over the entire surface and traditional Chinese (and Japanese) painting which is known 
to leave segments of the paper unpainted: 
 
The characterization of painting as an art that makes everything visible — and, by 
inference, that it is not able to render anything that is invisible — is based on the 
presumption of Western painting, in which the surface is totally painted over (in a 
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finished work): even empty spaces must be painted. Chinese painting, on the other hand, 
does not adhere to the principle of technical explicitness; it leaves blanks untouched by 
ink. Indeed, a Chinese painting can be said to be as much unpainted as painted…a good 
deal of the aesthetics of Chinese art is to suggest what is not visible. There is a contrast in 
Western and Chinese approaches to representation: traditional Western requirements of 
painting require that even empty spaces be painted — that a canvas, even one depicting 
an unpopulated and unoccupied landscape, must be covered in paint or else it is 
considered unfinished. In Chinese painting, however, not only is much of the surface 
of the paper unpainted, but some of these blanks ―depict‖ real objects — whether sky, or 
water, or clouds, or air. (Here one might observe the irony that, even when they share the 
same instrument, the brush, Chinese and Western painting differ radically in their 
aesthetics, a function, of course, of the preference in the West for oil and in China for 
ink.)
268
 
 
Whether we are considering the linear style of thickened brushstrokes with minimal dilution or 
the inkwash style where dilution constitutes a predominant directing agent, the fact remains that 
it is a norm for ink painting regardless of style to make significant use of the paper whose 
various uncovered segments can either be left blank or be showing through as part of the abstract 
effect in the very light inkwashes. Even an ink painting that makes no use of the dilution method 
at all must show some segments of the paper virtually untouched, otherwise for the paint to 
thoroughly cover the paper without revealing any blank corners would possibly defeat the 
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purpose of ink painting. Eoyang‘s argument seems to be referring just as much to the ‗inner 
sight‘ as the physical sight, especially in his example of the blank segments of paper depicting 
such flowing and subtle elements as water and air. The blankness operates upon the principle that 
it is naturally understood what the blankness actually depicts. The implication here is that the 
blankness, which symbolises the non-physical, must be expressed as a precursor to the physical, 
almost as if the non-physical must be revered as such. 
 
     Even the reunion scene in Ugetsu where Genjuro walks the 180-degree arc around the hut 
directly alludes to the principle that an empty space (which in ink painting terms would refer to 
an unpainted segment of the paper) does indeed accommodate a non-physical presence, only that 
in the case of the film that non-physical presence does not make an immediate apparition. Thus, 
the emptiness is not actually ‗empty‘ as such, but serves as a receptive interval for the 
individual‘s consciousness to converge with a non-physical energy should there occur a 
spontaneous compatibility between the vibrational frequencies of the two realms. Because the 
seemingly empty receptive interval must be a direct reflection of Genjuro‘s state of 
consciousness at the time of his reunion with his ghost-wife, there is an further suggestion that 
there is no such thing as plain emptiness or blankness (and again, such an idea is derived from 
ink painting principles), but more of a potentiality that is building up its capacity to manifest into 
tangible form. Even the blank spaces in ink painting normally depict something, whether it be 
sky or air or even water forms, clearly showing that the differentiation between physical and 
non-physical is very much shifting and adapting itself depending upon the imaginative 
perspective which remains a primary determinant.  
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     Eoyang then presents the traditional Western preference for oil and the Chinese (or Japanese) 
preference for ink, which again has far-reaching implications concerning the drastically 
contrasting ways in which certain cultural perspectives view the translucency and diffusion 
between differing qualities. The surface upon which oil is painted, whether it be canvas or wood 
or even metal, offers oil paints little to no absorption. And so, the boundary between paint and 
painterly surface cannot be considered ‗porous‘ in the metaphorical sense, as such a boundary 
allows little to no interpenetration. On the other hand, ink is naturally absorbed into paper and 
silk, causing Chinese (or Japanese) painting methods to allow maximum interpenetration 
between paint and painterly surface. Between the two styles of painting, it becomes very clear as 
to which style is structured according to the separation and dichotomisation of binaries (the two 
qualities running along both sides of a single boundary), and which style softens boundaries to 
the point where substances constituting the binary absorb each others‘ qualities inclusively. If the 
principle of the latter style is to be applied to Ugetsu, hierophany cannot at all be analysed in 
terms of the sacred-profane dichotomy based upon modern Western constructs. If dichotomy is 
to be applied to the scene at Lake Biwa for instance which is a metaphorical ink painting, it 
would be near-impossible to actually identify the difference between sacred and profane, let 
alone to categorise them accordingly, as the scene‘s components — tangible or otherwise — are 
made to meld into each other as thoroughly as diluted ink on wetted paper. We simply cannot 
make blanket statements of separation to describe the hierophanic nature of the scene, such as the 
sky is sacred and the boat is profane, or the mist is sacred and the lake is profane; in fact, such 
lame observations would be an insult to the scholar making them, betraying their lack of 
recognition of the most subtle, complex levels of existence.    
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Other avant-garde qualities in Mizoguchi’s film hierophany 
     The avant-garde nature of Mizoguchi‘s films primarily lies in the fact that they fulfilled a 
desperate cultural need for the renewal of a mythical past. His films featuring the most 
elaborately crafted historical settings compensated not merely for the imaginative abundance that 
the modern West was severely lacking, but also for the spiritual replenishment that the West may 
have been asking for in a manner not so much different from a crying child — that is, on those 
levels far below the mainstream surface consciousness. Before proceeding to discuss the cultural 
remedies believed to have been provided by Mizoguchi‘s films, it is important to lay out the 
basis of the cultural problem so that what then follows as a creative solution would unfold 
logically. Artaud was among the pioneering theorists who thoroughly addressed the problem of a 
cultural thirst. We cannot however discuss this perspective of his separately from the Surrealist 
usage of the Orient as an ideological weapon, as it is more than likely that Artaud‘s idealisation 
of the East was partially inspired by the Surrealists: 
  
For the Surrealists, the Orient was an extravagantly abstract myth that provided an 
oppositional stance against everything they despised in Western civilization. Artaud 
reiterates this mythic ideology when he invokes the Indo-Tibetan Schools of the Buddha 
as a war machine that will spread from East to West so as to destroy the latter‘s dualistic 
cleavage of the Spirit between the ―two terms‖ of spirit and flesh…269 
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According to Joshua Gonsalves, the Orient constituted an idealised myth that the Surrealists used 
to attack those undesirable aspects of the modern West, all this regardless of every possibility 
that the idealised versions constructed of the Orient may not at all be accurate reflections of their 
many complex realities. Artaud, who himself had a most ambivalent relationship with the 
Surrealist movement
270
, became one such idealist. That is why in order to partially resolve some 
of the inaccuracies within such idealistic perspectives, the study of Mizoguchi‘s films then 
proves to dismantle some of the idealistic overstatements concerning the Orient. Mizoguchi 
almost counters Artaud‘s idealism, for instead of completely avoiding historical feudal themes, 
Mizoguchi presents resolutions to the damaging effects of the feudal system of the past by 
bluntly exhibiting such damages. By no means does he nostalgically idealise the past, but rather 
he acknowledges the value of the unpleasantness characterising certain aspects of history as a 
platform for the diversity of new resolutions that could potentially counter such unpleasantness. 
Thus, Mizoguchi‘s avant-garde style thoroughly embraces historicity, even its more undesirable 
aspects. In fact, Ugetsu, The Life of Oharu, and Sansho the Bailiff — the three period 
masterpieces of his later career that earned the director the most international praise — are harsh 
social critiques, reflecting the horrors and cruelties that co-exist with the aesthetic refinements of 
the very class of people from whom such inhumanities arise. Yet as far as idealising the Orient 
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was concerned, addressing such tragedies was not part of Artaud‘s vision of cultural reform. His 
constant purpose was to bridge and harmonise the dichotomised properties (e.g. sacred-profane, 
reason-intuition, flesh-spirit, form-essence) into which the Western cultural attitude was so 
deeply steeped: ‗to resolve or even annihilate every conflict produced by the antagonism of 
matter and mind, idea and form, concrete and abstract, and to dissolve all appearances into one 
unique expression which must have been the equivalent of spiritualized gold.‘271 Here, Artaud is 
not at all doing away with the existence of dualities, but rather he is proposing their ultimate 
fusion. And despite such a position against dichotomy, Artaud himself aggressively 
dichotomised the relationship between East and West: 
 
Logical Europe endlessly crushes the mind between the jaws of two extremes: it opens 
and recloses the mind. But now the strangulation is at its peak. We have suffered too long 
under the yoke. The spirit is greater than the spirit, life‘s metamorphoses are manifold. 
Like you, we reject progress: come and tear down our houses.
272
 
 
So if the modern West was suppressing the creativity that should flow forth freely from the 
sacred source — consequently causing the West to earn a status of spiritual oppressor — the East 
then would be loftily idealised for the opposite qualities: the placement of imagination in a 
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superior position to external circumstances, the full incorporation of the sacred into ordinary life, 
and the importance attributed to the areas of emotion, intuition, and sensibility. The degree of 
accuracy such qualities possess in accordance to certain factual realities becomes quite 
irrelevant. For it is far more important, especially for Artaud, to portray the East as offering the 
power within its philosophical traditions to resolve the problems of materialism and intellectual 
meaninglessness that were constraining the West. Éric Rohmer was one of many film critics who 
also sought cultural solutions by looking to the ethereal but genuine qualities in Japanese films, 
especially in his statement concerning ‗the superiority of the Japanese film-makers over the likes 
of us, products of the West, incapable of projecting the enchantment of fairy tales onto the 
screen. Our period films smack of masquerade, our fantastic films of trickery.‘273 Rohmer is 
alluding here to the complete opposite of the lamely composed historical and fantastical films 
typical of the mainstream Western movie industry of the time
274
 — such an opposite then 
referring to the seamlessness between the fantastical world and everyday life. A brilliantly 
executed example again would be the homecoming scene towards the end of Ugetsu where the 
use of the long take conveys the completely uninterrupted flow between dimensions. The use of 
theatrical techniques to compose the scene is also considered to be one of Mizoguchi‘s genius 
methods, especially as such borrowings from theatre hardly necessitate the use, if any, of even 
the most basic tools of film editing such as cuts and dissolves: 
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When Genjuro arrives at his empty hut, walks around it and reenters to find Miyagi 
(Kinuyo Tanaka), this is strikingly evocative of the mawari-butai in kabuki staging. What 
is involved is the use of a stage on wheels that revolves to present a new set while the 
performers enact a transitional scene. So when Genjuro completes his circle, it is as if a 
new hut has slid in to replace the old one. The other theatrical device is used after 
Genjuro falls asleep and the ghost of Miyagi waits for daybreak. In terms of screen time, 
it is roughly a minute, but the changes in the light penetrating the house from outside 
suggest that several hours have passed in story time. In cinema this is usually 
accomplished through dissolves or other types of editing within the scene, but the 
discipline of the long take requires the use of this theatrical device, common in a medium 
that, as mentioned, routinely tells its stories in a series of long takes.
275
 
 
Even the second long take depicting the transition from night to dawn where the ghost-wife 
quietly watches over her family succeeds, in the gentlest way, in making the transcendental seem 
completely ordinary, almost as if the two qualities have become interchangeable. For over the 
course of about a minute as witnessed by the audience, beams of light stream through the cracks 
in the doors and walls of the hut, showing that the temporal passing within the film‘s setting has 
in fact occurred on an hourly basis. This second long take is rarely discussed in analyses of 
Ugetsu. Nevertheless, it remains a classic long take without any cuts and dissolves, nor even the 
slightest disruption, seamlessly bridging the early morning that is no longer accommodating 
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ghostly entities with the night immediately passed where the physical world and the 
transcendental world interact as if they are one and the same. The same sense of seamlessness 
even applies to the sacralisation of a prostitute-beggar in The Life of Oharu (1952) where the 
lowliest in society is bestowed hierophanic significance, further showing that the distinction 
between high (the sacred) and low (the prostitute) does not actually exist. The woman‘s sacrifice 
is portrayed in such a heightened way that her forbearing virtues become associated with a 
religious solemnity. Such sacred qualities arise from insurmountable difficulty and conflict 
causing Oharu to suffer in unresolvable despair. The climax of the film occurs when Oharu is 
given permission to see her teenage son, even though she is not allowed to be physically near 
him. She had been used as a procreative instrument by a feudal lord, and was thrown out of the 
house soon after she gave birth. The film is not religiously specific, or rather it is not religiously 
limited. It is a revelation of an innate predisposition to seek the most illuminating positive 
solutions amidst the most acutely negative circumstances. The impulse to withdraw into a non-
physical source that has the power to rise above the most unmerciful of external limitations is 
certainly not a determinant of any one specific religion. In fact Eliade would argue that this inner 
grace — the capacity to experience oneness with a higher power — is an unconditional quality 
of homo religiosus, and Artaud would further argue that inner grace reveals itself when external 
conditions and the individual‘s state of consciousness converge in ways that are conducive for 
this grace (which is a creative life force in itself) to be channelled forth. The task then is to 
analyse a scene that captures the dignity and humility as ritualistically expressed by a fallen 
woman in such a way that we can intuit the gesture as being innately graceful, in a sense that it is 
operating from a sacred source within. 
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The last scene then becomes one of the clearer exhibitions of the sacralisation of a lone woman 
who has not only come to have no value in the eyes of society but has also been completely 
disgarded by it. Reduced to a streetwalker without possessions, Oharu spends her later days 
begging from door to door. She walks passed a backdrop of architectural silhouettes while a 
chorus sings a prayer to accompany the solemnity and poignancy of the scene. The camera pans 
slowly along with her pace. She then ritualistically clasps her hands to pay her respects to what 
appears to be a temple, and the camera ceases to move as she performs her gesture. She proceeds 
to walk on, the camera starting again to pan slowly across the architectural silhouettes, still 
observing her pace. One begins to receive the impression that this gradual panning is much like a 
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metaphorical unrolling of a widely horizontal calligraphy scroll as it is being read. Then quite 
subtly, the camera stops moving, especially so that she walks passed the screen, disappearing 
thereafter. The film ends precisely with the still image of the architectural silhouettes, with 
Oharu having already left the camera behind. The anonymity with which she finally disappears 
from the edge of the frame alludes to an ultimate detachment from societal standards. It must be 
noted here that the gesture of quiet reverence and its interactive relationship with the elevated 
background setting (almost as if the set is living and breathing in response to the prostitute-
beggar‘s meditative walk) are very much aligned with Artaud‘s concept of intuiting the animistic 
aspects or rather the inter-dimensional nature of a gesture. Although the following passage is 
immediately referring to actors in Balinese theatre, the same principle of considering the organic 
wholeness of the gestural fusion with the set still applies to the ending of The Life of Oharu: 
‗These actors with their geometric robes seem to be animated hieroglyphs…these spiritual signs 
have a precise meaning which strikes us only intuitively but with enough violence to make 
useless any translation into logical discursive language.‘276 Significantly, Artaud mentions the 
dress of the actor performing the gesture, and it is here that we must note that the dress 
constitutes a central contribution to the animistic power of a gesture. The very loose nature of 
Oharu‘s clothes, especially the shawl that serves as a sheathe for the bag she is carrying on her 
back, causes her to look very bulky — all the more a metaphor for all the emotional burdens she 
has had to endure throughout her life. This last scene — characterised by its gradual pace and 
peacefully sympathetic observation of a destitute, unbearably oppressed woman — shows that 
even one of lowly status such as herself can perform a gesture of grace before a grand backdrop 
resembling a lengthy horizontal painting scroll.  
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    CONCLUSION   
 
I have attempted to show that sacred cinema reflects the most profound inner need within human 
consciousness to continually seek interpretations of images, and symbols that cause us to feel 
that we are not at all isolated packages of flesh and bone, that we are extensions of a higher 
source of pure potentiality that is always inspiring us towards expanding creativity. Cinema is an 
example of an artistic interpretation that we inherently seek whose intrinsic form and structure 
reflect the operative patterns of our imagination, or more precisely the mythical aspects of our 
imagination. The fact that cinema can portray events spanning years and years, all within a space 
of, say, one minute goes to show that the cinematic structure corresponds to an individual‘s free 
will to consciously slip into an imaginary time where the physical law of starting point-
destination (in other words, having to undergo certain sequential points in order to get from A to 
B) does not apply. Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to hold to a position that we as 
homo religiosus have an innate cinematic imagination — an imaginative capacity to consistently 
create visual and aural scenarios that help us to feel aligned with the greater purpose of a cosmic 
universe. This position significantly converges with that of Rachel Moore whose last paragraph 
in the Conclusion of Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic conveys magic as the most deep-
seated need, as can be seen in the attitudes and behaviour of small children who strive to believe 
in its existence, constantly seeking ways to assure them of that magical reality: 
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Most of us can recall, somewhere in the pockets of childhood memory, the time when 
someone, not without a small amount of glee, exposed magic as a sham. The 
confirmation that magic really works, incessantly tested by children, is inevitably denied 
one disenchanting day. Mine was when Miss K. informed me that Mary Poppins was all a 
movie trick; she couldn‘t really fly. My daughter‘s was when she looked out at Sydney 
Harbour for the fairies I had assured her would glide across the water and all she saw 
were ferryboats. Could not the question of credulity of the spectator, of the degree to 
which seeing is believing, take part in the same enchanted desire to determine the 
efficacy of magic so worried by children? Unlike most cultures, our culture operates with 
a remarkably inelastic spirit world and is the only one in which people don‘t devote a fair 
amount of time and money to some magical form of ritual healing, a divination, or spirit 
possession. The camera is our one magical tool flush with animistic power to possess, 
enchant, travel through time and space, and bewitch.
277
 In light of this, our theoretical 
speculations about the cinema are akin to the child looking furtively behind the curtain or 
checking out Santa‘s beard, whether to debunk the magician — or to conform that there 
                                                          
277
 ‗In 1926 Jean Epstein warned: ―But the young black who used to kneel in worship before the 
headlights on explorers‘ cars is now driving a taxi in Paris and New York. We had best not lag behind this 
black.‖ Cinema appeared as a magical god, not to the primitive this time, but to the civilized. Cinema, 
whose power was evident but not understood, threatened or, alternatively, promised to recast the 
enlightened as archaic once again. Early theoretical writing on the cinema often enacts an encounter with 
the primitive wherein the audience is poised wonderstruck before the screen‘s bright lights. But this 
example goes further upstream. Here, ―the black‖ shares an affinity with technology. The anxiety here is 
that the camera may well be that primitive, and it is the civilized who must hasten to avoid the headlights‘ 
blinding glare. Technology, an attribute of civilized society against which those upstream define those 
who live downstream (and in so doing, themselves), becomes, in the case of the image-producing 
machine, the very mark of their own primitiveness.‘ (Savage Theory, pp. 22-3.)   
266 
 
is such a thing as magic. The question of the degree to which cinema affects real life, like 
the issue of whether or not magic really works, is moot. The point remains that we, now, 
do not work without it.‘278 
 
Whether the trusting nature of children would lead to positive or negative consequences, the 
importance lies in the trust that they place upon the inter-dimensionality of existence, that the 
deep anchorage into the construct of exclusive physicality is for a credulous child a limitation 
which can have near-crippling effects upon the imagination (in fact, this crippling can be equated 
to modern secularisation‘s obstruction of mythical/sacred imagination). Considering that the 
capacity of our physical senses is something that we instinctively know (e.g. we know from a 
very early age that if we touch something that is too hot, we will get burnt), children remain 
ignorant of the difference between that which is empirically verifiable (that which can be 
physically quantified and assessed) and that which is not. Children already know what their 
physical senses can access (e.g. they know through experience that they cannot see something 
that is too far away, without having to be taught), in other words they know their own physical 
limits simply by testing it out as they grow up. It follows that they should also know the 
difference between that which exists as a reality and that which does not. But no, they do not 
seem to register such a difference. Moore‘s example of her daughter‘s disappointment at not 
seeing fairies glide across the water goes to show that seeing fairies may indeed be a child‘s 
expectation. Regardless of whether her mother had told her that she would see the fairies, the 
child still expects to see, hear, and feel things which adults and mainstream secular culture write 
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off as being completely and utterly non-existent. This expectation that predominantly 
characterises the elementary stages of human development may be a reflection of certain innate 
predispositions within our consciousness that do not demarcate between the realm of physical 
possibility and that which lies outside of it. Correspondingly, the mythical dimension does not at 
all exclude physicality, but presents an alternative reality that can offer relief and even escape 
should physical reality prove to be too burdensome. Here, Eliade fully acknowledges the child‘s 
very spontaneous ease of entry into a state of consciousness that is at one with illo tempore: 
 
At the very beginning of his Autobiography he quite candidly tells of an event when he 
was four or five years old, walking with his grandfather on the Strada Mare in Tecuci, 
when his eyes met those of a fellow toddler, also walking with her grandfather. 
 
For several seconds we stared at each other before our grandfathers pulled us on down 
the street. I didn’t know what had happened to me; I felt only that something 
extraordinary and decisive had occurred. In fact, that very evening I discovered that it 
was enough for me to visualize the image from Strada Mare in order to feel myself 
slipping into a state of bliss I had never known…For years the image of the girl on 
Strada Mare was a kind of secret talisman for me, because it allowed me to take refuge 
instantly in that fragment of incomparable time.
279
 (Autobiography, vol. I, 4) 
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Shortly thereafter, although the occasion seems to be chronologically earlier, Eliade 
relates another incident in which he entered a room into which he was not normally 
allowed to go: 
 
the next moment I was transfixed with emotion. It was as if I had entered a fairy-tale 
palace. The roller-blinds and the heavy curtains of green velvet were drawn. The room 
was pervaded by an eerie iridescent light…As was true also of the image of the little girl 
from Strada Mare, I could later evoke at will that green fairyland…I practiced for many 
years this exercise of recapturing the epiphanic moment, and would always find again the 
same plenitude. I would slip into it as into a fragment of time devoid of duration — 
without beginning and without end.
280
 (7) 
 
The very phrases are obviously meant to recall his theory of eternal return; the ―fragment 
of incomparable time‖, the ―epiphanic moment‖, ―devoid of duration‖, which he can later 
―evoke at will‖ is evidently an echo of illud tempus which later animates his 
apprehension of religious life. This is not to say that Eliade‘s theories are based on mere 
subjective experience, grotesquely expanded to subsume all of the spiritual experiences 
of humanity. Eliade did not begin writing his memoirs until the 1960s, and these events 
were supposed to have taken place in 1910 or 1911. It is rather the vocabulary of his 
theories which shapes his later descriptions. Nor would Eliade, after a lifetime of 
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academic involvement, be ignorant of the accusations such a description could evoke. I 
believe that he is quite deliberately revealing that he considered this subjective 
experience of re-actualizable, non-chronological time to be an elementary human 
experience, and furthermore that subjective experience is not ―mere‖ but is in fact the 
source of hierophany.
281
   
 
Bryan Rennie‘s interpretation that subjectivity is integral to the hierophanic experience has 
significant implications, especially concerning the absolute inseparability between subjectivity 
and objectivity. In fact, objectivity is implied here as a direct product of subjectivity itself. The 
supremacy of subjectivity means that there can be no external experience that does not converge 
in some way to certain operative patterns within the consciousness — or to put it more 
colloquially, there is no such thing as an ‗out-there‘ that is completely out there. In other words, 
there are no ‗victims‘ as such to undesirable circumstances (despite the fact that on the surface 
the action-reaction structure between victim and perpetrator does seem like a sound and valid 
identification), but there are ‗volunteers‘ who on a very profound level (some would even call it 
a ‗soul‘ level) have made an agreement to participate in whatever unwanted experience for 
specific reasons. By extension, there is no such thing as experiences that randomly assert 
themselves into our lives, but instead there are occurrences that again coincide with whatever 
(so-called) invisible signals that we are transmitting from within (e.g. Suppose if we find 
ourselves waiting for an airplane flight that is very badly delayed, we may not have actually 
caused the delay ourselves. But there are certain operative patterns within our consciousness that 
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have caused us to rendezvous with a delayed flight.) Subjectivity, as Rennie conceives of it (he 
refers to subjectivity as a ‗source‘282), then becomes a primary attractor of whatever occurrences 
we encounter — an grand attracting mechanism operating within a cosmic universe that in itself 
is a unified, magnetic field. Following Jean Epstein‘s theory of animistic cinema that I had 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Moore suggests much the same thing about the subjectivity of the 
lens that not only manipulates, but also extracts and generates poetic interconnections between 
the essences of things, transforming a thing into a person and a person into a thing: 
  
The lens has a subjectivity of its own…The lens itself seems caught in the never-ending 
spiral twisting people into things and things into people…The lens has the guile of an 
ingénue, the emotions of an executioner.
283
 
 
To transform a thing into a person is to cause the life force within the object to emerge and 
display itself through the images that play out, although the reverse process — which is to 
transform a person into a thing — is another matter altogether. This latter almost become a 
commodification of the person, in turn reflecting what Moore refers to as the ‗guile‘ of the lens 
to be able to take away the gift of aggrandising the life force that it had initially bestowed upon 
what it is filming. From a broader perspective, the lens is a giver and a taker — a liminal entity 
that simultaneously brings out the inner qualities of what it is capturing in such an intimate way, 
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yet at the same time it may coldly distance itself at any moment, causing the lens to be neither 
here nor there, breaking the mould of localised identity. The analogy of the Chinese/Japanese 
ink painting that I had discussed in various important places throughout this dissertation becomes 
an accurate metaphor for the animistic camera whose purpose appears to be the loosening and 
even the transformation of the ways in which boundaries between individuals, collectives, and 
geographical regions are drawn. The lens does not actually draw boundaries between the filmed 
images and the spectator, for being ‗drawn‘ means that the mark is made without much leeway 
for perspectives to shift. Rather, boundaries laid out by the animistic lens are considered and re-
considered in completely open-ended ways while catering for creative uniqueness and diversity 
that are always subject to change. Even the degree of intensity characterising the manner in 
which the lens is focusing upon its subject can be metaphorically ‗thickened‘ and ‗thinned‘ — a 
process of interweaving different points of transition that is also prevalent in an artist‘s treatment 
of ink. For although decisions concerning the concentration or dilution of the ink are made prior 
to the brush‘s contact with the rice paper or silk cloth, there is always a significant degree of 
unpredictability as to how the paint and the painting surface would interact, considering also that 
the surface‘s manner of absorption of the paint cannot actually be controlled, but can only be 
gently directed by the artist. Correspondingly, what happens in front of the lens is always 
characterised by varying degrees of spontaneity, and there are certainly elements that do not 
operate according to any rule-book or control measure. Moore‘s statement that the lens has its 
own subjectivity suggests that whatever is being experienced (e.g. the seemingly objective reality 
in front of the lens) cannot be excluded in any clear-cut way from the state of consciousness of 
the one experiencing the phenomenon (e.g. the artist operating the camera), just as the mirror and 
whatever it is reflecting remain inseparable — an idea that becomes all the more pronounced 
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when contrasting qualities are closely interacting with each other in fusion more than anything 
else, as in the case for ink painting. The implication here is that things that are interacting must 
share certain likenesses, however subtle; one cannot say that this thing has such and such 
qualities and that other thing does not have them at all under any and all conditions, because if 
those two things did not share some degree of similarity, they would not be interacting with each 
other. Thus, the lens does have mirror-like qualities reflecting the imaginative perspective of the 
artist — a focus that shifts between inner and outer worlds with unnoticeable ease, almost 
causing these two worlds to become interchangeable in the poetic sense. This state of in-
betweenness profoundly converges with the ma interval that I had discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3 and to a lesser extent in Chapter 4. Richard Pilgrim‘s interpretation presents ma not 
only as constituting an interstitial moment identical to illo tempore, but also as a fusion between 
subjectivity and objectivity that births a new dimension — ‗a third place‘ very much resembling 
the avant-garde hybrid creation that is birthed from the fusion of vanguard and rearguard. It must 
be noted however that not every avant-garde phenomenon can be considered ma-like, especially 
if the respective phenomenon is situated within a secular context that does not recognise the 
inter-dimensionality of existence, the example of Futurism which I had briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 1 being one such case (although the hierophanic moments in the avant-garde films that I 
have analysed in this dissertation are certainly ma-like; in fact, their ma qualities determined my 
selection criteria). Pilgrim continues: 
 
Jean Herbert…reports that ―Shinto insistently claims to be a religion of the ‗middle-now‘, 
the ‗eternal present‘…‖ 
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…Such is the case with the kehai [signs] of kami [sacred beings] as well, where kami 
come and go into the interstices of being but leave their faint signs, and where sensitive 
humans, by emptying themselves into the midst of now (naka ima) may directly 
experience the time/space gods embodied — however fleetingly — in the signs, sounds, 
and sights of the world. It is an ―experiential, mysterious place‖ created as a third place 
between all other places and as an accumulation of experienced ch’i beyond all 
distinctions, boundaries, orders, and descriptive constructs.
284
 
  
Pilgrim‘s interpretation offers the following descriptions of the ―ma‖ interval that can be equally 
applied to illo tempore: the ‗middle-now‘, the ‗eternal present‘, and even ‗faint signs‘. These 
descriptions suggest the experience of eternity through a point in time where temporal 
irreversibility is no longer a constraining factor within the immediate moment — in other words, 
ma is the re-discovery of an eternity that lies latent beneath that marker on the timeline. The 
implication here, especially if we are consistently keeping Eliade‘s illo tempore in mind, is that it 
is the eternity characterising mythical (non-linear) time that gave birth to its extension, which is 
linear time. So mythical time and linear time may outwardly appear like opposites, but ultimately 
they cannot be opposites, precisely because a certain source cannot give birth to something 
without that something carrying at least some properties of its own source. The experience of an 
interval of eternity necessitates a receptive state of consciousness where the world‘s troubles are 
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temporarily forgotten, as can be seen in Chapter 4 where the character Genjuro re-unites with his 
ghost-wife (who herself is a form of kami). Yet even before the re-union, he had been invited 
into the mansion of another ghost woman (Lady Wakasa), an instance described by Mark Le 
Fanu as a transition that hardly even presents itself as a transition, due to the detached but 
fascinated way in which our absorption into a ‗dream‘ (here alluding to Artaud‘s dream cinema) 
causes us to lose conscious awareness of the actual passing of events (we must note that illo 
tempore is also a detachment from the passing of linear time). The implication here is that the 
other world and the immediate physical world are metaphorically rolled into one: 
  
Granted, then, that the lady who materialises out of nowhere, as the peasant is selling his 
pots in the marketplace, should dazzle him out of his wits, it is not an additional surprise 
(indeed it is a positive aspect of the enchantment) that she should come from literally 
another world and another age. Everything about the lady is old-fashioned: that is here 
rarified charm. Few things in the finished film are handled more suavely, I think, than the 
way Mizoguchi governs the transition between the real, present-tense world of war of 
survival and making a living, and the archaic imagined world of art and luxury and erotic 
reverie into which Genjuro is irresistibly drawn. The viewer does not feel (any more than 
Genjuro does) the sudden break or sharp contrast that might be felt to exist between the 
marketplace and mansion-house. For it is part of the magic of dreaming that distinctions 
of time — distinctions of epoch — have no special meaning or significance.285 
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 Architecture and Film Hierophany 
     This episode in Ugetsu has helped me to conceive of the possibility that a further area of 
research that this dissertation could lead to is the intimate relationship between architecture and 
the intrinsic form and structure of sacred cinema. An effective example is shown upon Genjuro‘s 
entry into Lady Wakasa‘s mansion that is also a world inhabited by ghosts. The following image 
depicts two servants ritualistically lighting candles, viewed diagonally from across the garden. 
 
Despite the dominance of squares (the garden itself is a square, although we only see a small 
segment of it in this image), rectangles, and right angles in this image, it does not at all convey 
any sense of rigidity or sharpness about it. What softens the clean, hard shapes are the very 
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serene and quiet nocturnal atmosphere as well as the gentle, light-footed way in which the 
servants are kneeling and walking. Even the accompanying flute music is light and fleeting with 
many breaks and pauses; indeed if illustrated children‘s literature depicting an escape into a fairy 
world were to have music accompanying every page, this would be the kind of music to be 
selected. From a symbolic standpoint, the three windows directly correspond to Pilgrim‘s 
interpretation of ma as ‗a third place‘ in a sense that this immediate moment constitutes a hybrid 
dimension birthed from the fusion between subjectivity and objectivity, even between home and 
displacement: ‗It is an ―experiential, mysterious place‖ created as a third place between all other 
places and as an accumulation of experienced ch’i beyond all distinctions, boundaries, orders, 
and descriptive constructs.‘286 The three sliding windows serve as a latticed veil between this 
ghostly residence and the human world outside — the latticed pattern itself metaphorically 
constituting a grid of many, many windows within a larger window (or in this case, three 
windows), the notions of extra-sensory vision and widely multiplying perspectives becoming 
inevitable associations. Corresponding, Larry Shiner offers an elaborate interpretation of 
architectural hierophany that bears many points of resonance with the above image, as he 
incorporates the role of hard machinery into the discussion which evidently converges with the 
theme of angularity in Lady Wakasa‘s residence: 
  
Although modern building, siting, and town planning has produced much that reflects 
mere economic and political expediency, there are places and buildings which do embody 
and define spaces of great power. To take an unlikely example, consider the ascent in the 
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Eiffel Tower, that product of mechanical industry and pure engineering. As a result of the 
interplay of inner and outer space through the open framework, the lightness of the whole 
as compared to the massive steel beams, the constantly changing perspective as we move 
to a vantage looking over the whole of the city lying astride the Seine, we look down on 
the order and unity of the city like gods and we find this most mechanistic of structures 
on which we stand, to be an expression of spirit, of light, of air, of constantly 
interpenetrating spaces. Or consider Frank Lloyd Wright‘s famous ―Falling Water‖ where 
the chtonian resonances are countered by the abundance of light and the plasticity of 
interior spaces while its massive stone and concrete exterior forms bespeak endurance. It 
uses the products of the machine to triumph over the merely mechanical and functional, 
to reinstate the spirit of the waters, of the earth and woods, and to shelter and give free 
space for the spirit of man.
287
  
 
Similar to my interpretation of the latticed pattern on the sliding windows, Shiner also describes 
the ‗open framework‘ of the Eiffel Tower serving as a central point interconnecting the infinitely 
diverse avenues and vantage points throughout the entire city. Walking along any street in Paris 
with a view of the Eiffel Tower standing tall behind an alignment of old apartment buildings, one 
does feel that the steel structure composed of web-like criss-crossings of beams is quite 
omnisciently watching over us. Shiner also suggests that Frank Lloyd Wright‘s ―Falling Water‖ 
is mechanical structure that has transcended its own mechanical nature, precisely because it is 
nestled within a forest environment, rather resembling a deep basin built into the bottom of a 
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hollow hidden away in an innermost garden. Similar to the case of the smoothed angularity in the 
image set in Lady Wakasa‘s residence, the strength and mass of Wright‘s architectural structure 
are neutralised by the waterfall as well as the abundant greenery that appears to reach forward to 
cradle the house, transforming architecture into something far beyond a mere construct with the 
function of a dwelling place: ‗An amazing animism is restored to the world. We know now, once 
we‘ve seen it, that we are surrounded by inhuman living things.‘288 Epstein is proposing here that 
other living things can also possess human-like characteristics, and that being ‗human‘ is not at 
all a quality that should be limited to those who are biologically human. But of course, the 
concept of film hierophany that I have attempted to put forward throughout this disseration 
encompasses far more than those things that are conventionally considered to be ‗living‘, which 
is why the idea of living architecture as portrayed in sacred cinema becomes a new direction that 
is full of potential. This principle — that there are things normally considered inanimate that also 
have a latent interactive life force — is directly applied in Ron Fricke‘s Baraka (1992), a non-
narrated experimental documentary that puts into practice the ideas on film poetry and spatial 
poetry that I have extensively discussed throughout. Baraka is possibly one of the most grand 
and splendourous cinematic portrayals of hierophanic architecture to date, other masterpieces of 
a similar dedication being Luca Guadagnino‘s I Am Love (2009) and of course Nathanial Kahn‘s 
documentary My Architect: A Son’s Journey (2003). Yet Baraka remains one of the most 
profound expressions of a universal poetry beyond words (very literally, as there is not one word 
of spoken narration throughout the film) — not only beyond words, but perhaps even prior to 
words, referring to that pre-cultured state where acquired information has not yet taken a 
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dominant hold of individual attitudes and behaviour; so this is a creation of doco-poetry that 
Artaud would have been proud of, most likely. Baraka is filmed on location in 24 countries, 
which does support its underlying foundation of universal poetry, although I would argue that 
even if the filming was done in only one country, the artistry with which the film is composed 
would still demonstrate those same universal qualities.  
 
There is a very brief but momentous segment in the film where ma architecture is poetically 
fused with a natural formation, the quality that makes such a fusion so impressively executed is 
the very fact that the architecture and the natural formation do not even belong in the same 
image, and are most certainly located in different countries. It is the intrinsic film form that 
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entirely determines this poetic fusion between nature‘s creation and human-made structures. The 
image of a monk with his back to the camera takes place in Tokyo, Japan. He sits at an opening 
between two sliding doors, looking out towards what appears to be an elevated extension of a 
building with a traditional-style roof with ash-coloured tiles rather resembling dragon‘s scales. 
Evidently, this image is not completely symmetrical, but it does seem to generate a sense of 
being perfectly proportioned, especially so that the ma state of in-betweenness is constructed in a 
manner that seems to be carefully staged and even mathematically aligned. The monk sits in 
meditation, perhaps contemplating upon other realities that expand beyond the immediate 
architectural structure before him — although this causes us to consider alternative possibilities, 
that for instance if the elevated building extension were not there, this image simply would not 
express this elevated state of grace and serenity. For there would be nothing outwardly present 
for the monk to contemplate upon, causing this very brief sequence to be quite bland. And 
suppose if the building did not have such a height to it, we would not be able to see it because the 
monk would be blocking the view. In fact, the relationship between the height of the building 
extension and the height of the monk himself as well as his positioning appears to be perfectly 
calculated. The crown of his head rests just immediately below the lowest line of the roof; if the 
head was any lower or any higher, this image would not have accomplished such sophisticated 
balance. There is a cut to a close-up of the back of the monk‘s head, again poised perfectly in the 
middle of the opening of the sliding window. There is then another cut to a mid-shot of an 
opening in a massive rock formation, this time located on a sea-shore in Big Sur, California. The 
camera slowly zooms closer and closer to the opening through which the waves are channeling 
through and splashing against the rock‘s surface. This zooming magnifies the poetic convergence 
between the opening in the rock formation and the previous opening between the sliding doors 
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only a moment ago in Tokyo. There is a final cut to a wide-shot of the opening in the rock 
formation where we see the water spread passed the opening, expanding upon the shore in a 
manner not dissimilar to a release. 
 
The waves have grown tired from travelling immeasurable distances. They channel through this 
small opening — nature‘s interval — which serves as a final transition to the shore. Although 
contrasted from the previous ma moment — composed to accomplish high standards of internal 
framing (using certain components within the image to aesthetically frame certain others) — the 
sequence successfully transforms architecture into a living being whose consciousness 
experiences moments of rest and release from its normal functions, much like the waves. 
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The avant-garde as a state of consciousness and further directions in film hierophany 
     This dissertation had led me to a position that the avant-garde is universal and innate within 
the consciousness, much like the sacred. I could not offer such a position from the beginning 
because then there would be a danger that I would have to study films from many different 
countries and from many time periods, and that would not be manageable. Thus far, it suffices 
that the case studies I have presented convey mythical themes, images, and symbols that do 
operate on a universal level, even if the methods of expression and manifested results are 
divergent. We must keep in mind however that while hierophany and the avant-garde share 
certain structural relationships, only some avant-garde phenomena can be considered sacred. 
Renato Poggioli remains the only theorist of the avant-garde to propose an avant-garde psychic 
state that dictates behaviour, similar to a vibrational mediator transmitting instructive signals: 
I mean the instinctive forces and primary currents…: psychic seeds or roots, often to be 
perceived under the form of irreducible or unsuppressable idiosyncracies. And by 
ideology I mean the rationalization of these forms, currents, or residues into formulas of 
logic: their translation into theory, their reduction to programs and manifestos, their 
hardening into positions or even ―poses‖. In fact, an ideology is not only the logical (or 
pseudological) justification of a psychic state, but also the crystallization of a still fluid 
and suspended sentimental condition into a behavioral code even before it has 
crystallized into work or action.
289
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Poggioli describes a psychic state as a ‗condition‘ and ideology as ‗code‘, with the former always 
preceding and dictating the latter to the point where, if the former did not exist, the latter would 
not have a source from which to be executed. A code — in this instance, a socialised code — is a 
structured method of conduct that is understood and shared by the relevant individuals.
290
 The 
psychic state as a ‗condition‘, on the other hand, remains a state of consciousness, rather than a 
commonly visible phenomenon. In the latter half of the text, Poggioli cites Freud in direct 
association with depth psychology, and that from such a perspective, a work of art can contain 
within it both psychic value and therapeutic qualities: ‗Modern depth psychology, from Freud 
on, is not limited to looking at the elements of a work of art only as psychic symbols…it…also 
functions as private therapy for the individual artist.‘291 Ideology then is a behavioural extension 
of the psychic condition. The inextricable link between ideology and psychic state completely 
converges with Poggioli‘s presentation of the interrelationship between what he refers to as 
‗currents‘ and ‗movements‘:  
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…at times there are more vast and vague cultural manifestations which we more suitably 
label ―currents‖. ―Current‖…seems especially to allude to vital forces, intuitive and 
unconscious elements, tendencies rather than groups…Thus its validity is limited to 
generalized and unstable orientations, cultural situations more in potential than in 
execution, to tendencies in a fluid or raw state. Briefly, it indicates environmental factors 
only translatable with difficulty into terms of historical consciousness and theoretical 
awareness. ―Movement‖, on the other hand, is a technical term…appropriate to art 
history and literary criticism, insofar as both are concrete history and specific criticism.
292
 
 
Poggioli describes currents as ‗vast‘, ‗vague‘, ‗intuitive‘, ‗unstable‘, ‗fluid‘, and ‗raw‘. And he 
describes movements as ‗technical‘, ‗concrete‘, and ‗specific‘ — adjectives suggesting 
movements to be verifiable occurrences that are empirically observable. As he describes currents 
as ‗fluid‘ and movements as ‗concrete‘, the water metaphor implies that the latter is a direct 
transformation from the former. We must first consider the fact that water is the only element 
that can exist in a multitude of states ranging from fluid to frozen to vapourous. An avant-garde 
movement then is an identifiably localised version of a current. Furthermore, Poggioli describes 
currents as ‗unstable‘ and ‗translatable with difficulty into terms of historical consciousness and 
theoretical awareness‘, implying that currents constitute the thought forms that have not (yet) 
emerged with any tangible evidence. If currents remain within the state of pre-emergence, then 
movements are actively operating in a state of full emergence in the public arena. The fluid state 
(the current) is ever-capable of being contained within any shape or mould. The solidified state 
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(the movement) has in and of itself become shaped and moulded. Perhaps, Artaud also alludes to 
a similar idea of renewal and regeneration from a seminal fluid state: ‗The actor does not make 
the same gestures twice, but he makes gestures, he moves; and although he brutalizes forms, 
nevertheless behind them and through their destruction he rejoins that which outlives forms and 
produces their continuation.‘293 The implication here is while appearances would suggest that 
there is outward repetition in the form and choreography of certain theatrical gestures, there is no 
way that it can be considered repetition from the mythical perspective. The analogy here is that 
one can never jump into the same river twice, precisely because the river is always flowing, and 
would never wait nor pause for any cause. So what outwardly appears to be repetitious becomes 
transformed into an embodiment of expanding newness.  
 
     This avant-garde state of consciousness can be applied to the kind of sacred cinema that is 
entirely devoted to liminality as a determining foundation (one such example of a liminal state is 
the ma interval). The main character of this potential area of research is Victor Turner who 
describes liminality as ‗interposed between stretches of ‗ordinary‘ time, or occur[ring] either in 
places ‗set apart] from ordinary activities or temporarily changed in nature to accommodate 
ritual action.‘294 The purpose then is to discern a liminal dimension that is simultaneously sacred 
and avant-garde (avant-garde in a sense that it is a new hybridity resulting from the fusion of two 
or more states), which I am proposing should be referred to as the ‗fairy dimension‘ — the 
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analysis of cinematic portrayals of this perplexing half-world somewhere along the conjoining 
pivot between Heaven and Earth.
295
 The ‗ritual action‘, as Turner refers to it, is almost entirely 
defined by rare, mysterious, and mesmerizing characteristics, involving some form of travelling 
to, within, and from the liminal realm or the fairy dimension itself (in this dissertation, this form 
of travelling/transportation features in Cocteau‘s Orpheus and Mizoguchi‘s Ugetsu). The ritual 
travelling ‗reveals, however fleetingly, some recognition (in symbol if not always in 
language)‘296 of a dimension inhabited by divine earthlings — fairy-folk — who share a 
converging earthly realm with the mortal world, but who carry out an aloof existence. Fairytales, 
and other tales of the strange and enchanting, often describe the fairy dimension as a magical 
realm elusive to human perception. The elusiveness of the fairy dimension is accentuated 
through nostalgic overtones of traditional story-telling methods exemplified in iconic starting 
lines, such as ‗Once upon a time‘, or the Arabic equivalent ‗It was and was not so‘. Even those 
phrases are entirely characterised by liminality, yet selecting films that convey the 
simultaneously sacred and avant-garde nature of the fairy dimension is certainly not as simple as 
such opening lines may sound. For we must also keep in mind that many mainstream movies do 
occasionally feature some avant-garde elements. Hollywood blockbusters such The Lord of the 
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Rings (2001-3) and The Hobbit (2012) are effective examples of portrayals of the fairy 
dimension that truly do raise the bar in terms of cinema‘s imaginative potential. There are also 
films that have enormous popular value (as can be seen in the case for Hong Kong‘s intensely 
star-driven movie industry) that do in fact show an impressive range of avant-garde qualities. 
Tsui Hark‘s Green Snake (1993) features the widest variety of water states (in fact, I would 
argue that it would be difficult if not impossible to find any other film that features such aquatic 
variety), most of which the fairy beings in the film (the snake women) have a sacred affinity 
with: rain, mists, fog, streams, lakes, ponds, home baths, steam, snow, floods. Its anchorage in 
fluidity cause the fairy dimension to be detached from any finalised concrete form, as water is a 
symbol of purity in itself. In Annette Michelson‘s interpretation of Maya Deren‘s cinematic 
ideals, she describes ‗a cinema that would offer, as no other medium can, ―real toads in 
imaginary gardens‖...‘297, which is a metaphorical definition of the fairy dimension itself. This 
dimension is retained in the realm of the terrestrial — tangible and accessible to earthlings who 
remain bound by mortal flesh. This terrestrial nature stands for the aspect that is the most 
immediately ‗real‘, equivalent to Michelson‘s metaphor of ―real toads‖. At the same time, the 
fairy dimension is blessed with unfathomable, divine qualities — this divine nature constituting 
the aspect equivalent to Michelson‘s metaphor of ―imaginary gardens‖. Here, the integration of 
the ‗real‘ and the ‗imaginary‘ generates an overriding liminal quality, giving rise to an avant-
garde film form which ultimately does not posit any distinction between that which is imagined 
and that which is not, expanding further and further our definition what reality actually is. 
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